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 ABSTRACT 
 
 A Theory of Knowledge 
 
 by Frode Bjordal 
 
In this dissertation I present a new solution to the 
renowned Gettier problem.  My solution, which in a 
sense represents a defense of a rather traditional 
epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction 
between primary and secondary beliefs.  I argue that 
primary beliefs are known iff justified and true, 
whereas secondary beliefs are known iff they are 
believed on the basis of a known primary belief.  Much 
emphasis is put upon defending this approach against 
potential objections, but I also draw some 
epistemological and semantical consequences pertaining 
to such issues as the nature of epistemological 
justification, the Lottery Paradox, philosophical 
skepticism and the semantics of belief contexts. 
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 Introduction and overview 
 
In 1963 Edmund Gettier1 launched his well known and 
decisive criticism against a traditional analysis of 
knowledge according to which knowledge simply is the 
same as justified true belief.  Gettier's criticism 
has generated at least four types of responses.  (1) 
Some think that we should just give up trying to find 
an analysis of knowledge, (2) some people have 
suggested additional conditions that must hold if we 
know something, (3) others have suggested quite 
different analyses (like e.g. the causal analysis) of 
knowledge, and (4) others still have suggested a 
strengthening of the justification condition as the 
way out of the Gettier problem.   
 
It is not our purpose in this essay to discuss and 
evaluate the different responses to the Gettier 
problem.  I have mentioned the different kinds of 
responses in order to illustrate how my own response 
is related to the others.  The analysis that I will 
eventually propose might be said to fit into the 
                     
1.In "Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?",  
Analysis, 23 (1963), 121 - 123. 
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second type of response, because it introduces an 
extra structural requirement for knowledge when the 
belief of what is known is what I call a secondary 
belief.  But such a characterization would be somewhat 
misleading, for the analysis that I offer is a 
traditional analysis in the sense that the only 
epistemic requirements for knowledge are 
justification, truth and belief.  This might seem 
paradoxical as it stands, but will, I hope, become 
clearer at a later point in this exposition. 
 
In the first chapter I argue that any further 
epistemic conditions which one may suggest as a 
necessary condition for knowledge can be built into 
the justification condition.  I illustrate this by 
showing how a defeasibility condition can be built 
into our notion of justification by ascribing to it a 
certain recursive property.  I then argue that any 
such approach is bound to fail if it fulfills certain 
adequacy requirements which I find it implausible to 
deviate from.  In a second section to the first 
chapter I point out that there are some conflicting 
intuitions in the literature which justify us in not 
counting certain alleged Gettier-like counterexamples 
as genuine counter examples. 
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The ground work of my essay's constructive proposals 
is done in the second chapter, where a diagnosis of 
the Gettier problem is presented.  I then go on to 
discuss and make precise a notion of having a belief 
since some other belief is held. I show that the 
relation is transitive, and introduce a distinction 
between primary and secondary beliefs.   
 
In chapter III a more thorough treatment of the 
distinction between primary and secondary beliefs is 
given.  I make use of the fact that the relation of 
having a belief since some other belief is held is 
transitive in order to reach the important conclusion 
that the set of primary beliefs is non-empty, and that 
any one secondary belief is held since some primary 
belief (or beliefs) is (are) held.  I then go on to 
discuss what kind of primary beliefs there are, and i 
contrast these with non-inferential beliefs. 
 
In chapter IV some set theory is used in order to 
motivate a recursive definition of knowledge that 
makes use of the distinction between primary and 
secondary beliefs.   
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Chapter V deals with six types of Gettier beliefs that 
have not been analyzed earlier in the essay, and I 
purport to show that the analysis of knowledge that I 
suggest also avoids these counter examples. 
 
In chapter VI some counter examples that have been 
used to discard some other responses to the Gettier 
problem are considered.  It seems that the analysis 
that I give is unharmed by these counter examples as 
well.   
 
In chapter VII I discuss an example which may be 
considered to be an inductive Gettier example which is 
not avoided by my definition of knowledge in chapter 
IV.  Chapter VII is divided into two sections, and the 
first section again divided into three subsections.  
In the first section I work on the basis of the 
assumption that there are genuine inductive Gettier 
examples, whereas I in the second section try to show 
that there are no genuine inductive Gettier examples.  
 
In chapter VIII I apply aspects of the theory of 
justification and knowledge that has been developed in 
order to show that we with this theory can arrive at a 
very natural solution of the lottery paradox.   
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My essay includes two appendices.  The first of these 
can be regarded as an application of the theory which 
I have offered, and the second explicates some 
semantical consequences of a disquotational principle 
which I have presupposed.  In Appendix 1 I discuss and 
discard some new interpretations of the Dream 
Argument, and then offer my own interpretation.  I end 
the appendix by giving an anti skeptical argument 
which intends to show that we indeed do know that we 
are awake.  In Appendix 2 I defend a disquotational 
principle DP which I on several occasions appeal to in 
order to ascribe beliefs to subjects.  DP depends upon 
some unorthodox semantical presuppositions which I go 
on to defend.  The semantical topics discussed in 
Appendix 2 are of philosopical interest in their own 
right, but we are for the purposes of this essay 
mainly concerned with defending the epistemological 
principle DP. 
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 I 
 
1.0 Most analyses of knowledge which have been 
proposed as solutions of the Gettier problem are based 
on an addition of further epistemic conditions or on a 
strengthening of the justification condition.  I will 
in this chapter try to argue that such solutions must 
fail.  In the first section to follow I give a 
defeasibility analysis which is based on a 
strengthening of the justification condition, and I 
then go on to argue that such an analysis along with 
other such analyses must fail.  In the second section 
I discuss the socalled social aspect of knowing, a 
category which was introduced because of an example 
given by Gilbert Harman, and I argue that the 
intuitions that underlie this and similar examples 
conflict with intuitions that underlie examples which 
have been invoked in the discussion of the 
defeasibility analyses of knowledge.  I argue that 
Harman's counter example is not a genuine counter 
example to the traditional definition of knowledge. 
 
1.1 We can think of a defeasibility analysis of 
knowledge as being of the following form: 
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S knows p  iff  1)  p is true 
      2) S believes p 
     3) S is justified in holding p 
     4) p is indefeasible 
 
A variety of explications of "p is indefeasible" have 
been suggested.2  Generally, a defeasibility condition 
has been introduced by means of a subjunctive 
conditional in such a way that p is taken to be 
indefeasible e.g. if, and only if, there is no further 
true evidence e such that if S were to believe e (or S 
were justified in holding e) then S would no longer be 
justified in believing p.   
 
A notorious problem for defeasibility analyses has 
been to avoid the consequence that a subject S does 
not know p just because there is some misleading 
evidence e.  Consider e.g. the following Tom Grabit 
example suggested by Paxson and Lehrer.3  A subject S 
                     
2. For a thorough discussion of defeasibility analyses 
and other analyses, see Robert Shope: "The Analysis of 
Knowing", Princeton University Press 1983. 
3. Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson Jr.,  Knowledge: 
Undefeated Justified True Belief. Journal of 
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believes that Tom Grabit took a book from the library 
because S believes that S saw Tom grab the book.  But 
unbeknownst to S, Tom's demented mother Mrs. Grabit 
has claimed that Tom's identical twin is a notorious 
bookthif and was at the library at the time of the 
theft whereas Tom was miles away.  In reality, 
however, Tom has no twin.  The defeasibility analysis 
here gives the counterintuitive result that S did not 
know that Tom took the book as S's justification for 
holding that Tom took the book would, it seems, be 
defeated if S were to be justified in holding that 
Tom's identical twin was in or close to the library at 
the time of the theft.  But why should Mrs. Grabit's 
false testimony matter?  It seems that S really did 
know that Tom took the book.  This is not the same as 
to say that S might not have stopped believing that 
Tom took the book if told by Mrs. Grabit that Tom's 
identical twin was in or close to the library at the 
time of the theft, whereas Tom wasn't. 
 
Many epicycles have been added to the defeasibility 
approach in order to avoid such problems as this.  Let 
us, however, assume that a defeasibility analysis can 
                                                      
Philosophy, 66: 225-237. 
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be given which avoids the counter examples given above 
with Tom Grabit's demented mother and other such 
examples which are based on the existence of defective 
defeators, i.e. misleading counter evidence.  It seems 
that if it were possible to give such a defeasibility 
analysis of knowledge by introducing a fourth 
condition, then it should also be possible to 
incorporate the defeasibility condition in the 
justification condition for knowledge.  This could 
e.g. be done by saying that a person S is justified in 
holding p if, and only if, there is no true evidence e 
such that if S were justified in holding e then S 
would no longer be justified in holding p.  The 
analysans in the previous sentence should, of course, 
be replaced by one which does avoid the Tom Grabit 
counter example and related counter examples, and also 
note that the previous sentence cannot amount to a 
definition of the notion of justification (as that 
would be circular) but can only amount to a recursive 
expression of a property which the notion of 
justification may have.  Our point here is a simple 
but general one, viz. that  knowledge in addition to 
justification, truth and belief may be transformed 
into a traditional analysis of knowledge by 
incorporating the further conditions in the 
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justification condition.  The resulting notion of 
justification may then not be our normal notion of 
justification, but that would only show that it may be 
somewhat unnatural to make such a transformation, not 
that it cannot be made.  And although it may be the 
case that the resulting notion of justification may be 
somewhat unnatural if a defeasibility condition or 
some other further conditions were built into it, we 
should on the other hand not forget but keep in mind 
that the further conditions for knowledge that have 
been proposed are in general epistemic conditions. 
 
Let me in the following, in order to support my claim 
that a defeasibility condition can be built into the 
justification condition, outline a defeasibility 
analysis of knowledge which has the defeasibility 
condition built into the justification condition.   
 
Although the analysis which I will outline in the 
following few pages is a defeasibility analysis of 
knowledge, it also differs substantially from 
defeasibility analyses in the following two respects: 
 It is a recursive analysis, and it is also holistic 
in the sense that all justified information might be 
relevant.  The defeasibility analysis which I sketch 
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may also be claimed to supersede other defeasibility 
analyses as it has the advantage that it avoids the 
objection based on the Tom Grabit example given above. 
 
Suppose a person S thinks himself justified in holding 
p. It then seems that S will be committed to the claim 
that any normal or superior person with any further 
justified information about the world apart from p who 
also held p would be justified in holding p; and 
conversely, if S were to think that any normal or 
superior person with any further justified information 
about the world would be justified in holding p, then 
S would thereby be committed to the claim that he 
himself is justified in holding p. It follows as a 
corollary, that when S thinks himself justified in 
holding p, he is committed to the claim that he 
himself, at any later time, on the basis of any 
further justified information (apart from p), would 
continue to be justified if he still were to hold p.  
As above, a converse statement also holds.   
 
It does not seem unreasonable to think that the best 
explanation for why we have this is that what we are 
committed to is true when what we think is right, i.e. 
that a person is justified in holding p iff he at any 
  
  12 
later time, on the basis of any further justified 
information (apart from p), would continue to be 
justified if he still were to hold p. 
 
If we let "Vtsp"  denote the set of justified informa-
tion that S has at the time t, apart from the 
information that p, or more formally {q*Jtsq}'{p}, we 
can specify what we have said more precisely: 
 
Jtsp  ]  ~(œt`)(t` > t & (Vtsp d  Vt`sp) & Bt`sp Y 
Jt`sp)
4
                        
Here "Bt`sp" signifies that s believes that p at t`, 
and "~" is the symbol for necessity, such that we in 
this case can read the whole expression as follows: "s 
is justified in holding p at time t iff it is 
necessary that for all times t` later than t, that if 
(the condition) then Jt`sp."   
 
It now seems that a kind of bifurcation can be gener-
ated from the Gettier-examples, showing that the 
epistemic subjects in these situations are not 
                     
4.  It might be argued that we also need a conjunct on 
the right side stating that it is possible to believe 
p, because it is not possible to believe anything. If 
that is right, then such a conjunct can be taken to be 
presupposed throughout this text. 
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justified.  Let us, in order to show this more 
clearly, consider Gettier's classical example of Smith 
and Jones.  Consider the following statements: 
 
   a) Jones is the man who will get the 
job, and Jones has ten coins in 
his pocket. 
 
   b) The man who will get the job has ten 
coins in his pocket.  
 
Smith has strong evidence for a), and a) entails b). 
Suppose Smith is aware of this entailment, and that he 
accepts b) because of a) at the time t.  Smith is, 
according to Gettier, justified in believing b) at t. 
 Now, Smith, unbeknownst to himself, gets the job, and 
he happens, without knowing it, to have ten coins in 
his pocket.  In this case Smith believes a true 
sentence, viz. b), and is, according to Gettier, 
justified in holding b). But we would not want to say 
that Smith knows b), because b) is true for another 
reason than the one Smith thinks.  
 
According to the property of justification which we 
have invoked, however, Smith is not justified in 
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holding b) at time t. In some possible developments of 
history, Smith could at a later time obtain more 
information relevant to b), and then be justified in 
holding b), and then also know b), e.g. if he were to 
get the information that he gets the job and that he 
has ten coins in his pocket. But in some other 
developments of history he would not be justified in 
holding b), e.g. because he only were to gather the 
additional information that Jones does not get the job 
and that he himself got it, and not the justified 
information that he himself has ten coins in his 
pocket. In this case Smith would not be justified in 
believing b). It may seem that analogous arguments in 
similar cases can establish that Gettier-beliefs in 
general are not justified beliefs, but we will see 
below that such is not the case. 
 
Let us next consider the argumentstrategy against 
traditional defeasibility analyses of knowing which 
was considered above in order to show that it does not 
raise problems for the definition of knowledge which 
has been developed here.  Suppose s is convinced that 
Tom Grabit stole a book from a library because he saw 
him steal the book at time t.  Imagine that at a later 
time Tom's mother says to him: "Tom has an identical 
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twinbrother who is a notorious book thief."  Call this 
sentence S, and the proposition it expresses B.  
Suppose B is false, and that Tom has no twinbrother.  
Tom's mother might e.g. be lying, or be suffering from 
dementia, or from the influence of drugs.  Our 
intuitions are that s knows at t that Tom Grabit stole 
a book, and the question therefore is whether the 
defeasibility analysis of knowledge which we have 
outlined is compatible with this intuition. 
 
It will, according to the analysis given here, be 
possible at a later time t`, that s has the justified 
information that s has at t, plus the justified 
information B` expressed by the sentence S' = "Tom's 
mother uttered the sentence S".  We now claim that the 
information that B, as opposed to the information that 
B', is not justified because it is possible for s at a 
later time than t` to obtain more justified 
information than at t`, and thereby to become 
justified in holding -B, since -B is true. The claim 
that it is possible at a later time to become 
justified in holding -B if -B is true, amounts to 
saying that -B is an accessible truth, where we appeal 
to the following definition: 
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        p is accessible at t  iff   p Y 	(›s)Jtsp 
 
Let there furthermore be a class of sentences given by 
the following definition: 
 
p is metaphysical5 at t iff 	(›s)Jtsp & 	(›s`)Jts`-p 
 
It follows that if -B is an accessible and non-
metaphysical truth at t, which seems reasonable, then 
no one can be justified in holding B.  
 
Even if B' is true and accessible, and hence someone 
can be justified in believing B', it does not follow 
that anyone is justified in holding B.  B` cannot, it 
seems, justify B unless a set C of conditions like 
"Tom's mother is honest", "B is uttered in a normal 
context, and not as part of a play", "Tom's mother is 
sane", "Tom's mother is justified in holding B" etc... 
are themselves justified, and this set justifies the 
person in holding that B. The set R consisting of the 
negation of the members of C can be looked upon as the 
                     
5.  We use the word "metaphysical" here because it 
seems to be in cases like the continuum hypothesis, 
"God exists", "distance is infinitely divisible" that 
opposing views can both be justified in this strong 
sense. 
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set of restorers of -B. If a sentence r is a restorer 
of a sentence q for a person s (short: r
s
(q)) at the 
time t it will be the case that Jts(rs(q) Y q). If we 
appeal to the following closure principle of 
justification:  
 
ClJ  (Jtsr  &  Jts(r Y q))  Y  Jtsq  
 
we see that Jtsq if Jtsrs(q).  Substitute -B for q. It 
follows from r being accessible that 	(›s)Jtsrs(-B), 
and from ClJ and the assumption that r is a restorer 
of -B for s that 	(›s)Jts(-B), and from the assumption 
that B and -B are non-metaphysical it follows that 
-(›s`)Jts`(B).  But B' can only be a defeater to the 
extent that somebody is justified in holding B.  It is 
at best only if somebody were to be justified in 
holding B, and not by being justified only in holding 
B', that this person would be unjustified in holding 
that Tom stole the book.  It follows from this, that 
somebody who continues to believe that Tom stole the 
book from the library after having come to hold the 
justified belief B', would not be unjustified in 
believing this, because there are conditions (e.g. 
about honesty or dementia) for being justified in 
holding that B, which, ex hypothesi, are not justified 
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in this case.  But it is therefore, as can be seen 
from the form of -Jtsp, viz. ‘(›t`)(t` > t & (Vtsp d  
Vt`sp) & Bt`sp & -Jt`sp), also not the case that s is 
unjustified at t in holding that Tom stole the book 
from the library, because Vt`sp is to consist of 
justified information.  Given all of this, it would 
seem that we can arrive at a definition of knowledge 
of the traditional form as justified, true belief if 
we incorporate a defeasibility condition in the 
justification condition for knowledge. 
 
But any such rectifications of a traditional analysis 
of knowledge which I have pointed out here and which 
rely upon an incorporation of any suggested further 
conditions for knowledge in the justification 
condition for knowledge, are, I think, bound to fail 
unless the resulting notion of justification entails 
truth.  For suppose justification does not entail 
truth.  It is then possible that S believes p and S is 
justified in believing p although p is false.  Suppose 
further that S believes p or q only because S believes 
p, e.g. in a situation where S strongly disbelieves q 
but believes p or q nonetheless because S believes p. 
 As it happens, q is true.  But clearly, if S is 
justified in holding p then S is justified in holding 
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p or q.  The same holds for indefeasibility.  If p is 
indefeasible then p or q is indefeasible.  So even if 
the justification condition incorporates 
indefeasibility it is true that if S is justified in 
holding p then S is justified in holding p or q.  It 
follows from this that all three conditions are 
fulfilled if justification does not entail truth, for 
S is in this situatiuon justified in holding p or q, 
and S believes p or q and p or q is true.  But we do 
not want to say that S knows p or q.  What this shows 
is that unless justification or one of the further 
epistemic conditions which have been suggested as 
additions to the traditional analysis of knowledge 
entails truth, the resulting analysis is bound to 
fail.   
 
But it is unreasonable, I think, to hold that an 
epistemic condition like justification, whether or not 
it incorporates indefeasibility or other epistemic 
conditions, should entail truth.  The most natural 
view to hold is that epistemic conditions like S being 
justified in holding p, or p being indefeasible for S 
or it being evident for S that p etc. do not entail 
that it is true that p.  It would at the very least 
take quite a bit of non-trivial philosophical 
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argumentation in order to show that a set of epistemic 
conditions short of knowledge which a proposition p 
fulfills for a subject S can only be fulfilled if the 
proposition p is true.  One cannot merely stipulate 
that only true propositions can be justified or 
fulfill whatever additional conditions one wants to 
incorporate in the analysis which one suggests.   
 
Given all of this, it seems to me to follow that a 
large family of proposed analyses of knowledge are 
bound to fail.  We can at least draw such a conclusion 
if we want to hold that neither justification nor any 
other additional epistemic condition entails truth and 
that it follows from the fact that a proposition p 
fulfills the epistemic conditions and justification 
for S that also the proposition p or q fulfills those 
epistemic conditions and the justification condition. 
 And it seems that these are deciderata which we 
should want any epistemic conditions short of 
knowledge to fulfill. 
 
It should here be noted, however, that there are 
authors who have tried to get around the Gettier type 
difficulties by either holding that justification 
entails truth or that justification is not transmitted 
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by deductive inferences  drawn by the epistemic 
subject.  Notably, Robert Almeder6 has argued that one 
cannot be completely justified in believing a false 
proposition, and Irving Thalberg7 has argued against 
the principle that if you are justified in believing a 
proposition p and you correctly deduce q from p, where 
p entails q, then you are also justified in believing 
q.  If anything, these suggested ways around the 
Gettier problems seem desperate and utterly 
implausible, and that probably accounts for why these 
suggestions, to put it mildly, have failed to gain any 
influence. 
 
 
1.2 There is a type of examples in the literature 
which are claimed to be related to the Gettier 
examples and to show that knowledge cannot simply be 
defined as justified true belief.  The first one to 
                     
6.See Robert Almeder, Truth and Evidence, 
Philosophical Quarterly, 24, 365-369, and 
his The Invalidity of Gettier-type 
Counterexamples, Philosophia (Israel) 13, 
67-74. 
7.See Irving Thalberg, In defense of Justified 
True Belief, Journal of Philosophy, 66, 
795-802, and his Is Justification 
transmissible through Deduction?, 
Philosophical Studies, 25, 347-356.  
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publish this kind of example was Gilbert Harman,8 and 
I cite extensively 
 
"Suppose that Tom enters a room in which many 
people are talking excitedly although he 
cannot understand what they are saying.  He 
sees a copy of the morning paper on a 
table.  the headline and main story reveal 
that a famous civil-rights leader has been 
assassinated.  On reading the story he 
comes to believe it; it is true; and the 
condition that the lemmas be true has been 
satisfied since a reporter who witnessed 
the assassination wrote the story under his 
by-line.  According to an empiricist 
analysis, Tom ought to know the 
assassination had occurred.  It ought to be 
irrelevant what information other people 
have, since Tom has no reason to think they 
have information that would contradict the 
story in the paper. 
But this is a mistake.  For, suppose that the 
assassination has been denied, even by 
eyewitnesses, the point of the denial being 
to avoid a racial explosion.  The 
assassinated leader is reported in good 
health; the bullets are said, falsely, to 
have missed him and hit someone else.  The 
denials occurred too late to prevent the 
original and true story from appearing in 
the paper that Tom has seen; but everyone 
else in the room has heard about the 
denials.  None of them know what to 
believe.  They all have information that 
Tom lacks.  Would we judge Tom to be the 
only one who knows that the assassination 
has actually happened?  Could we say that 
he knows this because he does not yet have 
the information everyone else has?  I do 
not think so.  I believe we would 
ordinarily judge that Tom does not know." 
                     
8.Gilbert Harman, Knowledge, Inference and 
Explanation.  American Philosophical 
Quarterly 5:164-173. 
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I do not share Harman's intuitions.  My view is that 
this is not a genuine counter example to the standard 
definition of knowledge, for it seems to me to be 
false to say that Tom did not know that the civil 
rights leader was assassinated just because other 
people were victims of a cover up.  Why should the 
cover up matter?  I grant that Tom at a later time, if 
he becomes aware of the evidence which has misled 
other people, may himself be misled by the misleading 
evidence and thus no longer believe that the civil 
rights leader was assassinated.  But that does not at 
all show that Tom did not know that the civil rights 
leader was assassinated.   
 
Most commentators have tried to find a way around the 
Gettier problems while at the same time come to the 
result that Tom in the above example did not know that 
the civil rights leader was assassinated.  I do not 
think that such a strategy is a reasonable one.  For 
note the similarity between Harman's example and the 
example with the demented Mrs. Grabit.  In both cases 
there is some misleading evidence which at a future 
time may stop S or Tom from believing what he did 
believe.  It seems clear that this is a case where 
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there are conflicting intuitions in the literature, 
for insofar as we want to say that S did know that Tom 
Grabit took the book despite the false testimony of 
Mrs. Grabit we should also want to say that Tom in 
Harman's example did know that the civil rights leader 
was assassinated despite the cover up stories which 
seduced many or most people into believing that no 
assassination took place.  One may here retort that 
there is a difference between these examples because 
one may more plausibly be said to be justified in 
believing the cover up stories than in believing the 
demented Mrs. Grabit.  And I shall be willing to grant 
that there is such a difference, but I do not see why 
that difference should make a difference.  As I see 
it, Tom did know that the civil rights leader was 
assassinated.   
 
But even if one disagrees with me and thinks that 
there is such a significant difference between the 
examples discussed above that Tom in Harman's example 
did not know that the civil rights leader was 
assassinated whereas S in Lehrer and Paxson's example 
did know that Tom Grabit took the book, then that is a 
result which one should be able to get at by some 
adjustments in one's theory of justification, e.g. by 
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incorporating a defeasibility condition along the 
lines of our previous section.  One could then hold 
that Tom in Harman's example was not justified in 
believing that the civil rights leader was 
assassinated, whereas S was justified in holding that 
Tom Grabit took the book in Lehrer and Paxson's 
example.  Let me emphasize that I would not be in 
agreement with such a strategy, as I think that it 
would be unreasonable to say that S in Harman's 
example was not justified in holding that the civil 
rights leader was assassinated.  The main point which 
I want to make here, however, is that Harman's example 
and related examples do not, as I see it, pose a 
threat to a standard definition of knowledge as 
justified true belief.  We shall accordingly in this 
essay concentrate ourselves on more standard type 
Gettier examples which clearly do show that knowledge 
cannot simply be defined as justified true belief. 
  
  26 
 
 II      
 
Let us consider one of Gettier's counter examples in 
order to diagnose the problem that it poses for a 
traditional analysis of knowledge: Smith has strong 
evidence which justifies him in holding that Jones 
owns a Ford, and he believes that Jones owns a Ford.  
Smith picks a city at random, Barcelona, and forms the 
belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona.  Smith doesn't believe that Brown is in 
Barcelona, and has no justification for holding that. 
 But since Smith is justified in holding that Jones 
owns a Ford, he is also justified in holding that 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.  But Jones 
doesn't own a Ford.  Smith has been mislead.  Brown, 
however, happens by sheer luck to be in Barcelona.  So 
Smith has a justified true belief that Jones owns a 
Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.  But we wouldn't want 
to say that Smith knew that Jones owns a ford or Brown 
is in Barcelona.   
 
It seems to me that the general structure of Gettier 
type counter examples can be extracted by considering 
this, or any other Gettier type counter example.  By 
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"general structure" I mean some features that all 
Gettier type counter examples have in common.  This is 
a claim that I hope to vindicate by going through 
several Gettier type examples in later portions of 
this essay.  As for now, I only want to point out what 
I think these features are, and work from there9.   
 
Let us call the proposition that Jones owns a Ford p, 
and the proposition that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is 
in Barcelona q.  It then seems that the Gettier type 
example has the following features: 
 
 
      1.S believes p 
 
      2.S is justified in holding p 
 
      3.p entails q 
 
      4.S believes q because S 
believes p 
                     
9. This List of features differs from others that I 
have seen, e.g. the one given by Robert Shope: "The 
Analysis of Knowing", Princeton University Press 1983, 
p.4. But the list is not incompatible with any list 
that I have seen. 
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      5.S is justified in holding q 
because of 2, 3 and 4. 
 
      6.p is not true 
 
      7.q is true 
 
We will use the expression "because" in such a way 
that a sentence of the form "S believes q because S 
believes p" is true if and only if the sentence "S 
believes p" is an adequate and true answer to the 
question "Why does S believe q?".  Or, in other words: 
S believes q because S believes p if and only if the 
fact that S believes p explains why S believes q. 
 
We should also note that our analysis is intended to 
be synchronistic.  The analysis offered is of the 
knowledge of a subject at a given time t, so the 
because-relation which we invoke should not be taken 
in a temporal sense. 
 
Feature 5 might raise the following question.  Are 2, 
3 and 4 generally sufficient for S to be justified in 
holding q? I think they are.  But one might think of 
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something like the following as providing a counter 
example.  Suppose that the Peano axioms, unbeknownst 
to S, entail Fermat's Theorem.  S believes, or claims 
to believe Fermat's Theorem because S believes the 
Peano axioms for arithmetic, and is justified in 
holding the Peano axioms.  The features or conditions 
2, 3 and 4 above are thus fulfilled, but would we in 
such a case as this say that S was justified in 
holding Fermat's Theorem?  No.  Not at all.  Nor would 
we, however, say that S believes Fermat's Theorem 
simply because S believes the Peano axioms, as S 
crazily claims.  And this is so because the fact that 
S believes the Peano axioms does not explain why S 
believes Fermat's theorem.  It must in some sense be 
evident that p supports q in order for it to be the 
case that the fact that S believes p explains why S 
believes q.  For S to believe q because S believes p, 
we shall accordingly require that the fact that p 
supports q has to be recognized by anyone that 
understands p and q.  Note that the evidence 
requirement that we have introduced is not an 
additional requirement for what it takes to say that 
someone believes something because she believes 
something else.  We still have that S belives q 
because S believes p if and only if the fact that S 
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believes p explains why S believes q.  The evidence 
requirement that we are suggesting is built into the 
notion of explanation that we used in the definiendum 
in the definition of "S believes q because S believes 
p".  With this evidence requirement for explanations, 
which is thereby also a requirement for what it takes 
to believe something because of something else that is 
believed, I think that 5 is quite plausible.  So if S 
is justified in holding p, and p entails q and S 
believes q because S believes p then S is justified in 
holding q.   
 
It should at this point be noted that "because" in the 
formulation "S believes q because S believes p" is not 
a transitive relation.  That is to say, that even if S 
believes q because S believes p, and S believes r 
because S believes q, it need not be the case that S 
believes r because S believes p.  For the evidence 
requirement we have been invoking may not hold for the 
entailment from p to r. This may be easier to see if 
the explanatory chain is somewhat long.  Suppose S 
were fortunate enough to find a proof of Fermat's 
theorem (FT) in Peano arithmetics, and started his 
proof with the Peano axioms (PA).  It is by no means 
evident to anyone who understands PA and FT that PA 
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supports FT, so it cannot be the case that S believes 
FT because S believes PA.  But we were imagining that 
S had found a proof of FT based upon PA.  So S must 
have gone through a series of steps from PA=s(1) 
through s(2), s(3)....  to FT=s(n) in his proof.  For 
each i, 1#i#n, it must be the case that S believes 
s(i+1) because S believes s(i), as we do require 
mathematical proofs to be transparent to those who 
understand what is going on.  But this shows that 
believing something because you believe something else 
is not a transitive relation, as S does not believe FT 
simply because S believes PA.  There is, however, an 
important sense in which S's belief in FT is based 
upon his belief in PA, and we will in the following 
try to explicate the sense in which this can be said. 
 
It seems that we can divide the set of beliefs that a 
person has into those beliefs which (1) she has 
because of some other belief or beliefs that she has 
and which (2) are entailed by the latter, and those 
that do not stand in both of these relations to other 
beliefs.  We shall call the former type of belief 
secondary beliefs, and the latter type we will call 
primary beliefs.  (A more refined definition willl be 
given later.) The reason why we are interested in 
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secondary beliefs should be clear from the list of the 
seven features of Gettier type beliefs given above.  
If we consider features 3, 4, 6 and 7, we can see that 
Gettier type of beliefs do stand in these two 
relations to other beliefs.  In addition, Gettier 
beliefs are such that they do not entail the belief or 
beliefs because of which they are held.  Features 6 
and 7 make sure that the Gettier belief does not 
entail the belief because of which it is held, and 
feature 3 and 4 only restate the two relations that I 
have been invoking in drawing the distinction between 
primary and secondary beliefs.  Since 4 entails 1, we 
can see that the two relations invoked capture 
features 1, 3, and 4 of the features that I have 
claimed are common for Gettier type beliefs.   
 
On the basis of these considerations, our strategy 
will roughly be to hold that primary beliefs are known 
iff they are justified and true beliefs and that 
secondary beliefs are known iff there is a primary 
belief because of which the secondary belief is 
believed and this primary belief is also a known, i.e. 
 a justified and true, primary belief.  In our example 
above, we can then see that Smith does not know that 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.  For Smith 
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believes that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona because Smith believes that Jones owns a 
Ford.  Smith does not, however, know that Jones owns a 
Ford, since it is not true that Jones owns a Ford.  If 
Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is a primary 
belief, and there are no other beliefs than Smith's 
belief that Jones owns a Ford because of which Smith 
believes that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona, our strategy can easily be seen to work as 
the primary belief because of which Smith believes 
that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is not 
known.  Suppose Smith's belief to the effect that 
Jones owns a Ford is a secondary belief.  There is 
then at least one primary belief p which entails that 
Jones owns a Ford and is such that Smith believes that 
Jones owns a Ford because Smith believes p.  But p 
cannot possibly be a justified and true primary 
belief.  For if it were true that p and p entails that 
Jones owns a Ford it would also be true that Jones 
owns a Ford.  But it is not true that Jones owns a 
Ford.  So there can be no justified and true primary 
belief because of which Smith believes that Jones owns 
a Ford which also entails that Jones owns a Ford.  
This shows that our strategy gives the desired result 
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that Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona. 
 
One might at this point wonder why I have not included 
a third condition of the following form in my 
definition of secondary beliefs: "A belief because of 
which a secondary belief is believed is not entailed 
by the secondary belief." After all, Gettier beliefs 
seem to have this property that they do not entail the 
beliefs because of which they are held (features 6 and 
7 make that clear), and it is with Gettier type of 
beliefs that we are concerned.   
 
But the suggested requirement would, or at least 
could, give rise to a problem of the following kind.  
Suppose S believes q because S believes p, where p is 
a primary belief which is false and justified and 
true, whereas q is a secondary belief fulfilling the 
suggested requirement (i.e.  q does not entail p).  
Suppose further that S believes r because S believes 
q, where q is logically equivalent with r.  (Since 
circular explanations are no good, it cannot at the 
same time be the case that S believes q because S 
believes r.) Suppose further that there are no other 
beliefs because of which S believes r.  If we were to 
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adhere to the requirement that a secondary belief 
cannnot entail a belief because of which it is held, 
we would have to conclude that r is a primary belief. 
 But then r would, if we were to follow the strategy 
that we are considering, be known iff r is a justified 
and true belief.  But we have assumed that q, the 
belief because of which S believes r, is a Gettier 
type of belief.  So q is not known iff q is a 
justified and true belief.  But r is logically 
equivalent with q.  So r cannot be known iff r is a 
justified true belief.  So r should not be counted as 
a primary belief, but would have to be counted as such 
a belief if we were to adopt the suggested 
requirement.   
 
Furthermore, if we made use of such a non-entailment 
requirement we would not be able to think e.g.  of a 
mathematical theorem q which is shown in a proof by S 
to be equivalent to a theorem p as something q which S 
believes because S believes p.  This should suffice as 
an explanation for why we do not include the suggested 
non-entailment requirement in our definition of 
secondary beliefs. 
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In order to arrive at a working definition of 
knowledge, however, we need to define a relation that 
holds between the beliefs of a subject and which is 
also a transitive relation.  We need, in other words, 
to find a way of stating that a belief q of a subject 
S is a belief that S has either because it is the case 
that S believes q because S believes p where p is a 
primary belief,  or because it is the case that there 
are beliefs p and p' such that S believes q because S 
believes p' and S believes p' because S believes p and 
p is a primary belief, and so on for longer 
explanatory chains of beliefs.  We also need to keep 
the requirement that p entails q.  This we do by 
defining the ancestral of the relation "S believes q 
because S believes p and p entails q".  We need to 
sharpen, or slightly revise, our distinction between 
primary and secondary beliefs.  In order to do that, 
we have to invoke a series of definitions. 
 
First we define: 
 
1BSpq =df S believes q because S believes p and p 
entails q. 
 
We then define the notion of BS-heredity: 
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2α is BS-hereditary=df(p)(q)((p0α & BSpq) e q0α) 
 
Informally, this says that a class of propositions α 
is BS-hereditary iff for any two propositions p and q 
where p is in α and S believes q because S believes p 
and p entails q then also q is in α.  The empty set is 
trivially BS-hereditary, as are all sets that contain 
none of the beliefs that S has.  Also, a set can be 
BS-hereditary and contain some or all of the beliefs 
that S has, and it may in addition contain 
propositions that S does not believe.  BS-heredity is 
therefore by itself not sufficient to arrive at 
anything of substance.  We therefore define: 
 
3q is secondary to p for S =df (α)((α is BS-
hereditary & (r)(BSpr e r0α)) e q0α) 
 
 
This definition requires some explanation.   First 
note, that another way of expressing that a set α is 
BS-hereditary is to say that the set α is closed under 
the relation BS, i.e.  if p is in α and BSpq then also 
q is in α.  Definition 3 thus says that a belief q is 
secondary to p for S just in case q is in all sets α 
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which are closed under the BS relation and also 
contain all beliefs r which stand in the BS relation 
to p.  What do we achieve by this definition? Suppose 
a belief q of S is such that S believes q because S 
believes p1, and S believes p1 because S believes p2, 
........  and S believes p
n-1 because S believes pn, 
where n$1.  This is what we informally mean by saying 
that q is a belief of S secondary to S's belief p
n
.  
By our definition, q is secondary to p
n
 just in case q 
is in all sets closed under the BS-relation which also 
contain all beliefs r that stand in the BS-relation to 
p
n
.  Let β be any such set of statements, and suppose 
q is secondary to p
n
 for S.  If, in fact, S believes p
n
 
(as we have assumed), then, since β contains all 
beliefs that stand in the BS-relation to p
n
, also p
n-1  
is in β.  But β is closed under the BS-relation, and 
since BSp
n-1pn-2, ......, BSp1q, clearly also q is in β. 
 We have thus shown that the definiendum holds if q is 
in fact a belief of S which is secondary to a belief p 
of S in our informal sense. 
 
Let us, before we show that the truth of the 
definiendum in 3 guarantees that a belief q is 
secondary, show that S must believe p in order for it 
to be the case that some belief q is secondary to p 
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for S.  Suppose S does not believe p.  In that case 
the second conjunct of the antecedent in the 
definiendum in 3, i.e.  the sentence (r)(BSpr e r0α), 
is true for all sets α, since it for all r is false 
that BSpr.  So it follows from definition 3 that if q 
were secondary to p for s and S did not believe p then 
q would be in all BS-hereditary sets α.  But the empty 
set is, as we pointed out, a BS-hereditary set, so a 
statement q cannot be in all BS-hereditary sets.  So 
if q is secondary to p for S then S believes p.  In 
other words, the definiendum in 3 is always false if 
it is not the case that S believes p.  This shows that 
our definition gives the desired result that if q is 
secondary to p for S then S believes p. 
 
Let us now show that the truth of the definiendum 
guarantees that a belief q is secondary to p for S in 
the informal sense provided there are beliefs r that 
stand in the BS-relation to p, i.e. such that BSpr is 
true.  Suppose the definiendum is true with this 
proviso.  We then know that S believes p and that q is 
in all BS-hereditary sets which also contain the 
beliefs r that stand in the BS-relation to p.  In 
other words, all BS-hereditary sets which contain the 
beliefs r such that BSpr also contain q.  But then 
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also the BS-hereditary set β which only contains the 
beliefs r such that BS-pr and in addition those 
beliefs that must be in β because of β's BS-heredity 
must contain q.  Clearly β is a subset of all other 
sets that fulfill the condition of the antecedent, so 
if q is in β then q must be in all sets fulfilling the 
antecedent of the definiendum.  It therefore suffices 
to assume that q is in the described set β.  But if q 
is in β, then either q is one of the r's such that 
BSpr, or there is one r such that BSpr and BSrq, or 
there is one r and one s such that BSpr, BSrs, and 
BSsq, and so on.  So if there are beliefs r such that 
BSrp then the truth of the definiendum guarantees that 
q is secondary to p for S.  Also note that this shows 
that if q is secondary to p for S then S believes q, 
so that we in combination with our result in the last 
paragraph have: If q is secondary to p for S then S 
believes p and S believes q. 
 
It only remains to consider the situation when there 
are no beliefs r such that BSpr.  In that case q 
cannot be secondary to p, so we want the definiendum 
to be false.  But if there are no beliefs r such that 
BSpr then BSpr is always false so the second conjunct 
of the definiendum is true for all sets α.  But the 
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statement q cannot be in all BS-hereditary sets since 
the empty set is BS-hereditary.  So the definiendum is 
false if there are no beliefs r such that BSpr. 
 
We will now give some definitions of vocabulary: 
 
4q is a secondary belief for S =df (›p)(q is 
secondary to p for S) 
 
Next: 
 
 
5p is a primary belief for S =df S believes p & p 
is not a secondary belief for S 
 
 
Furthermore: 
 
 
6S believes q since S believes p =df q is 
secondary to p for S 
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7S believes q on the basis of p =df p is a primary 
belief for S and S believes q since S 
believes p. 
 
 
8p induces q for S =df S believes q on the basis 
of p. 
 
 
We will finally define the following notation: 
 
 
9BS(q, p1, ...  , pn) =df "p1, ....., pn" is a 
complete list of beliefs that induce q for 
S. 
 
It follows from these definitions that "p1, ...  , pn" 
in BS(q, p1, ...  , pn) is a list of all and only those 
beliefs that are primary beliefs for S that are such 
that S believes q since S believes p1, ...  etc.   (If 
q is a primary belief, i.e.  if n=0, we simply write 
BS(q).)   
 
Although such lists as the ones referred to in 9 
exist, it would of course be difficult, not to say 
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impossible, for us to list any of them, and different 
individuals will not generally have the same list 
corresponding to the same secondary beliefs.  Our 
notation will, however, be useful in stating the 
definition of knowledge that we give in chapter IV.   
 
Let us finally make the note, that we will assume that 
if B(q,p1,...,pn), n>0, then the beliefs p1,...., pn are 
severally sufficient for S to believe q.  We moreover 
assume, that if S were to have the same beliefs that 
she has except the beliefs pi, 0<i#n, then she would 
also not believe q.  This assumption follows from what 
we have said about the nature of the because-relation 
which we are invoking. 
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 III 
 
I think that we with the definitions in the previous 
chapter have done much of the groundwork for arriving 
at an adequate definition of knowledge.  This is 
something I hope to show in the next chapter. 
 
In this chapter I want to show that the since-relation 
which we have invoked in "S believes q since S 
believes p" is a transitive, anti symmetric and anti 
reflexive relation, and that the set of primary 
beliefs for that reason is nonempty.  I then go on to 
say more about what kind of beliefs that are primary, 
and to show that primary beliefs should not be 
confused with basic beliefs in the foundationalist 
sense. 
 
That the since-relation is anti symmetric and anti 
reflexive follows from the fact that we do not accept 
circular explanations as genuine explanations, and the 
since-relation is defined in terms of the because-
relation, which in its turn is defined in terms of the 
notion of an explanation.  As the fact that S believes 
q cannot explain why S believes q, it cannot be the 
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case that S believes q because S believes q.  Could it 
be the case that there were a chain of the form: S 
believes q because S believes p1 and .......  and S 
believes p
n
 because S believes q? We would then have 
to say that the fact that S believes q explains why S 
believes p
n
 and .......  the fact that S believes p1 
explains why S believes q.  But we do not want to 
accept such a circular chain of propositions which are 
supposed to explain each other.  Explanations should 
not be circular.  It therefore follows that the since-
relation is anti reflexive and anti symmetric. 
 
It can also be proved that the since-relation is a 
transitive relation.  In fact, the ancestral of any 
relation can be shown to be transitive, and the since-
relation is, as we know, the ancestral of the relation 
BSpq (i.e. S believes q because S believes p and p 
entails q).  But let us give an informal proof of 
this.  Suppose S believes q since S believes p and S 
believes r since S believes q.  In this case it is 
clear that there is a finite number n of beliefs t, 
t', t''....  such that S believes r because S believes 
t, S believes t because S believes t', S believes t' 
because S believes t'' etc.  , where each t followed 
by i  "'"'s, 0<i#n-1, entails the t which is followed 
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by  i-1 "'"'s.  One of these t's followed by a finite 
number of "'"'s would be q, and the one with n-1 "'"'s 
would be p.  As entailment is transitive, it is then 
clear that S believes r since S believes p.  So the 
since-relation is clearly a transitive relation. 
                                                      
We can, as pointed out in the previous chapter, define 
a subset of the beliefs that S has which are believed 
since some other beliefs that S has (and consequently 
entailed by those latter beliefs) are believed 
(secondary beliefs), and those beliefs that do not 
stand in that relation to other beliefs (primary 
beliefs).  We now want to show that the set of primary 
beliefs must be non-empty.   
 
We will let "Bp" stand for "S believes p", and "B" 
stand for "the set of all beliefs that S has".  The 
corresponding abbreviations for justification ("Jp" 
and "J") and knowledge ("Kp" and "K") will be used 
later.  We have defined BS (secondary beliefs) as the 
set of propositions q such that there is at least one 
proposition p such that q is believed since p is 
believed.   
 
More formally we could express this as 
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      BS = {q:(›p)(Bq since Bp)} 
 
We call the set BS the set of secondary beliefs.  The 
definition above could also be stated by saying that a 
belief q is secondary if and only if q is believed 
since some other belief p1 is believed and........and 
q is believed since some other belief p
n
 is believed, 
where n is larger than or equal to one.  We call the 
set BP = B/BS (B minus BS), i.e.  all beliefs that are 
not secondary beliefs, the set of primary beliefs.   
 
The set BP cannot be empty.  We could show this by 
giving examples of primary beliefs.  That is something 
which we will do later in this chapter. Let us at this 
point be more systematical.   
 
Suppose BP is empty.  It would then be true for each 
of my beliefs that I have that belief since I have 
some other belief(s) (where the latter entail(s) the 
former).  But the relation that we are invoking is 
transitive, anti-symmetric (i.e. if I believe q since 
I believe p then it is not the case that I believe p 
since I believe q) and anti-reflexive (i.e. I do never 
believe p since I believe p).  This has as a 
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consequence that we can not have a cluster of beliefs 
such that I believe one since I believe any of the 
other.  The since-relation forms a unidirectional 
tree, or sometimes a chain.  So if all of my beliefs 
stand in the since relation to some other belief that 
I have, it must be the case that I have infinitely 
many beliefs.   
 
But can it be the case that I have infinitely many 
beliefs? At least I cannot have infinitely many 
beliefs that can be verbalized in the sense of our 
disquotation principle DP (see Appendix 2), and it is 
with beliefs that can be verbalized that the Gettier 
problem is concerned since otherwise we would be at 
pains of stating the problem.   
 
But why can I not have infinitely many verbalizeable 
beliefs?  Because there must be a finite limit of the 
number of characters in a sentence for me to be able 
to understand that sentence, and there is only a 
finite number of characters that I can understand, so 
there is only a finite number of sentences that I can 
understand.  But I have to understand what I believe, 
so I can only have a finite number of verbalizeable 
beliefs.   
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Some people may, however, hold that we have an 
infinite number of beliefs in some de re contexts.  
One might e.g.  want to say that we believe of each 
natural number that it is nonnegative, and not only 
that we believe that all natural numbers are 
nonnegative.  If so, it would not, I think, present a 
problem for my arqument to the effect that the set BP 
is non-empty.  For these alleged de re beliefs could 
not form an infinite branch or chain of the form: S 
believes A(1) since S believes (A2), and S believes 
(A2) since ...  etc.  We would rather have an infinite 
branching of the tree, such that all the de re beliefs 
of particular natural numbers are beliefs I have since 
I have the de dicto belief that all natural numbers 
are nonnegative. 
 
Since we have only a finite number of beliefs, and 
since the set BP is not empty for that reason, we can 
arrive at the following useful result by appealing to 
König's Lemma which says that a tree with an 
infinitely long branch has an infinite number of 
nodes.  It then follows by modus tollens that we 
cannot have an infinite series of the form "S believes 
p1 since S believes p2 and S believes p2 
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since..........".  This means that any such series, 
whether a chain or a branch of a tree, must terminate 
in a belief that is in BP.  As the since relation is 
transitive we can then see that any secondary belief 
is induced by at least one primary belief.   
 
And note that this is at it should be.  For we have 
been assuming that the fact that S believes q because 
S believes p iff the fact that S believes p explains 
the fact that S believes q.  So if a proposition q 
such that S believes q were preceeded by an infinite 
chain of beliefs primary to q, we would be faced with 
a situation where we would have an infinitely long 
explanation of the fact that S believes q.  But 
explanations must come to an end, or at least so we 
assume. 
 
On the basis of these considerations we can therefore 
conclude that the set BP cannot be empty.  And this 
gives us the result which we wanted to establish, viz. 
that there are primary beliefs. 
 
What kind of beliefs, then, are primary beliefs?  We 
know that a primary belief is a belief which is such 
that it is not believed because of some other belief 
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which entails it.  Given our definition of the 
because-relation, it then follows that a belief p is a 
primary belief for S iff there is no belief p' which S 
has that is such that the fact that S believes p' 
explains why S believes p, and p' entails p.  There 
are therefore two different kinds of primary beliefs 
that a subject S can have, viz. those beliefs that S 
has which are such that there are no beliefs which 
explain why S has them, and those that are such that 
although there are beliefs that S has which explain 
why S has them, none of these explanatory beliefs are 
entailing them.  I shall here focus upon the first 
type of cases, i.e. on the kind of primary beliefs 
where it can be said that there are no beliefs p' 
which S has that are such that the fact that S 
believes p' explains why S believes p, as we shall 
spend a fair amount of time on the second kind of 
primary beliefs in a later portion of this essay.   
 
One may think that the kind of primary beliefs that we 
are focusing upon can be identified with non-
inferential beliefs, as it seems plausible to assume 
that a belief q is inferred from a belief p by S iff 
the fact that S believes p explains, either directly 
or through an explanatory chain, why S believes q.  
  
  52 
There is, however, an objection to this assumption 
which goes along the following lines.  What if S jumps 
to a conclusion q on the basis of p in a situation 
where it is not at all the case that it is recognized 
by anyone who understands p and q that p supports q? 
Given the evidence requirement that we introduced in 
chapter II, we would then have a situation where it is 
not the case that the fact that S believes p explains 
why S believes q.  But S inferred q from p.  It 
therefore seems that there are cases where S believes 
q and there is no belief p which is such that the fact 
that S believes p explains why S believes q, but q is, 
it seems, an inferential belief nonetheless. 
 
What should we say about this?  We should first note 
that such cases are not likely to be really important 
ones, and, more importantly, that it will not be a 
problem for our account that there are such cases.  It 
will only go to show that there can be inferential 
beliefs which are primary because no beliefs explain 
why they are held.  One may think that one can make a 
good case for holding that there can be no such 
situations as the one which was just suggested.  For, 
given our disquotational principle DP (see Appendix 
2), it seems that it must be the case that S should be 
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able to account for her own inference from p to q in 
such a way that it is obvious to anyone that 
understands p and q that p supports q.  S should be 
able to account for the inference in the somewhat 
indirect sense that S should, so we may assume, be 
disposed to assent to sentences which express 
propositions which are intermediaries of p and q and 
thus make the inference from p to q more transparent. 
 Only, this does not seem to work if S has committed a 
rather stupid fallacy, for it is then not obvious to 
anyone who understands p and q plus the extra reasons 
which could be given by S that p supports q.  This 
goes to show, then, that the set of primary beliefs 
which are not held because of some other belief is not 
identical with the set of non-inferential beliefs.  
Rather, the latter set is a proper subset of the 
former set, i.e. all non-inferential beliefs are 
primary beliefs which are not held because of some 
other belief, but not all primary beliefs which are 
not held because of some other belief are non-
inferential belief.  This is a consequence of the fact 
that we have built in an evidence requirement into our 
notion of explanation.   
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But although the set of primary beliefs which we are 
now considering cannot be identified with the set of 
non-inferential beliefs, it seems to be safe to assume 
that the members of that set for the most part are 
non-inferential beliefs.  In particular, this is 
likely to be true if the epistemic subject we are 
considering is a rational subject.  We shall 
accordingly in the following focus upon the primary 
beliefs which are non-inferential beliefs, and we 
shall in later portions of this essay even pretend 
that non-inferential beliefs can be identified with 
the beliefs that are such that no other beliefs 
explain why they are held. 
 
Our question then becomes: What kind of beliefs are 
non-inferential beliefs? We do not intend to make any 
attempts to deviate from the tradition by trying to 
categorize any beliefs as non-inferential which are 
not commonly thought of as being non-inferential, but 
we shall suggest the following linguistic criterion 
for identifying beliefs as non-inferential beliefs. 
 
LCS's belief in proposition p is non-inferential 
if S would give an appropriate answer to 
the question "Why do you, S, believe p?" by 
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asserting a sentence s which expresses the 
proposition p. 
 
 
Note that we are not suggesting that a belief in a 
proposition p is non-inferential only if a sentence 
which expresses p is an appropriate answer to the 
question "Why do you believe p?", as there may, for 
all I know, be other types of propositions which are 
plausibly categorized as non-inferential beliefs.  We 
are only suggesting that a large family of non-
inferential beliefs can be identified by means of 
criterion LC. 
 
Given LC, it follows that many, or maybe most, non-
inferential beliefs are beliefs which are intimately 
related to our sources of knowledge, e.g.  to 
perception or to memory, or to our faculty of 
reasoning in the case of beliefs which we think of as 
a priori beliefs.   
 
If e.g.  S believes that S sees that there is a green 
tree, it would be appropriate for S, if queried, to 
answer the question "Why do you, S, believe that you 
see that there is a green tree?" with the sentence "I 
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see that there is a green tree".  Similar remarks can 
be made with respect to other predicates which take 
agents and propositions as argument values and are 
intimately related to our sources of knowledge, e.g.  
"remember that", "hear that", "being told by    that" 
and "read that".  Some of these, such as "see that" 
and "remember that" must be understood in a veridical 
sense, whereas e.g.  "read that" may not always be 
veridical.  One cannot see that there is a green tree 
if there is no green tree, but one may read that Malta 
is an ugly island without it being the case that Malta 
is an ugly island. 
 
Note that we in the case of "see that" also would want 
to include the nonperceptual notion of "see" which is 
used e.g. in sentences like "She could finally see 
that the sum of 18 and 5 equals 23".  The use of "see" 
in the sentence mentioned is only metaphorically 
related to the visual faculty, and does instead 
signify that the child by means of her faculty of 
reasoning came to realize that 18 and 5 is 23.  By 
incorporating this use of "see", we see that our 
analysis is able to accomodate a priori knowledge, at 
least if we, as seems reasonable, by a priori 
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knowledge mean knowledge which can possibly be arrived 
at solely by means of our faculty of reasoning.   
Let us at this point emphasize that the set of primary 
beliefs is not a set of some kind of foundational 
beliefs or basic beliefs.  For it follows from our 
discussion that primary beliefs, unlike foundational 
or basic beliefs, can be utterly unjustified and/or 
false.  A person may e.g.  have the primary belief 
that he can trust the missionary who told him that 
there is one God, Allah, and that Mohammed is his 
prophet.  Many of us would think that the belief is 
both false and unjustified.  And no one would think 
that all such primary beliefs, if we e.g. consider 
similar primary beliefs that pertain to other world 
views, could be true and justified.    
 
But although primary beliefs need not be justified, I 
think that primary beliefs which are non-inferential 
are at least prima facie justified.  If e.g. a person 
believes that she sees a green tree, then she is, I 
think, as a rule of thumb, justified in believing that 
she sees a green tree.  The person is, however, in 
such a case, not justified in believing that she sees 
a green tree simply because she believes that she sees 
one, or because such a belief, given our LC, would 
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count as a non-inferential belief.  That this must be 
so, should be pretty obvious, for a person may e.g. 
believe that she sees a green tree while under the 
voluntary influence of a hallucinatoric drug, or she 
may have been informed by a reliable physician that 
her colorvision is unreliable, and so on.  In more 
normal cases, however, we would want to say that a 
person who believes that she sees a green tree is 
justified in believing that she sees a green tree.   
 
One might also want to hold, possibly somewhat more 
controversially, that a person S is prima facie 
justified in believing that she has been informed by T 
that it is the case that p if S believes that she has 
been informed by T that it is the case that p.  If 
such were the case, it would not mean that it would be 
extremely rarely the case that one is not justified in 
believing what one is being told although one does 
believe it.  What one would want to say, rather, would 
be, I take it, that it takes something out of the 
ordinary for us not to be justified in believing that 
we are being informed (in the veridical sense) if we 
believe that we are being informed, whereas we in 
ordinary cases do not need any specific reason in the 
sense that we have to believe certain specific 
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propositions in order to trust the people that we 
communicate with.  This would, it seems, provide some 
evidence for holding that a belief to the effect that 
one is being informed by someone should count as a 
non-inferential belief.  But even if such a view is 
tenable, note that if we e.g. are justified in holding 
that the person we are dealing with is a notorious 
liar, or a politician, this would seem to undermine 
our justification in believing that we have been 
informed by that person.  Similarly, if we have good 
reasons not to believe what we are being told because 
of other justified beliefs that we may have, this may 
undermine our justification in believing that we have 
been correctly informed about anything. 
 
Note, however, that one in the case with "informed 
that" cannot appeal to LC in order to show that a 
belief that S has to the effect that she was informed 
by T that it is the case that p should count as a non-
inferential belief.  For one may plausibly argue that 
it would be appropriate for S to answer a why-question 
by saying that she can trust T and T told her that p, 
and that it would not be appropriate for her to answer 
such a question by saying that she was informed by T 
that it is the case that p.  But it does, however, 
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seem pretty clear that S's belief to the effect that T 
told her that p would count as a non-inferential 
belief according to our criterion LC.  The more 
controversial aspect of the claim above to the effect 
that our beliefs about being informed by someone are 
prima facie justified can then, if the analysis 
suggested here is appropriate, be reduced to the 
question as to whether our beliefs to the effect that 
we can trust people are prima facie justified.   
 
But to believe that you can trust someone is something 
you do because you believe in that person, and there 
seems to be an important difference between believing 
that and believing in.  We here seem to have a 
distinction which is similar to the distinction 
between knowing that and knowing how.  That S knows 
that p signifies that S stands in a specific relation 
to the true proposition p, so that we may say that S 
has a propositional attitude when S knows that p.  But 
when we e.g. say that S knows how to drive a car, no 
such propositional attitude is to be found which can 
serve as an analysans.  Simlarly, I take it, when S 
believes that p that signifies that S has a 
propositional attitude, viz. a belief, towards the 
proposition p, whereas when a person S believes in a 
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person T, we have to do with a non-propositional 
attitude.  To believe in a person is to trust that 
person.  The relevance of this is that it seems 
unnatural to ask for any beliefs which are primary to 
S's belief to the effect that S can trust T.  Yes, we 
may say that S believes that she can trust T because S 
believes in or trusts T, but to believe in T is not 
the same as to have a propositional belief.  All of 
this, then, goes to show that we can treat S's belief 
to the effect that she can trust T as a primary 
belief.  It still makes sense, though, it seems, to 
ask whether one is justified in believing in a person. 
 But it seems that one in normal situations are prima 
facie justified in believing in the people with which 
one communicates, and that it takes something out of 
the ordinary for one to not be justified in believing 
in them.  Our argument for this would here be the same 
as the one presented above, viz. that we do not seem 
to need any reasons in the sense that we need to 
believe certain propositions in order to trust 
someone.  If we at all can be said to have any reasons 
for believing in people in normal situations, then 
these would, it seems, be based on factors such as 
context and body language, and such reasons would not 
be such that we could verbalize them.  But also note, 
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that we are not committed to the view that we do not 
need any propositional reasons in order to trust 
someone.  If we are right in holding that a belief to 
the effect that one can trust some person T is a 
primary belief which relies upon the fact that one 
trusts or believes in T, then it does not matter to 
our analysis whether the justification that one has 
for trusting T relies upon further propositional 
beliefs or not. 
 
We have seen that one can make a very good case for 
holding that a belief to the effect that one has been 
informed by someone should not be counted as a non-
inferential belief.  We shall, however, in parts of 
this essay for the sake of simplicity pretend that 
they are in fact non-inferential.  This should, I 
think, create no problem, as we have seen how we can 
find an inducing belief for such beliefs.  For we have 
argued that S believes that she has been informed by T 
that it is the case that p because S believes that she 
can trust T and that she was told that p is the case 
by T, and this latter belief which S has is a primary 
belief which induces the former. 
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All of this, however, raises the question as to what 
it means to say that someone is justified in believing 
something.  I shall have more to say about that 
problem in other parts of this essay, but let it here 
be remarked that I intend to be as neutral as possible 
with respect to the question as to what theory of 
justification which is the most appropriate one.  The 
solution which I propose of the Gettier problem does 
not depend upon any particular theory of 
justification. 
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 IV 
 
We will in this chapter explicate an important 
assumption which underlies the traditional definition 
of knowledge as justified true belief by means of some 
elementary set theoretic reasoning, and we then go on 
to give an argument by analogy in order to show that 
the underlying assumption must be given up.  The 
chapter then concludes with a suggested revision of 
the traditional analysis of the concept of knowledge 
which relies upon our distinction between primary and 
secondary beliefs. 
 
Let "T" denote some very large set of true 
propositions that includes all true propositions that 
S ever believes.  We will introduce the following 
notation: p0C(A) (read p is a member of the 
consequences of A, or shorter: p is a consequence of 
A) iff A entails p.  The traditional definition of 
knowledge that is presupposed in the Gettier type 
examples can then, if we incorporate our distinction 
between primary and secondary beliefs, be stated as 
follows:  
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I    p0K iff p0C(J1BP)1C(T)1B 
 
(p is known iff p is a consequence of a justified 
primary belief and a consequence of something true and 
p is believed) 
  
But, since B=BPcBS, this is equivalent to 
  
II    p0K iff p0C(J1BP)1C(T)1(BPcBS) 
(p is known iff p is a consequence of a justified 
primary belief and a consequence of something true and 
either p is a primary belief or p is believed since a 
primary belief is believed (i.e.  p is a secondary 
belief))  
 
This gives us 
 
III   p0K iff p0C(J1BP)1C(T)1BS 
(p is known if p is a consequence of a justified 
primary belief and a consequence of something true and 
p is a secondary belief)        
 
We can now see why the Gettier example succeeds.  Let 
p be "Jones owns a Ford" and q be "Brown is in 
Barcelona", and let p' be the primary belief such that 
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Smith believes p since Smith believes p'.  p' could 
e.g. be "Jones has truthfully and correctly told me 
(i.e. informed me) that he owns a Ford', or p' could 
simply be p (e.g. if Smith's evidence for p does not 
entail p? See below.).  pvq is in K because p' is in 
J1BP (and hence pvq is in C(JnBP)) and q is in T (and 
hence pvq is in C(T)) and pvq is in BS.   
 
There is some evidence for holding that the 
traditional definition of knowledge is not captured by 
I, but that it  should, given our set theoretical 
apparatus, rather be rendered as follows: 
 
IV p0K iff p0C(J)1C(T)1B 
 
Nicholas Rescher10 has e.g. given the following 
argument against the traditional definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief.  Suppose S is 
justified in holding p and p is true, but p does not 
at all believe p, and suppose further that S believes 
q but that S is not justified in holding q and q is 
not true.  Rescher assumes that the following two 
closure principles for belief and justification are 
                     
10.In the article on logic in The New 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
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true, viz. that if a subject is justified in believing 
a proposition p then that subject is justified in 
believing the proposition that p or q, and that if a 
subject believes a proposition q then that subject 
also believes the proposition that p or q.  But it 
then follows that S, who believes the unjustified and 
false proposition q and who is justified in holdinq p, 
where p is true but not believed by S, has a justified 
true belief in the proposition that p or q.  But we 
would as before not in such a situation want to say 
that S knows that p or q. 
 
Rescher's argument, we should note, suffers from two 
defects.  His argument is not supported by a genuine 
example, and it seems furthermore to be quite 
implausible to assume the closure principle for 
beliefs which he makes use of.  It is, it seems, not 
generallly true that beliefs are closed under logical 
consequences.  If our analysis in Appendix 2 is 
correct, it is a necessary condition that a 
proposition be grasped by the subject in order for it 
to be believed by the subject.  So it cannot be true 
in general that if a subject believes q then she 
believes p or q.  To see this, suppose e.g. that the 
subject is a child who believes that snow is white.  
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We do not then want to say that she e.g. believes that 
snow is white or the continuum hypothesis is true, for 
she doesn't even grasp the proposition that snow is 
white or the continuum hypothesis is true. 
 
It may, however, it seems, on the basis of our 
disquotational principle DP be possible to generate a 
genuine counterexample to the traditional definition 
of knowledge as it is rendered by IV without assuming 
any closure principles for belief statements.  Suppose 
Andrea, who is the mother of John, is the victim of 
wishful thinking.  She has overwhelming evidence for 
believing that John is into drugs and that he does not 
attend school.  But she believes that John is drug 
free and attending school nonetheless.  So we can say 
of Andrea that she is justified in holding that John 
is into drugs and that she does not believe that John 
is into drugs.  On a given day when John is supposed 
to be at school, Andrea would be disposed to assent to 
the sentence "John is at school", so, given DP, she 
believes that John is at school.  As it turns out, 
John isn't at school, rather, he is using drugs.  But 
clearly Andrea would also be disposed to assent to the 
sentence "John is at school or John is using drugs", 
even though she would not assent to the sentence "John 
  
  69 
is using drugs".  So Andrea believes that John is at 
school or John is using drugs, and her belief is 
justified and true.  But we would not want to say that 
Andrea knows that John is at school or John is using 
drugs.  If one thinks that this example is somewhat 
less than entirely convincing, one may want to replace 
"John is at school" with some other sentence which 
expresses an utterly unjustified and false belief 
which Andrea may have. 
 
Whether I or IV should be taken to be the most 
appropriate rendering of the traditional definition of 
knowledge may be a matter of controversy.  The 
question does, however, not have any bearings on the 
considerations which are to follow, and I shall 
therefore be assuming that I gives an adequate 
rendering of the traditional definition.  The 
conclusions reached would be unaffected if we were to 
assume that IV gives the adequate rendering of the 
traditional definition instead of assuming that I 
gives an appropriate rendering of it. 
 
But I differs from 
 
V    p0K iff p0C(J1BP1T)1B 
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(p is known iff p is a consequence of a justified true 
primary belief and p is believed)  
 
As a consequence, II and III differ from the 
corresponding statements that we get by using V 
instead of I:  
 
VI     p0K iff p0C(J1BP1T)1(BPcBS) 
(p is known iff p is a consequence of a justified true 
primary belief and either p is a primary belief or p 
is believed since a primary belief is believed (i.e.  
p is a secondary belief))  
 
VII    p0K  if p0C(J1BP1T)1BS 
(p is known if p is a consequence of a justified true 
primary belief and p is a secondary belief)  
 
To see that V differs from I it suffices to show that 
C(J1BP)1C(T) is not logically equivalent to C(J1BP1T) 
(because of the tautology pe((p&q/p&r)/(q/r)), and 
because something known has to be believed).  To show 
this it is enough to show that there are sets A and B 
such that C(A1B) is different from C(A)1C(B). 
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Consider the sets A={p} and B={q}, where pvq is 
different from any logical truth.  We then have 
pwq0C(A) and pwq0C(B), since both p and q entails pwq. 
 So pwq0C(A)1C(B).  But A1B is the empty set, and the 
empty set only entails logical truths.  As pwq was 
supposed to be different from any logical truths, we 
have that pwqóC(A1B).  It follows that C(A1B) is not 
generally equivalent to C(A)1C(B).   
 
At this point I want to appeal to an analogy in order 
to justify that we should use V and not I in order to 
capture the notion of knowledge.  Consider the 
statement "A bachelor is an unmarried man".  We can 
from this form the true statement that the set of 
bachelors (Ba) is identical to the intersection of the 
set of unmarried people (U) and the set of men (M), 
i.e.  Ba = U1M.  Suppose we now want to talk about the 
set of all mothers of bachelors Mo(Ba).  Is this set 
identical to Mo(U)1Mo(M) or to Mo(U1M)? It is 
identical to the latter but not to the former.  For 
someone, say Tina, could be the mother of an unmarried 
woman and the mother of a married man but not the 
mother of an unmarried man, so Tina0Mo(U)1Mo(M) and 
TinaóMo(Ba).  Because we have introduced the 
distinction between primary beliefs and secondary 
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beliefs which enabled us to use the C- operator in the 
analysis, we can interpret the Gettier problem as 
giving us a structurally similar argument for 
considering V and not I as the most proper explication 
of knowledge.   
Note that it is only in this more constructive phase 
of our investigation that we have had a real need for 
the incorporation of our distinction between primary 
and secondary beliefs.  If we did not have these 
constructive concerns, we could have formulated I 
without making any appeals to the distinction between 
primary and secondary beliefs, and our argument by 
analogy would even in such a case provide strong 
evidence for doubting that such a formulation could be 
an adequate explication of the concept of knowledge. 
 
We now have to be a bit careful though.  V as it 
stands is not entirely adequate as an explication of 
the concept of knowledge.  Consider the following 
possibility.  p and q are both primary beliefs that 
entail r, but r is believed (and so r0BS) only since q 
is believed and not since p is believed.  The 
epistemic subject does not make the connection between 
p and r.  p is justified and true, so r0C(J1BP1T) for 
that reason.  But q, the only belief such that r is 
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believed since it is believed, is not both justified 
and true.  It seems that we are now getting a Gettier 
type of situation again: We do not want to say that 
the epistemic subject knows r, but r satisfies V.   
 
The way to avoid this problem is to make explicit 
reference to the primary beliefs that are such that 
the particular secondary belief is believed since the 
primary beliefs are believed.  We cannot use the 
C-operator, but rather an operator that explicitly 
mentions the primary beliefs in BP that are such that 
the subject believes the relevant secondary belief 
since he believes the mentioned primary beliefs.  But 
we introduced such an operator at the end of the 
second chapter of this essay, and this can now be put 
to use.  I think we on the basis of such a strategy 
can provide an explicit definition of knowledge that 
captures both the insight expressed by formulation V, 
and the moral that can be drawn from the counter 
example that was just given.  The definition that I 
will suggest is as follows:  
 
If p is a primary belief then p is known iff p is a 
justified true belief. 
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If p is a secondary belief then p is known iff p is a 
justified true belief and at least one of the primary 
beliefs on the basis of which p is believed is known. 
           
This recursive definition can, given the notational 
convention introduced at the end of the first chapter, 
be expressed more succinctly as follows:  
 
q0K iff q0J & B(q,p1, .  .  .  ,pn) & q0T & (Kp1w 
...wKp
n
), 
 
If n=O, i.e.  if q0BP, we simply get 
 
      q0K iff q0J & B(q) & q0T 
 
Informally, the definition of knowledge presented here 
simply says that a secondary belief is known if and 
only if at least one of the inducing primary beliefs, 
i.e.  the primary beliefs that are such that the 
secondary belief is believed since they are believed, 
is known.  A primary belief is known if an only if it 
is a justified true belief.                           
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Since what is known is also justified and true, as is 
anything which is believed because of something which 
is known, we get the following result: 
 
 B(q,p1, .  .  .  ,pn) e (q0K / (Kp1w ...wKpn)) 
 
Informally: If q is believed on the basis of p1,..., 
p
n
, then q is known iff p1 is known or .....  or pn is 
known. 
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 V 
 
 
We will in this chapter deal with some Gettier type 
examples in order to vindicate the analysis given 
above.   
 
There seems to me to be seven different types of 
Gettier counter examples in the literature.  We have 
in the previous chapter already shown that the 
analysis which we are proposing is capable of dealing 
with one type of Gettier examples, viz. the one that 
arises when a disjunctive statement is believed since 
one of the disjuncts is believed.  We will therefore 
in this chapter only discuss the six remaining types 
of Gettier examples.   
One type of Gettier situation occurs when an 
existential generalization of a statement is believed 
since a particular instance of the statement is 
believed.   
 
A second type occurs when a particular instance of a 
statement is believed since a (restricted) universal 
quantification of the statement is believed.   
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A third type of Gettier situation occurs when a 
statement is believed since it is believed that what 
the statement says is or was perceptually experienced 
(e.g.  when someone says that he/she believes that the 
mail man came since he/she believes that he/she saw 
the mail man come).   
 
The fourth type that I will consider is exemplified by 
Gettier's first counter example, as it does not fit 
into either of the six other categories.   
 
A fifth type of counter example is illustrated by the 
so called pyromaniac example.   
 
I finally consider a counter example given by Richard 
Feldman.   
 
We will in going through these examples for the most 
part assume that there is only one primary belief such 
that the secondary Gettier belief is believed since 
that primary belief is believed.  We could naturally 
operate with several primary beliefs in all examples, 
but no such beliefs would, I think, be different from 
the ones that I have specified in any relevant or 
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important respects, and one of them would have to be 
known in each example.  I do therefore not think that 
the outcome of my discussion of these examples would 
be any different if I all the time assumed that there 
were several primary beliefs for the secondary Gettier 
belief. 
 
But it is at this point, I think, that the reader 
should look for a possible retort.  If it can be shown 
that there is a primary belief that I know and is such 
that I believe the Gettier belief since I believe that 
primary belief, my analysis fails.  I think that there 
are good reasons, though, to think that there are no 
such beliefs.   
 
First type.  This type can be illustrated by Keith 
Lehrer's following example11: 
 
"A pupil in S's office, Mr. Nogot, has given S 
evidence e that justifies S in believing `Mr. Nogot, 
who is in the office, owns a Ford,' from which S 
deduces p: `Someone in the office owns a Ford.' But, 
                     
11. I am citing from Robert Shope op.cit. p. 4. 
Lehrer's example appeared in the paper "Knowledge, 
Truth and Evidence", in Analysis, 25 (1965). 
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unsuspected by S, Mr. Nogot has been shamming and p is 
true because another person in the office, Mr. Havit, 
owns a Ford."  
 
In this case S's primary belief would presumptively be 
expressed by "Mr. Nogot, who is in the office, has 
(truthfully and correctly) informed me that he owns a 
Ford." But the primary belief is not known, as it 
would have to be for S to know that p according to our 
definition.   
 
Second type.  Suppose Mr. Smith has deceived Ms. Jones 
and told her that the grapes on the plate have an 
excellent taste.  The grapes are in fact clever made 
fake decoration grapes, but someone has put one 
similar looking real grape onto the plate.  Ms. Jones 
decides to taste one of them.  Ms. Jones believes that 
she is about to taste a grape, and she has 
justification for this belief.  She reaches out, and 
by chance she grabs the single grape of the heap.  Did 
she know that she was about to taste a grape? It seems 
that she did not.   
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In this example12 Ms. Jones believes that the 
particular fruit she is about to pick is a grape since 
she believes that all the things on the plate are 
grapes, and she might be said to believe that all the 
things on the plate are grapes since she has the 
primary beliefs that she sees that the things on the 
plate are grapes and that Mr. Smith has truthfully and 
correctly told her that they are all good tasting 
grapes.  But neither of these two primary beliefs are 
known.  So Ms. Jones' belief that she is about to 
taste a grape does not count as knowledge according to 
our definition of knowledge.   
 
Third type.  Mr. John Duosmith13 is estranged from his 
wife and in financial troubles.  A man's body is found 
in a hotel room, shot in his head with Duosmith's 
revolver in the hand and a "suicide note" signed by 
Duosmith.  Mrs.  Duosmith identifies the handwriting 
and the corpse as her husband's, as they are totally 
similar.  What happened, though, is that Mr. John 
Duosmith received a secret visit from his identical 
                     
12. My example is similar to Laurence Bonjour's fake 
barn example. 
13. This example is due to Villam Rozeboom, in: "Why I 
know so much more than you do", American Philosophical 
Quarterly, IV, 4, 1967. 
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twin Jim, of whom Mr. Duosmith never told his wife 
because Jim was a notorious criminal and an 
embarrassment to the family.  Jim was going to beg 
John for help to escape some former accomplices who 
were seeking retaliation for something he had done.  
John, however, saw his opportunity to avoid his 
financial troubles and to escape his wife and begin a 
new life.  So John killed Jim, wrote a "suicide note" 
and made it look like it was he, John, who were lying 
dead on the bed.  But after John left the hotel he was 
mistakenly identified as Jim by Jim's pursuers, and 
killed by them. 
 
In this case John Duosmith's wife was justified in 
believing that her husband was dead since she had the 
primary belief that she saw the dead body of her 
husband in the bed of the hotel room.  But she did not 
know that she saw her dead husband in the bed, as she 
saw Jim and not John.  According to our analysis she 
did therefore not know that her husband was dead. 
 
Fourth type.  This type is illustrated by Gettier's 
first counter example.  Smith has evidence for 
thinking that Jones is the one who will get the job 
and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket (p). Smith 
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therefore believes that the one who will get the job 
has ten coins in his pocket (q).  But Jones does not 
get the job.  Smith gets the job, and Smith, 
unbeknownst to himself, happens to have ten coins in 
his pocket.  So q is justified, true and believed, but 
not known.   
 
We can see that Smith believes q since Smith believes 
p.  Let us refer to the primary belief that is such 
that Smith believes p since he believes that primary 
belief as p'.  p' might e.g. be expressed by "The 
director has truthfully and correctly informed me that 
Jones will get the job and I have seen that Jones has 
ten coins in his pocket." But p' is not known.  As it 
is only on the basis of p' that Smith believes q, it 
follows that Smith does not know q according to our 
analysis.   
 
Fifth type.  This type is illustrated by the following 
example14, often considered to be a "causal" counter 
example to a standard definition of knowledge: 
 
                     
14. I cite from Shope op.cit. p. 25. The example is 
due to Brian Skyrms: "The explication of "X knows that 
p." Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), 373-389. 
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"Striking a match, S infers that it will light 
directly from S's knowledge that it is a dry match of 
a brand ("Sure-Fire" matches) that has often and 
always lit for S when dry and struck.  However, 
unsuspected by S this one cannot be lit by friction 
because of impurities and is going to light only 
because of a burst of rare -radiation."   
 
One could be strongly tempted to discard this as a 
genuine counter example if one has some sceptical 
inclinations.  But the nonsceptical reader may 
observe, that even if it is granted that S is 
justified in holding that the next match will light, 
he does not know that it will according to our 
definition, because his primary belief that the match 
is like previously struck Sure-Fire matches in all 
respects relevant to ignition15 is not known.  More 
simply: It seems that S believes that the match will 
light on the basis of S's belief to the effect that 
his striking of the match will cause the match to 
light.  The latter primary belief is not known as it 
is not the case that S's striking of the match causes 
the match to light. 
                     
15. Shope op.cit. credits Marshall Swain for the 
observation that S's belief in this case rests on a 
false belief. 
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Sixth type.  Richard Feldman has presented an example16 
that he takes to be a Gettier type counter example 
where the knowledge claim does not rest on a false or 
unjustified belief.  Let me cite extensively:  
 
"Suppose Mr.  Nogot tells Smith that he owns a Ford 
and even shows him a certificate to that effect.  
Suppose, further, that up till now Nogot has always 
been reliable and honest in his dealings with Smith.  
Let us call the conjunction of all this evidence (m). 
 Smith is thus justified in believing that Mr.  Nogot 
who is in his office owns a Ford (r) and, 
consequently, is justified in holding that someone in 
his office owns a Ford (h). 
 
As it turns out, though, m and h are true but r is 
false.  So, the Gettier example runs, Smith has a 
justified true belief in h, but he clearly does not 
know h. 
 
What is supposed to justify h in this example is r.  
But since r is false, the example runs afoul of the 
disputed principle (The disputed principle is that 
false evidence can justify a belief, FB).  Since r is 
false, it justifies nothing.  Hence, if the principle 
is false, the counter-example fails.   
 
We can alter the example slightly, however, so that 
what justifies h for Smith is true and he knows that 
it is.  suppose he deduces from m its existential 
generalization:  
 
(n) There is someone in the office who told Smith that 
he owns a Ford and even showed him a certificate to 
that effect, and who up till now has always been 
reliable and honest in his dealings with Smith. 
 
                     
16. In "An Alleged Defect In Gettier 
Counter-examples", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 52, No. 1 (1974), 88-69. 
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n, we should note, is true and Smith knows that it is, 
since he has correctly deduced it from m, which he 
knows to be true.  On the basis of n Smith believes h 
- someone in the office owns a Ford.  Just as the 
Nogot evidence, m, justified r = Nogot owns a Ford - 
in the original example, n justifies h in this 
example.  Thus Smith has a justified true belief in h, 
knows his evidence to be true, but still does not know 
h." 
 
I think Feldman is successful in rebutting the 
response to the Gettier problem that simply consists 
in holding that false evidence cannot justify a 
belief.  I think that we are in fact sometimes 
justified by false evidence.  It frequently happens 
that we have justified false beliefs.  In particular, 
I do not deny that Smith has a justified true belief 
in h. 
 
But Feldman's example is, I think, not successful in 
rebutting the analysis that I have presented.  Note 
that it is not the case that n entails h, for it does 
not follow from the fact that you are told that h is 
the case that it is the case that h.  Feldmann's 
example is therefore not one that disconfirms our 
analysis in the sense of finding beliefs P and Q that 
is such that S believes Q since S believes P and S 
knows P and it is implausible to say that S knows Q.  
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For since n does not entail h it is not the case that 
Smith believes h since he believes n.   
 
But, given that Smith believes h, it must also be the 
case that Smith believes  
 
(n') Someone in the office informed Smith 
that he owns a Ford. 
 
In fact, given Feldmann's scenario, Smith believes h 
since he believes n', i.e. if we, for the sake of 
simplicity, assume that n' is a primary belief.17  But 
Smith does not know n', for n' is false.   
 
Feldmann's example is thus not succesful in rebutting 
our analysis, which is not the same as to say that our 
analysis has been proven to be true.  As is the case 
for most philosophical theories, it may be impossible 
to prove the theory which we are suggesting.  If the 
theory is false it can be proved to be false by 
finding a falsifying example.  If the theory is true, 
it is still most likely that it is impossible to prove 
that it is true.  But we may gain confidence in the 
                     
17.See our discussion concerning "informed that 
.." in chapter III. 
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theory from the fact that it holds in many and all 
instances in which the theory has been tested.  
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 VI 
 
We will in this chapter consider objections that have 
been raised against four other types of responses to 
the Gettier problem. 
 
One response to the Gettier problem which we already 
discussed in the first chapter consists in adding a 
fourth condition stating that the justified true 
belief must be indefeasible, wher "indefeasibility" 
means something like "The subject's justification must 
be such that no further addition to his evidence would 
undermine his justification."  A lot of epicycles have 
later been added to this kind of approach, as it soon 
became clear that such a condition, as it stands, is 
too strong.  The following example should make this 
clear18: 
 
"S believes that his acquaintance, Tom Grabit, stole a 
book from the library since S saw Tom do it.  But, 
unsuspected by S, Tom has an identical twin brother 
who was in the library near the time of the theft."  
                     
18. Cited from Shope op.cit. p. 45-46. 
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The Tom Grabit example shows that the defeasibility 
analysis is too strong.  How is the analysis that we 
have presented affected by the Tom Grabit counter 
example? It is not affected at all.  It is simply not 
relevant that Tom Grabit's twin was in the library 
near the time of the theft.  S knows that Tom Grabit 
stole the book, because S's primary belief (viz. that 
S saw Tom take the book) is justified and true, and 
hence known.  S might of course loose his belief if he 
is later informed about the twin's presence.   
 
Another type of response consists in adding a fourth 
condition that prohibits false propositions to 
constitute the evidence for or the justification for 
the proposition.  There is the following counter 
example19,: 
 
"S is told by Mr. Nogot and by Mr. Havit who are in 
his office that they own Fords.  S infers that someone 
in his office owns a Ford.  But Mr. Nogot is shamming, 
whereas Mr. Havit tells the truth." 
 
                     
19. This example is taken from Keith Lehrer op.cit. 
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In this case we would want to say that S did know that 
someone in the office owned a Ford, but the proposal 
to eliminate false evidence does not get this result. 
 The analysis is therefore too strong.  Our analysis, 
however, is not harmed by this example, because the 
primary belief that Mr. Havit has informed S 
(truthfully and correctly) that he owns a Ford is 
known.  So S knows that someone in the office owns a 
Ford. 
 
A third type of response may be exemplified by the so 
called causal analyses of knowledge.  There are many 
different variants of these.  One, due to Max 
Steiner20, consists in adding the following condition: 
"The sentence "p" must be used in a causal explanation 
of S's believing that "p" is true." The following 
example due to Alvin Goldman21 is considered to be a 
counter example: 
 
                     
20. I cite from Shope op.cit. p. 120. Steiner's 
article is: "Platonism and the Causal Theory of 
Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy, 70:57-66. 
21.  I cite from Shope op.cit. p. 121. Goldmann's 
article is: "A Causal Theory of Knoving", Journal of 
Philosophy, 64:357ff. 
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"The Careless Typesetter.  On a newspaper known to be 
generally reliable, a typesetter carelessly misprints 
details of a story which S misreads because of 
eyestrain in such a fashion as to believe the true 
story." 
 
The example is not a counter example to our analysis 
of knowledge, however, for S believes the true story 
only since he has the primary belief that the 
newspaper presents the true story.  But that primary 
belief is not known, so S does not know the true 
story.   
 
We will finally consider a counter example to an 
analysis of knowledge due to Ernest Sosa22.  The 
counter example is due to Gilbert Harman23: 
 
                     
22. "Epistemic Pressupposition", in George S. Papaas 
(ed.): "Justification", Dordrecht Reidel 1979. Sosa's 
analysis of knowledge is rather complex, and we would 
not do his analysis justice by presenting an all too 
brief paraphrase of it. Let it just be mentioned that 
Sosa's analysis relies on what he calls "trees of 
justification". The reader is referred to Sosa's 
article, or to Shope op.cit. p.1O3ff. 
23. I cite from Shope op.cit. p.ll4. The example is 
due to Gilbert Green: "Reasoning and Evidence One Does 
not Possess.", in Peter French et.al.: Midwest Studies 
In Philosophy. Volume V: Studies in Epistemology. 
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"The unobtainable unopened letter.  S knows p: `Norman 
is in Italy,' thanks to being told upon phoning 
Norman's office that he is spending the summer in 
Rome.  In addition, Norman tried to deceive S by 
having a friend in San Fransisco mail a letter from 
Norman to S claiming that he is spending the summer in 
San Fransisco.  The letter will continue to lie 
unopened in a building to which the postman 
misdelivered it on its way from San Fransisco to S." 
 
But the unopened letter does not matter any more than 
the presence of Tom Grabit's twin in the library for 
our analysis of knowledge.  S believes that Norman is 
in Italy since he has the primary belief that he has 
been correctly informed that Norman is in Italy, and 
that primary belief is justified and true.  So, 
according to our analysis, S knows that Norman is in 
Italy. 
 
There are many more responses to the Gettier problem. 
 And it would probably exceed the proper limits of any 
essay to discuss them all.  As far as I can see, all 
of the responses that have been suggested have their 
problems.  I do not at this point see any problems 
with my own analysis.  But, as the art of giving 
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counter example is pretty sophisticated, it would be 
somewhat premature to conclude that a final solution 
of the Gettier problem has been presented.  We will in 
the next chapter study a different type of counter 
example which seems to threaten the analysis which I 
have suggested as a solution of the Gettier problem. 
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 VII 
 
 
7.0. 
Our analysis of knowledge is amongst other things 
supposed to avoid the Gettier type examples, and we 
have, if I am right, in the previous two chapters seen 
that it does indeed avoid many of them, but a problem 
of the following kind may arise with the account which 
has been given up to now.   
 
Suppose Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford simply 
because Smith believes that he has often and always 
seen Jones drive a Ford.  In this case the belief 
because of which Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford 
does not entail that Jones owns a Ford.  So, given 
this description, Smith's belief that Jones owns a 
Ford would have to be counted as a primary belief 
according to our analysis, and it would seem that his 
belief is justified.  If so, Smith knows that Jones 
owns a Ford if Jones owns a Ford.  Suppose Jones in 
fact does own a Ford, but not the one that Smith has 
seen him drive which is one that he has leased, or it 
is a company car.  We now seem to get a Gettier 
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situation which our analysis is not able to account 
for, for we would not want to say that Smith knows 
that Jones owns a Ford, but according to our analysis 
it seems that he does. 
 
In general, how do we account for Gettier type 
situations where the evidence does not entail the 
Gettier belief, in which case our analysis would 
classify the Gettier belief as a primary belief and 
hence as knowledge if justified and true?  We will 
call this an inductive Gettier situation. 
 
I will divide my answer to this question into two 
sections.  In the first section I will work on the 
basis of the assumption that there indeed are such 
Gettier beliefs which are not entailed by a belief 
because of which they are held.  In the second section 
I will suggest that there are no such Gettier beliefs. 
 If my argument in the second section is correct, we 
avoid some potential difficulties associated with the 
account given in the first section.  In particular, we 
will then have a theory which arguably has less 
problems while remaining uncommitted to 
foundationalism and skepticism.  On the other hand it 
seems that the approach of the second section will be 
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committed to a moderate scepticism with respect to at 
least some unobserved matters of fact, but that is a 
form of skepticism which I think that we should be 
willing to embrace.  If the conclusion of my argument 
in the second section should be false, i.e. if there 
indeed are inductive Gettier cases, the approach that 
I have given in the first section will remain as an 
alternative, but, maybe less plausible account.  Let 
me, however, remark that the difference between the 
two following accounts should not be exaggerated.  
They both seem to me to be viable and somewhat similar 
solutions to the inductive Gettier problem.  Maybe the 
most important reason why I opt for the second account 
is that it is less complicated and also more congenial 
to traditional accounts of inductive arguments. 
 
In a second subsection of the first section I give an 
outline of a strategy which can be used in order to 
adopt the approach of the first subsection of that 
section while at the same time avoiding any 
commitments to humean skepticism with respect to 
induction.  I am not claiming that the strategy that I 
outline is altogether satisfactory, but then again, 
nor are, to my knowledge, any other accounts of 
inductive reasoning.   
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In a third subsection of the first section I show how 
one on the basis of the discussion which precedes may 
arrive at an alternative formulation of our analysis 
which may be thought of as a certain simplification of 
the analysis which we have proposed earlier, but I 
then argue that we should not adopt any such 
alternative formulations because the connection 
between a secondary belief and its inducing primary 
beliefs then gets lost. 
 
Although I do not, at least not fully, endorse the 
approach given in the first section to follow, I do 
think that some important observations on the nature 
of justification are made in the discussion there.  
Some of these observations should, I think, be taken 
seriously independently of the inductive Gettier 
problem, and it is for that reason that I devote the 
next chapter to an analysis of the so called lottery 
paradox. 
 
 
7.1.1. 
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It is not, it would seem, reasonable to hold that a 
belief q, which S believes because S believes p, is 
justified if S's belief in p is justified, unless p in 
fact entails q.  We are here assuming that S does not 
have some other belief p' which is justified and 
entails q and is such that S believes q because S 
believes p'.  To see that it may be claimed to be 
unreasonable to think that something less than an 
entailing inference can transmit justification, 
suppose e.g. that Tim is justified in holding that 
John comes from the USA, but does not at all know from 
where in the USA.  Tim knows the USA very well, and 
reasons as follows: "Most people from USA do not come 
from Bakersfield, California, so John most likely 
comes from USA'=USA minus Bakersfield.  Most people 
from USA' do not come from Barstow, California, so 
John most likely comes from USA''=USA' minus 
Barstow.....  and so on.  So John most likely comes 
from 212 84th Street in New York City."  
 
Tim is, however, clearly no more justified in 
believing that John comes from Manhattan than he is in 
believing that he comes from anywhere else in the USA, 
including Bakersfield.  But if one thinks that 
something less than entailment from p to q is 
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sometimes sufficient to preserve justification, then 
why isn't Tim justified in holding that John comes 
from 212 84th Street?  Let us call the problem which 
we have pointed out for the paradox of justification.  
 
One might reply that the paradox of justification 
depends upon a sorites type argument, and that Tim 
stops being justified somewhere down the line in his 
chain of reasoning.  And it is true enough that the 
paradox of justification is based upon a sorites type 
argument, but I cannot see that one can evade the 
paradox just by so labeling the argument upon which 
the paradox is based.  If one holds that Tim is 
justified in believing that John comes from, say, 
USA'''', but that Tim is not justified further on in 
his chain of reasoning, then it seems clear that one's 
notion of justification is a somewhat vague one that 
admits of different degrees, one of which would 
presumptively be considered minimal.  Let us call this 
weak justification.  As weak justification is vague, 
we will not attempt to make this notion precise. 
 
While what I have here called weak justification may 
not be an unreasonable or useless notion, it conflicts 
with the more strict notion of justification which may 
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seem appropriate as a condition for knowledge, and 
which we, following Ayer, can define as having the 
right to be certain.  Applied to our examples above, 
it is then clear that while Tim may be justified in 
believing that John comes from the USA, it is not the 
case that he is justified in believing that John comes 
from USA', for he has no right to be certain that John 
comes from USA' since he doesn't have the right to be 
certain that John does not come from Bakersfield, 
California.  Likewise, while Smith may be justified in 
believing that he has often and always seen Jones 
drive a Ford even in the strong sense of having the 
right to be certain, this does not, it seems, give him 
the the right to be certain that Jones owns a Ford.  
It seems that the paradox of justification shows that 
a belief q, which is inferential in the sense that it 
is believed because a belief p is believed, must be 
entailed by a strongly justified belief p' which is 
such that q is believed because p' is believed in 
order for q to be strongly justified. 
 
Perhaps the following example would bring out the 
difference between the notions of strong and weak 
justification that we have discerned.  Suppose Smith 
has bought one Lotto ticket.  According to the weak 
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notion of justification, it would be appropriate to 
say that Smith is justified in holding that he is not 
going to win.  But Smith does not have the right to be 
certain that he is not going to win, so he is not what 
we can call strongly justified in holding that he is 
not going to win.   
 
It seems to be beyond any doubt, that someone that 
subscribes to weak justification and holds that we are 
sometimes justified in holding q when we believe q 
because we believe p where p does not entail q, need 
not, and in fact cannot, hold that all non-deductive 
inferences preserve justification.  For there are 
cases when it is obvious that the non deductive 
inference does not preserve justification.  A hasty 
generalization is one such case.  The problem for an 
adherent of weak justification is therefore to give an 
account of "justifies" that decides when non-deductive 
inferences preserve justification, and when they do 
not preserve justification.  The paradox of 
justification shows that this may be a difficult 
problem indeed, and that such an account will most 
likely have difficulties with preserving our intuition 
that if p justifies q and q justifies r then p 
justifies r.  It will have such difficulties because, 
  
  102 
as I have tried to show with my example, epistemic 
closure principles for nondeductive inferences like 
the one expressed by the sentence  "a is an F and the 
vast majority of F's are G's, therefore a is a G"  
must be false.  I may be completely justified or even 
know that a is an F and also that the vast majority of 
F's are G's without being justified or knowing that a 
is a G.  This last statement is obviously true for 
knowledge, as it may be the case that it is false that 
a is a G.  But it is, as my argument above has shown, 
also false for justification if we by "justified" mean 
"having the right to be certain".   
 
Maybe an adherent to weak justification could make a 
good case for allowing one or a few applications of an 
epistemic closure principle as the one I have 
indicated.  But if so, he would have to give up the 
principle that if p justifies q and q justifies r then 
p justifies r, since one cannot accept an indefinite 
number of applications of such an epistemic closure 
principle.  This is a problem which is avoided if one 
adheres to what I have called strong justification. 
 
It seems, though, that there may be a way around the 
paradox of justification without giving up one's 
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acceptance of what I have called weak justification.  
We will here try to give a rough sketch of such an 
approach to justification which shows that one may 
adopt a weaker notion of justification than the one 
which says that one must have the right to be certain 
in order to be justified, and at the same time avoid 
the paradox of justification and also the related 
lottery paradox which we will discuss in the next 
chapter. I am not suggesting that the approach which I 
outline should be adopted.  
 
Think of probabilities as in some sense being 
determined by the subjective expectations of a person. 
 The expression P(q)=1 may e.g. roughly signify that S 
expects that q with complete certainty.  Let there be 
some number t which is smaller than 1 but close enough 
to 1 so that the following relationship between 
justification and probability may be said to hold 
according to the adherent of weak justification: 
 
  J(q) e P(q)$t 
 
Let us now define the following relationship between 
propositions: 
 
  
  104 
 (q => r)  /  P(r\q)$ (1 + t - P(q)) 
(Or in words: (q => r) if, and only if, the 
probability of r given q is larger than or equal to 1 
+ t  minus the probability of q.) 
 
Note that q => r is not defined if P(q)<t.  Suppose it 
is the case that q => r.  Since the probability of r, 
i.e.  P(r), is given by P(q) multiplied by P(r\q), we 
see that 
 
  P(r) = (t + t2 - t @P(q)) $ (t + t2 - t2 ) = t 
 
So if q => r then P(r)$t.   
 
It seems that we now have a relationship between 
propositions which on the one hand is weaker than 
entailment but which on the other hand is strong 
enough for the following relation to hold: 
 
 (Jq & (q => r) & q>r) e Jr 
 
(Here "q>r" abbreviates "S believes r because S 
believes q".) Suppose P(q)=1.  By the definition of (q 
=> r), the probability of r given that q is the case 
must then be larger than or equal to t, i.e.  
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P(r\q)$t.  Suppose P(q)=t.  The definition of q => r 
now gives P(r\q)=1.  So in the case when P(q)=t the 
relationship q => r will hold if, and only if, the 
probability that r obtains given that q obtains equals 
1. 
 
One might want to consider the possibility that the 
relation q => r could serve instead of entailment in 
our analysis of knowledge, since "=>" is transitive.  
In order to decide whether this is possible one would, 
I think, need to do some research on the metaphysics 
of probability and on the relationship between 
probability and justification.  It seems, though, that 
one may at least use such an approach as the one which 
I have outlined here in order to avoid the paradox of 
justification and the lottery paradox.  I do, however, 
not think that such an approach would be successful, 
and there are three reasons for that.  It seems that 
the numerical value of the parameter t which we have 
used in stating this approach could only be settled by 
a rather arbritrary stipulation.  As soon as one were 
to stipulate a numerical value N(t) of t, it seems 
that one could reasonably ask for a justification for 
why one should use the number N(t) rather than e.g. 
the number N(t) minus 0.002.  Secondly, an approach 
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like the one I have outlined would have to rely upon a 
certain metaphysics of probability which may be 
befuddled with methodological problems.  How can we 
possibly measure the probability of a proposition if 
the probability of a statement is to be thought of in 
terms of the subjects expectations?  Thirdly, although 
there may be ways around the former problem, e.g. 
along the lines suggested by Ramsey, the connection 
between subjective probability and justification which 
is presupposed is at the very least questionable.  For 
it seems that we are sometimes in epistemic situations 
where we are justified in holding a proposition 
without believing that proposition, and the subjective 
notion of probability which was presupposed in the 
approach outlined above would essentially be based on 
a reduction of high probability measures to high 
degrees of belief.  
 
It seems, then, that the sketched alternative 
strategy, which basically relied upon a technique that 
made it possible to avoid the paradox of justification 
while adhering to a weak notion of justification, runs 
into insuperable difficulties.  Given these problems 
with the alternative approach, our policy will be to 
use the word "justification" in the strong sense.  We 
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will, in other words, treat the word "justified" as 
being synonymous with "having the right to be 
certain", because it is, it seems, in this strong 
sense that we need to be justified in order to know.  
At least there is this sense of being justified, and 
it is worthwile to explore the scope and limits of the 
notion of knowledge which it gives rise to.   
 
A further argument for using this strong sense of 
justification is that it is consistent with a 
restriction as to when inferential beliefs are 
justified which may help us to avoid the inductive 
Gettier problem.  Let us, in order to show this, again 
make use of the distinction between inferential and 
noninferential beliefs.  Let us, for the sake of 
simplicity assume, contrary to what we have shown to 
be the case earlier24, that a belief is inferential iff 
it is believed because some other belief is believed, 
and a belief is noninferential iff it is not 
inferential.  Recall that a belief q is believed by S 
because a belief p is believed by S iff "S believes p" 
is a true answer to the question "Why does S believe 
q?".   We are thus using "because" as before, but do 
                     
24.See our discussion of primary beliefs and 
inferential beliefs in chapter IV. 
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not now have the requirement that an inferential 
belief q is believed because of a belief p which also 
entails q. 
 
Given this distinction, we see readily that any 
secondary belief is inferential.  But it seems clear 
that also a primary belief may be inferential.  This 
latter possibility is the one that gives rise to the 
inductive Gettier problem.  We will in the following 
suggest a way to overcome the inductive Gettier 
problem by relying upon a restriction as to when 
inferential beliefs are justified. 
 
Let "p>q" abbreviate "S believes q because S believes 
p".  A principle which it seems can be invoked in 
order to avoid the inductive Gettier problem can then 
be stated as follows: 
 
JP (›p)(p>q) e (Jq / (›p)(p entails q & p>q & Jp))  
 
In other words: An inferential belief is justified iff 
it is entailed by a justified belief because of which 
it is believed.  It follows by iteration that this 
amounts to the same as holding that an inferential 
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belief is justified iff it is a secondary belief which 
is induced by a justified primary belief. 
 
One should note that the principle JP has as a 
consequence that a subject S is not justified in 
holding q if S believes q because S believes some 
proposition p1 and ......  S believes q because S 
believes pn, where none of p1,..., pn entails q but a 
conjunction of some of p1,..., pn does entail q, even 
though S may be completely justified in believing the 
conjuncts of that conjunction.  This seems to be an 
implausible result.  In order to avoid this result, we 
need to avoid a situation in which no single one of 
the propositions pi as specified above entails q but a 
conjunction of some of them does.  We will therefore 
assume that the following holds: If p1 and p2 are 
logically distinct, i.e. if neither p1 is a logical 
consequence of p2 nor p2 is a logical consequence of 
p1, and S believes q because S believes p1 and S 
believes q because S believes p2 then S also believes 
q because S believes p1 and p2.  In symbols: 
 
CP If (p1,p2)>q and -|p1ep2 and -|p2ep1 then (p1, 
p2, p1&p2)>q. 
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CP may be taken as an additional stipulation 
concerning the because-relation which we have been 
using all along.   
 
I now want to discuss the relationship between the 
principle JP and the analysis of knowledge as 
presented earlier.  For it may on reflection seem that 
the principle JP supersedes the analysis of knowledge 
that has been presented, and that JP can provide us 
with a rather simple solution to the Gettier problem. 
 May it, so one may ask, not simply suffice to require 
that the evidence for a belief must entail the belief 
in order for it to count as knowledge?  But such a 
strategy will not work, for the evidence for the 
belief, i.e. its inducing belief, may be false.  We 
have already stressed that primary beliefs can be 
false.  S may e.g. believe that Tegucigalpa is the 
capital of Guatemala since S believes that the 
geography teacher informed S that Tegucigalpa is the 
capital of Guatemala.  But the geography teacher 
misinformed S.  The latter belief is a false, although 
justified primary belief.  But this fact will allow 
Gettier problems to remain since S e.g. may form a 
disjunctive belief to the effect that Tegucigalpa is 
the capital of Guatemala or Brown is in Barcelona, and 
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yet though S knows nothing about Brown's whereabouts, 
Brown happens to be in Barcelona. 
 
But may it not suffice, in order to deal with the 
Gettier examples, to require, as in JP, that the 
evidence for a belief must entail the belief in order 
for the belief to be justified? Can we in such a 
manner preserve the traditional definition of 
knowledge as justified true belief? The answer is no, 
and for the same reason as above.  Consider the 
example we just gave, where S has a justified false 
belief to the effect that Tegucigalpa is the capital 
of Guatemala.  Let us call the statement that 
Tegucigalpa is the capital of Guatemala p.  Let q be 
any statement such that S disbelieves q or S does not 
believe q and q is true, and suppose S reasons and 
accepts the statement that either p or q.  Let us call 
this disjunction r.  It is clear that r is a justified 
true belief, given that we, as I think we should, 
count S's belief in p as a justified belief.  But we 
do not want to say that S knows r.  This shows that JP 
cannot replace our analysis of knowledge, but can only 
supplement it in order to avoid the inductive Gettier 
examples.   
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There is, I think, more to be said for principle JP 
than the fact that it makes it possible to get around 
the difficulties we encountered with the inductive 
Gettier example.25  I think that as a matter of fact 
most of our inferential beliefs are such that they are 
entailed by some of the beliefs because of which they 
are held.   These are examples of questions that we 
have to consider in order to test this intuition: 
 
A  Suppose you are inside a house and look out.  You 
see the branches of the trees moving in a certain way 
and infer that the wind is blowing.  Is it the case 
that 
 
 a) You believe that the wind is blowing because 
you believe that you see the branches of the trees 
move like they do? 
 
Or: 
 
 b) You believe that the wind is blowing because 
you believe that you see the branches of the trees 
move like they do and if the wind weren't blowing then 
                     
25. See e.g. the next section. 
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you wouldn't see the branches of the trees move like 
they do? 
 
 
B  Suppose you come to believe that Smith owns a Ford 
after having often and always seen Smith drive a Ford. 
 Is it the case that  
 
 
 a) You believe that Smith owns a Ford because you 
believe that you have often and always seen Smith 
drive a Ford? 
 
Or: 
 
 b) You believe that Smith owns a Ford because you 
believe that you have often and always seen Smith 
drive a Ford and if Smith didn't own a Ford then you 
wouldn't often and always have seen him drive a Ford? 
 
 
It seems that b) is the most reasonable answer to give 
to these questions.    
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It also seems to be a fact, and I think in a certain 
sense a necessary fact, about us, that we believe a 
whole range of conditional propositions like: If the 
water is heated then it will boil, not freeze.  I will 
burn if I touch the fire.  If I don't eat and drink 
I'll die.  If (I see that) the branches of the trees 
are moving in certain ways then the wind blows.  Such 
conditional beliefs play a role in making inferential 
beliefs into beliefs that are entailed by some of the 
beliefs because of which they are held.  At least so 
one may claim.  But not only may they play such a 
role.  They also seem to play a more important and 
irreplaceable role in our biological survival.  It 
seems that we couldn't possibly not have a whole range 
of such action guiding conditional beliefs as the 
one's mentioned, and survive.  Why would we take the 
stairs or the elevator instead of jumping out the 
window from a tall building to leave it if we didn't 
believe that the latter strategy would be a fatal one? 
 
But this raises the question as to what the nature of 
these conditionals is.  Are they simply material 
conditionals?  No.  It would seem not.  They must be 
some kinds of subjunctive conditionals or causal 
statements.  We do not simply believe that the water 
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will boil if it is heated in the material and 
truthfunctional sense that either the water is not 
heated or it will boil.  We believe that the fact that 
the water is heated will in some sense cause the water 
to boil.  Similarly, we believe that the fact that we 
touch the fire will cause us to burn, and so on for 
similar cases.   
 
But do such causal if-then-statements ensure that the 
consequent is entailed by the truth of the statement 
plus the truth of the antecedent?  The nature of 
causal statements is a controversial issue in 
metaphysics, and we do not want to get sidetracked by 
getting involved in that discussion.  For our purposes 
it should suffice to think of causal statements in 
terms of subjunctive conditionals, but it then seems 
that a bifurcation must occur.  We may, it seems, in 
some situations understand the causal proposition that 
the state of affairs p causes the state of affairs q 
as being identical with the proposition expressed by 
"If q weren't the case then p wouldn't have been the 
case".
26
  Let us call a causal statement which is 
                     
26.If one finds it hard to swallow that the 
causal if-then statement is being 
identified with a subjunctive conditional, 
one may instead read me as if I am 
suggesting that the causal statement 
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natural to interpret in such a way an antecedent-
causal statement.  An example of an antecedent-causal 
statement would be the statement that the man died 
because he jumped from the Eifell tower.  In some 
other situations it seems to be more appropriate to 
understand the proposition that the state of affairs p 
causes the state of affairs q as being identical with 
the proposition expressed by "If p weren't the case 
then q wouldn't have been the case".27  We will call 
such causal statements consequent-causal statements.  
 An example of a consequent-causal statement would be 
the statement that the fetus was conceived because the 
lovers had intercourse.  Given such an approach as 
this we see that the truth of an antecedent-causal 
statement together with the truth of the antecedent 
entail the consequent.  For q certainly follows by 
modus tollens if it is both the case that p and that 
if q weren't the case then p wouldn't have been the 
case.  Similarly, we see that the truth of a 
consequent-causal statement together with the truth of 
the consequent of such a statement entail the 
antecedent. 
                                                      
entails the subjunctive conditional. 
27.See previous footnote. 
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One may take all of these considerations to support 
the thesis that many, maybe most inferential beliefs 
are beliefs that are entailed by some of the beliefs 
because of which they are held.  In fact, it would 
even seem to lend support to the thesis that 
inferential beliefs in general are entailed by some of 
the beliefs because of which they are held, and that 
we could lay down the following principle: 
 
BP (›p)(p>q) e (›p)(p|q v p>q) 
 
Or informally: If there is a belief because of which S 
believes q then there is a belief because of which S 
believes q and which also entails q.   
 
But I do not think that BP is true.  There seem to be 
strong reasons to think that there are cases where I 
believe something q but also realize that my evidence 
for the belief q is far from conclusive.  I may e.g. 
believe that the wine will taste good (p) simply 
because I believe that the wine comes from France.  
The latter does not entail the former.  At best it 
makes it somewhat probable.  Or I may believe that red 
will come up next on the roulette table (q) because I 
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believe that black has come up fifteen times in a row, 
without believing something that entails that red will 
come up next.  I may in a sense just choose to believe 
that red will come up next because I believe that 
black has come up so many times.  In the same way, I 
may choose to believe that red will not come up 
fifteen times in a row.  Principle BP would require 
there to be beliefs I have which entail p and q 
respectively, and that seems to be an unreasonable 
requirement, as p and q both have the status of being 
more or less educated guesses. 
 
The reason why I bring principle BP into the 
discussion is that I want to refute the following 
somewhat seducing considerations that one could 
marshall in favour of principle BP: 
 
The following two axioms for belief statements seem 
reasonable: 
 
B1 ((Bp w B-p) & Bq) e B(peq) 
 
B2 (Bp & Bq) e B(p & q) 
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If these axioms are true, and I in fact do believe 
that red will come out next because I believe that 
black has come out fifteen times in a row, it seems to 
follow that I by that very fact also believe that 
black has come out fifteen times in a row and if black 
has come out fifteen times in a row then red will come 
out next.  It then seems natural to say that I believe 
that red will come out next because I believe that 
black has come out fifteen times in a row and if black 
has come out fifteen times in a row then red will come 
out next.  Likewise, it seems natural, given our 
example above, to say that I believe that the wine 
will taste good because I believe that the wine is 
French and if the wine is French then the wine will 
taste good. 
 
One mistake in the above argument is that it 
presupposes that the truth functional conditional can 
always be used in an adequate rendering of if-then-
statements.  But it is far from plausible to hold that 
a belief in a material conditional which a subject has 
as a result of B1 can be understood as a belief in an 
if-then-statement.  The reasons why this is not 
plausible are well known.  If we e.g. let p be the 
proposition that 2+2=4 and q the proposition that the 
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earth is round then we get as a result that anyone who 
believes both of these also believes the proposition 
(2+2=4 e the earth is round).  So far, so good.  But 
we do not ordinarily say that anyone believes that if 
2+2=4 then the earth is round, so we shouldn't 
interpret a subject's belief in the proposition (2+2=4 
e the earth is round) as a belief in the proposition 
that if 2+2=4 then the earth is round.  It is for this 
reason not reasonable to make such a use of principle 
B1 as is presupposed in the argument above. 
 
A second mistake in the above argument is that it 
seems to reverse the order of things.  Yes, B1 and B2 
seem to be plausible principles, but rather than 
showing that a subject who believes q because he or 
she believes p thereby also believes q because he or 
she believes p & (p e q), it seems to show that 
someone who believes e.g. p and q thereby believes (p 
e q) because she believes p and q.  And the subject 
need not believe both of p and q in order to believe 
(p e q) for that reason.  For (p e q) is equivalent to 
(-p w q), so a subject may therefore believe (p e q) 
simply because she believes q, or simply because she 
believes -p. 
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There may, on the other hand, be another way in which 
someone in fact  believes that a certain wine is good 
because she believes that the wine is French and if 
the wine is French then the wine is good.  But then 
the conditional statement believed by the subject 
would presumptively be an instance of a law-like 
proposition, or it could be a belief in a causal 
conditional of the kind that we have discussed above. 
 A person who believes such a conditional might e.g. 
be under the false impression that all wines that are 
French are good.  But a belief in such a law-like 
proposition or causal conditional cannot be inferred 
from B1 plus the fact that someone believes that a 
wine is good because he or she believes that it is 
French.  Nor can we infer that the person has such a 
belief in the general goodness of French wines by 
means of any other plausible epistemological 
principles from the mere fact that he or she believes 
that the wine is good because he or she believes that 
it is French. 
 
All of this supports my claim that BP is false.  But 
BP is neither needed for our analysis, nor, as I have 
tried to show, desirable in its own right.  As we have 
pointed out, there seem to be cases where we have 
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beliefs which are inferential and not entailed by any 
of the beliefs because of which they are held.  They 
would thus count as primary beliefs according to our 
theory.  By principle JP, these would all be beliefs 
that are not justified.  This is a consequence which 
must be argued for. 
 
Suppose it is the case that I believe that the wine is 
good because I believe it is French, but I have no 
further beliefs which explain why I believe that the 
wine is good.  I do e.g.  not believe that all French 
wines are good or that if it weren't good then it 
wouldn't be French.  Maybe I believe that most French 
wines are good, but I am not enough of a wine expert 
to give any further arguments for my belief about this 
particular wine.  Do I have the right to be certain 
that the wine is good given that I have the right to 
be certain that the wine is French and that most 
French wines are good? It seems not.  I may be said to 
be justified to a certain degree if we speak in terms 
of weak justification, but I do not have the right to 
be certain.   
 
Note that I would lack justification for the belief 
that a particular French wine were good, in the strong 
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sense of having the right to be certain, even if I 
were a great wine expert and I were justified in 
holding that the vast, vast majority of French wines 
were good.  This would be a consequence of JP, and it 
can be argued for in the same way as we did above when 
we pointed out the paradox of justification.  For we 
can imagine a partition of French wines into a variety 
of categories, and we can suppose that I were a wine 
expert.  Suppose I were justified in holding that the 
wine is good because I were justified in holding that 
the wine is French and that the vast, vast majority of 
French wines are good.  Take another category A, which 
is such that I were justified in holding that the 
vast, vast majority of good French wines are A.  A 
could e.g. be the proposition that the wine does not 
come from a certain chateau in Bordeaux. It would then 
seem that I would be justified in holding that the 
wine is good and A.  We next in turn take other 
categories B, C, ....  and so on with which I am 
familiar, where each of these are so related to the 
previous categories that I were justified in holding 
that the vast, vast majority of those that fall within 
the previous categories also fall within it, and I 
would end up being justified in holding that the wine 
is good and A and B and C and......and Z.  But only a 
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few good French Wines are A and B and C and ....  and 
Z, so I am not justified in holding that the wine is 
good and A and B and C and ....  and Z. 
 
Not only would I in the case with the French wine lack 
the right to be certain that the wine is good.  I 
would not even be certain that the wine is good.  At 
least not if I, given my actual lack of expertise, 
were epistemologically reasonable.  I would rather 
believe to a certain degree that the wine is good, 
without being quite sure.  But it seems adviseable to 
not only follow Ayer in requiring that we should have 
the right to be certain when we know, but also to 
follow him and e.g. Ramsey in holding that we should 
be certain about what we know.  It does e.g. not seem 
correct to say that I know that the lecture starts at 
14.00 if I have to check my schedule to verify it.  
That we should thus adopt Ayer's and Ramsey's position 
also seems to be supported by the fact that it is 
seldom if ever the case that one has the right to be 
certain if one is not certain.  If I have to check the 
schedule in order to verify that the lecture starts at 
14.00, i.e. if I thus display a lack of certainty with 
respect to when the lecture starts, it would be odd 
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indeed if I could be said to have the right to be 
certain that it starts at 14.00.   
 
These comments which I have here made with regard to 
the requirements that beliefs be certain are not 
essential to the present account.  The requirement is 
e.g. not needed to reach the conclusion that I do not 
have the right to be certain that the wine is good in 
the example above.   
 
But does a restriction to beliefs that are certain 
restore the validity of principle BP?  This would seem 
to be a question of psychology.  Could it be the case 
that a person were certain that q because he or she 
were certain that p, without it being the case that 
the person were certain about anything which entails q 
and is not entailed by q? I do not see why not.  But 
maybe one could make a case for adhering to principle 
BP if one restricts oneself to beliefs that are 
certain.  However that may be, we shall not follow 
such a course of action.  We shall, in other words, 
not assume principle BP, although one possibly could 
make a case for that principle if one restricts 
oneself to beliefs that are certain.  One important 
reason for following such a policy is that we thereby 
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avoid making the restriction to beliefs that are 
certain an essential part of the analysis which is 
being offered. 
 
Let us, before we proceed, sum up some of the main 
points so far of the discussion in this section.  I 
have given arguments for a principle (JP) which says 
that an inferential belief q is justified only if q is 
believed because of some belief p which is justified 
and which also entails q.  The arguments I have given 
are sorites type arguments which show that 
justification is not preserved by inductive 
inferences.  I have also considered but discarded a 
principle (BP) which says that all inferential beliefs 
in fact are secondary beliefs.   
 
Let us now apply this principle (JP) to the examples 
that we have considered in order to see what kind of 
consequences it gives rise to. 
 
S looks out the window and sees the branches of the 
trees move, and S forms the belief that the wind 
blows.  Since in this case S believes that the wind 
blows because S believes that S sees the branches move 
like they do, we have, according to JP, that S is 
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justified in holding that the wind blows only if there 
is some belief p such that p entails that the wind 
blows and S is justified in holding that p.  We have 
already pointed out one plausible candidate for such a 
belief, viz. the belief in the conjunction that S sees 
the branches move like they do and if the wind weren't 
blowing then S wouldn't see the branches move like 
they do.  One may claim, then, that it is because S is 
justified in holding this latter belief that S is 
justified in holding that the wind blows.  This raises 
a skeptical question, which we will address in the 
last subsection of this section: In virtue of what is 
S justified in holding that if the wind weren't 
blowing then S wouldn't see the branches move like 
they do? 
 
Suppose I believe that the wine is good because it is 
French.  According to our principle JP, I am only 
justified in holding that the wine is good if there is 
some further belief p such that p entails that the 
wine is good and I believe that the wine is good 
because I believe p.  Maybe I do have such a belief 
primary to my belief that the wine is good.  But if 
so, it would, given my lack of expertise in wines, 
certainly not be a justified belief. 
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Suppose someone believes that red will come out next 
because black has come out fifteen time in a row on 
the roulette table.  Maybe that person does have a 
belief primary to his or hers belief that red will 
come out next.  But, given the nature of the game, 
such a belief would certainly not be justified. 
 
We finally consider the example which started us on 
the discussions of this section.  Smith believes that 
Jones owns a Ford because Smith believes that he has 
often and many times seen Jones drive a Ford.  
According to our principle JP, Smith is justified in 
holding that Jones owns a Ford only if Smith's belief 
to the effect that Jones owns a Ford is secondary to a 
justified belief.  We have suggested one plausible 
candidate for a justified belief primary to Smith's 
belief in Jones' Ford ownership, viz. the belief that 
Smith has often and many times seen Jones drive a Ford 
and if Jones didn't own a Ford then Smith wouldn't 
often and many times have seen Jones drive a Ford.  I 
have no problems with accepting that Smith is 
justified in holding the latter belief.  But Smith 
does not in this case know that Jones owns a Ford 
according to our analysis because it is not true that 
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if Jones didn't own a Ford then Smith wouldn't often 
and always have seen Jones drive a Ford. 
 
7.1.2  
We will in the following subsection suggest an 
alternative formulation which may be thought of as a 
certain simplification of our original analysis which 
can be adopted if one accepts principle JP.  Let us 
again take a look at the principle JP: 
 
JP (›p)(p>q) e (Jq / (›p)(p entails q & p>q & Jp))  
 
After having seen the potential usefulness of 
principle JP for justification, a natural question to 
ask is whether one can get an adequate analysis of 
knowledge by in addition to principle JP also adopting 
an analogue principle for knowledge: 
 
KP (›p)(p>q) e (Kq / (›p)(p entails q & p>q & Kp))  
 
And KP does, it seems, facilitate a certain 
simplification of the theory which we have been 
propounding.  Given principles KP, JP, and CP we now 
only need a principle NP which says that a belief 
which is non-inferential is known iff it is a 
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justified true belief, in addition to a principle NC 
to exclude circular explanations, in order to arrive 
at an analysis of knowledge which one might think 
supersedes the analysis which we have suggested and 
which at the same time is an analysis that is founded 
upon the same insights as those upon which the earlier 
analysis was founded.  At least so it may seem.   
 
A more formal formulation of principle NP looks like 
this: 
 
NP -(›p)((p)>q) e Kq/Jq&Bq&q 
 
In order to formulate the principle NC which excludes 
circular explanations, one must make use of the 
ancestral of the relation denoted by "because" in S 
believes q because S believes q.  We use the symbol 
">>" to denote this ancestral relation: 
 
NC p>>q e -(q>>p) 
 
The motivation for adopting principle NC is based on 
the fact that "S believes p" in "S believes q because 
S believes p" is intended to be an explanation of the 
fact that S believes q.  And we do not normally accept 
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circular explanations.  NC is thus only an explication 
of what we mean, and have meant all along, by 
"because".   
 
If one accepts principle JP, one can thus in a certain 
sense simplify the analysis of knowledge which we have 
been proposing by adhering to the principles JP, CP, 
NC, KP and NP.  We reproduce these here for the 
reader's convenience: 
 
JP (›p)(p>q) e (Jq / (›p)(p entails q & p>q & Jp)  
 
CPIf (p1,p2)>q and -|p1ep2 and -|p2ep1 then (p1, 
p2, p1&p2)>q. 
 
NC p>>q  e  -(q>>p)  
 
KP (›p)(p>q) e (Kq / (›p)(p entails q & p>q & Kp)  
 
NP -(›p)((p)>q) e Kq/Jq&Bq&q 
 
This, then, is one way in which one can deal with the 
Gettier examples, and at the same time avoid the 
inductive Gettier cases.  As I, for reasons which will 
become clear in the next section, do not think that JP 
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is an entirely plausible principle (or at least I do 
not think that we have sufficient evidence for 
adopting JP), I shall leave it as an excercise to 
figure out how these six principles are interrelated. 
 Also note that there is not much, if anything to be 
gained by such a "simplification" as the one suggested 
by the above reformulation even in one finds that JP 
is a plausible principle.  On the contrary, it seems 
that we would lose some insights.  It would e.g. no 
longer be possible to introduce the expressions "p 
induces q for S" and "S believes q on the basis of p" 
if we were to adopt such a revision, for the 
relationship between a secondary belief and a primary 
belief which induces the former would get lost if we 
were to adopt such a revised formulation of our 
theory.  It is furthermore open to question whether 
the above reformulation really is a simplification of 
our official analysis. 
 
Before we move on to the the next section, we will in 
the following subsection show how the approach which 
we have outlined in this section may possibly be 
worked out in such a way as to avoid humean skepticism 
with respect to induction. 
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7.1.3. 
 
Consider again S's belief to the effect that if S sees 
the trees move like they do then the wind blows.  The 
humean skeptic may claim that S is not justified in 
holding that if S sees the trees move like they do 
then the wind blows, although he may grant that S is 
justified in holding that S sees the trees move like 
they do.  "Why does S believe that if S sees the trees 
move like they do then the wind blows?" the humean 
skeptic may ask.  And the skeptic would probably in 
his own answer to the question claim that S must 
ultimately appeal to some kind of uniformity principle 
which is not justified.  The skeptic may claim that S 
cannot rule out that the trees move by themselves 
without being caused to do so by the wind, since S, by 
assumption, is inside and cannot feel that the wind 
blows.  One cannot in response to this just claim that 
the trees could not be moving by themselves.  It is at 
least logically possible that they should be, and if 
they actually were then S would not know that the wind 
blows, although S would, one may claim, have a 
justified belief to the effect that the wind blows.  
But it is, I presume, this latter claim that the 
skeptic would disagree with. 
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One may, when faced with such a skeptical challenge, 
try to trace an inducing primary belief for S's belief 
in the consequent causal statement that if S sees the 
trees move like they do then the wind blows, or 
alternatively stated, the conditional belief that if 
the wind weren't blowing then S wouldn't see the trees 
move like they do, in order to see if in fact S is not 
justified in holding it after all.  
 
Let p abbreviate "the wind blows" and let q stand for 
"S sees the trees move like they do".  Why, then, does 
S believe p6q, where "6" signifies that p causes q or 
that if p weren't the case then q wouldn't have been 
the case?  His belief in p6q seems to be one that he 
is so to speak conditioned to have on the basis of 
past experience.  We could maybe end our questioning 
here, and claim that beliefs that we are thus 
conditioned to believe are justified.  That may be a 
possible way out, but I think that we should consider 
this to be an excessively defensive strategy.   
 
But one may want to suggest that S believes p6q since 
S believes that * and that (*e(p6q)), where "*" 
abbreviates "S has experienced that p (e.g. felt that 
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p) on many and all similar occasions with evidence 
like the one expressed by q".  But is S justified in 
holding * & (* e (p6q))?  The humean could again grant 
that S is justified in holding the first conjunct, but 
deny that S is justified in holding the second.  For 
why may not the trees on this occasion just be moving 
by themselves?   
 
But why, then, does S believe that (* & (* e (p6q)))? 
The humean would say that S believes that because S 
believes in some uniformity principle.  Why not?  Let 
us for the sake of argument accept this.   
 
Let us assume that S believes that U=there is some 
regularity in nature and that C = (U e (* e (p 6 q))). 
 One may then claim that S is justified in holding H = 
U & * & p & C and that S believes p since S believes 
H, so S knows q if H is true and a primary belief for 
S.  The humean, I assumed, already granted that S is 
justified in believing * and p, so let us take it to 
be established that S knows that * and p.  It thus 
remains to consider U and C.   
 
Note that U is a very weak statement.  No matter what 
course the events in the world take, there will be 
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some regularity in the world.  And S is clearly 
justified in believing so.  But why does S believe 
that there is some regularity in the world?  One may 
hold that S's belief in U is induced by S's belief 
that EU=S has experienced that U.  EU seems to be a 
truly primary belief according to our criterion LC.  
For if you ask S why S believes EU then it would be 
appropriate of S to answer that he or she believes EU 
because it is the case that EU.  And EU is, it seems, 
both justified and true.  So S knows that EU.  H, 
then, cannot be a primary belief for S, but if we 
substitute EU for U in C and H and get H' we seem to 
get at a primary belief which induces q for S.  If 
this is right, then S knows q if S knows H'.  If H' is 
primary, then S knows H' iff S has a justified true 
belief that H'.  We have already argued that S has a 
justified true belief in EU, in * and in p, and all of 
these seem to be primary beliefs for S according to 
our ceriterion LC, for S would for all these beliefs 
invoke the content of the belief as the reason why he 
holds the belief.   
 
It remains to consider whether C', i.e.  C with U 
replaced by EU, is also a justified true primary 
belief for S in order to decide whether H' is in fact 
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a primary belief.  And it seems that C' is a primary 
belief, but in this case it would not help to appeal 
to our criterion LC.  Only, it would not, it seems, be 
reasonable for S to base the belief in C' on some 
other belief.  That is to say that we should not 
expect S to have any further beliefs which explain why 
S belives C'.  C' is, so to speak, a fundamental 
empirical hypothesis for S which is justified by its 
own content and not by other beliefs.  Note that this 
is not the same as to say that C' is analytically 
true.  We have said that C' may be justified by its 
own content, and not that C' is true because of its 
meaning. 
 
One may claim, then, that S has a justified true 
belief in H' and that H' is a primary belief.  If so, 
then S knows that H'.  But S's belief that q is 
induced by S's belief that H'.  So according to this 
analysis S knows that the wind blows by looking out 
the window and observing how the branches of the trees 
are moving. 
 
This, then, is one approach that one may suggest that 
we should use in order to respond to humean skepticism 
while adhering to principle (JP).  The response raises 
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questions that need to be dealt with.  Let me first 
give the following argument to show that the strategy 
is not necessarily inferior to a more standard 
approach which would accept the use of inductive 
arguments.  I take it that such an approach would 
grant that S is justified in holding EU and * and q, 
but would proceed directly from S's justification in 
holding q to S's justification in holding p.  I will 
also assume that S is justified in holding p only if S 
is justified in holding that p6q.  But then the 
following holds: 
 
 J(EU & * & q) e (Jp / J(EU e (* e (p6q)))) 
 
We have here assumed the principles that justification 
is closed under justified implication and justified 
consequent causal statements: 
 
JI Jp & J(p e q) e Jq 
 
JA Jq & J(p6q) e Jp 
 
To see that the above principle holds, given our 
assumptions, suppose first that S is justified in 
holding (EU & * & q) and p.  But we assumed that S is 
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justified in holding p only if S is justified in 
holding (p6q), so it follows that S is justified in 
holding (p6q).  It then follows that S is justified in 
holding (EU e (* e (p6q))). 
 
Suppose next that S is justified in holding (EU & * & 
q) and (EU e (* e (p6q))).  It follows that S is 
justified in holding EU and (EU e (* e (p6q))).  By JI 
it follows that S is justified in holding (* e (p6q)). 
 But S is justified in holding *, so by JI S is 
justified in holding (p6q).  Since S is justified in 
holding q, it follows by JA that S is justified in 
holding p. 
 
S is, in other words, justified in holding p iff S is 
justified in holding C', provided that S is justified 
in holding EU and * and q.  But we have assumed that S 
is justified in holding EU and * and q.  So S is, 
given these assumptions, justified in holding p iff S 
is justified in holding C'.   
 
This shows that the present analysis does not diverge 
too much from a standard approach which would accept 
the use of inductive arguments.  The approach is even 
consistent with such a standard approach.  The 
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difference between this and a standard approach is 
that it instead of accepting that the use of inductive 
arguments preserves the justification value of the 
premises suggests that we have primary beliefs which, 
if justified, confer justification upon the beliefs 
that they induce.  The difference between this and a 
standard approach is therefore similar to the 
difference between using e.g. mathematical induction 
as an inference rule and producing the same results by 
having axioms or an axiom schema of induction. 
 
In what, then, does the advantage of this approach 
consist? If the approach, which depends upon the 
adoption of principle (JP), helps us to solve the 
inductive Gettier problem then that would, it seems, 
be a sufficient advantage.  Another advantage that the 
approach seems to have is that it avoids the paradox 
of justification which we discussed at the beginning 
of the preceding section.  In developing that paradox 
we assumed that Tim knows the USA very well, so Tim 
should reason as follows: "I am justified in holding 
that: John comes from USA.  The probability that John 
does not come from Bakersfield, California, given that 
John comes from USA, equals P1 which is very close to 
1.  So the probability that John comes from USA'=USA 
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minus Bakersfield equals P1.  The probability that 
John does not come from Barstow california given that 
John comes from USA' equals P2 which is very close to 
1.  So the probability that John comes from USA''=USA' 
minus Barstow equals P1 times P2.  And so on....  So 
the probability that John comes from 212 84th Street 
on Manhattan equals P1 times P2 times...........times 
Pn, where each of Pi, 1#i#n, are close to 1, but their 
product would be close to zero."  
 
Instead of becoming justified in holding that John 
comes from a certain place in Manhattan, which would 
be absurd, the analysis gives Tim justification for 
holding that the probability that John comes from this 
spot is very low indeed.28  This clearly shows that our 
present analysis results in a more proper attitude 
towards the paradox of justification as opposed to the 
analysis which was based upon the weak notion of 
justification, for it is obvious that Tim is no more 
justified in holding that John comes from a certain 
place on Manhattan than he is in holding that John 
comes from Bakersfield, California.  
                     
28.  I shall not at this point pursue any metaphysical 
questions about probability.  There is, of course, a 
sense in which the probability that John comes from 
212 84th Street equals 1 if he comes from there and 
equals zero if he doesn't. 
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The analysis outlined here does not, I think, refute 
humean skepticism.  What I have shown, though, is that 
the analysis, in addition to having certain advantages 
over a standard approach, does not presuppose or lead 
to humean skepticism.  The analysis is therefore in 
that respect not inferior to a standard approach.   
 
 
7.2. 
 
The account given in the previous section of this 
chapter suffers, I think, from at least one important 
defect.  This defect is that principle JP does not 
follow from, but is only consistent with, the fact 
that justification is not generally preserved by non-
deductive inferences.  The paradox of justification 
does show that justification is not generally 
preserved by certain enumerative types of inductive 
arguments, but it does not show that justification is 
never preserved by non-deductive arguments, or that 
we, as principle JP has it, always need justified 
entailing evidence for a proposition q for which we 
have evidence, in the sense that we believe q because 
we believe something else, if q is to be counted as 
justified.  And note in this connection that it would 
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take an inductive argument to arrive at the conclusion 
that no inductive argument preserves justification.  
But if so, the conclusion that inductive arguments 
never preserve justification is not itself justified. 
  
 
One may also think that a second and third defect in 
the account given in the previous section is that 
principle JP will commit us to foundationalism and a 
certain type of skepticism.  For, in order for us to 
be justified in holding some inferential belief q, 
there must, if JP is true, be at least one justified 
primary belief which we do not believe because of any 
other beliefs which we have and is such that q is 
believed because of it.  And this seems in some cases 
to be a somewhat doubtful assumption.  Am I not 
justified in believing that a fire would burn me if I 
put my hand in it?  It seems that I am, and it also 
seems clear that the belief is inferential.  But do I 
believe that a fire would burn me if I put my hand in 
it since I believe some proposition p which entails 
that a fire would burn me if I put my hand in it?  If 
JP is true there must be such a belief in a 
proposition p which is a justified primary belief if 
my inferential belief in the proposition that a fire 
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would burn me if I put my hand in it is justified.  
But this requirement seems both to presuppose a strong 
foundationalism and to lead to skepticism.  Maybe the 
scepticism and foundationalism which JP gives rise to 
are true theories, but why think that the inductive 
Gettier problem which launched us on the discussion 
which gave rise to JP provides sufficient evidence for 
such theories?  Such a question does not seem 
unreasonable given that the paradox of justification, 
as I have been suggesting in the previous paragraph, 
does not provide sufficient evidence for principle JP 
and for the scepticism and foundationalism which one 
may claim that it gives rise to. 
 
It is, however, I think, not obviously the case that 
the account in the previous section would commit us to 
foundationalism or skepticism any more than our 
resolve to think of justification as having the right 
to be certain. And we have seen that we do need to 
think of justification as having the right to be 
certain in order to avoid the paradox of 
justification.  Our theory will, it seems, be a 
foundationalist one at least in the very modest sense 
that it holds that there are non-inferential beliefs 
which are justified, but that is not the same as to 
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say that the way such non-inferential beliefs cohere 
with other beliefs of the subject does not play any 
role in justifying the belief in question.  Recall 
that we do not hold that all non-inferential beliefs 
are justified, rather we hold that some types of non-
inferential beliefs are prima facie justified.  But 
this leaves open the possibility that these beliefs 
are justified because of some kind of coherence 
condition which they fulfill.  And so it is that our 
analysis may be claimed to be uncommitted to 
foundationalism, and this would be so even if we were 
to adopt the account given in the previous section. 
 
Let us next consider the accusation that the account 
of the previous section is committed to certain types 
of skepticism.  I think there is more to be said for 
such an accusation than there is to be said for the 
accusation that the approach will be commited to full 
fledged foundationalism.  Basically, the principle JP 
will compell us to hold that we in all cases where a 
skeptic questions our knowledge of a proposition q, 
where q is an inferential belief, need to know a 
proposition p which entails q and is such that we 
believe q because we believe p.  But this only seems 
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to give the skeptic more ways of attacking our claim 
to know the proposition q.   
 
It seems that it because of all this would be better 
if we could abandon principle JP while at the same 
time avoid the inductive Gettier problem.  We could 
then adopt the quite plausible standard view that some 
but not all inductive arguments preserve 
justification.  I will in the following argue that it 
is possible to adopt such an alternative strategy.  
 
I think the fundamental mistake of the discussion in 
the previous section was in its assessment of the 
Gettier example which we called an inductive Gettier 
example.  Let us therefore consider the example again. 
 Smith believes that Jones owns a Ford simply because 
Smith believes that he has often and always seen Jones 
drive a Ford.  Jones does in fact own a Ford, but not 
the one that Smith has seen him drive.  In the example 
it was further assumed that Smith does not believe 
that Jones owns a Ford because of some belief that 
Smith has which also entails that Jones owns a Ford.  
But is this a true assumption?  I do not think it is. 
 Is it not the case that Smith believes of the car 
which he has often and always seen Jones drive that it 
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is a Ford which belongs to Jones?29  It is because of 
our disquotational principle DP that we can say that 
Smith believes of that car that it is owned by Jones, 
for Smith would assent to the sentence "Jones owns the 
car which you (Smith) have seen Jones drive, and it is 
a Ford", and the definite description in this sentence 
would in this case be used referentially in order to 
pick out the car that Smith has seen Jones drive.   
 
But the discussion in the previous paragraph only 
refutes one particular candidate for an inductive 
Gettier example.  Could there, so one may ask, not be 
other more plausible candidates?  If we consider the 
different types of Gettier beliefs that we studied in 
chapter V, one will, assuming that my classification 
of the different types of "standard" Gettier beliefs 
is adequate, on reflection realize that it is only in 
the case when an existential generalization of a 
statement of the form (›x)(Fx) is inferred from some 
                     
29.  It seems that we here, given my analysis of 
belief statements in chapter II, have a paradigmatic 
case of a de re belief, and one which entails that 
Jones owns a Ford at that.  But although Smith's 
belief would count as de re according to my analysis, 
it is, however, not important for my present argument 
whether Smith's belief is a de re belief of the car 
that Smith has seen Jones drive or merely a de dicto 
belief which is not also a de re belief.   
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particular evidence that an inductive Gettier problem 
could arise.  Suppose, then, that some evidence E 
inductively justifies S in holding that (›x)(Fx), and 
that it is true that (›x)(Fx) and that S believes that 
(›x)(Fx), and assume further that S's belief in 
(›x)(Fx) is an inductive Gettier belief.  But what 
would make S's belief in (›x)(Fx) a Gettier belief if 
not a fact to the effect that it is an object b which 
is F and not the object a which S thought was an F?  I 
cannot see that there could be any other possibilities 
here.  But if so, it is more than reasonable to hold 
that S believes  (›x)(Fx) because S believes Fa, and 
Fa does, of course, entail (›x)(Fx).  If I am right, 
this shows that there are no inductive Gettier 
examples. 
 
My suggestion, then, or I should say hypothesis, is 
that all Gettier type beliefs are in fact entailed by 
some belief because of which they are believed.  My 
hypothesis is, in other words, that Gettier beliefs 
are always secondary beliefs, and I have tried to 
provide ample evidence for this hypothesis.  I may, 
however, be proven wrong.  Someone may one day come up 
with an example which falsifies my hypothesis.  But as 
far as I can see, the hypothesis holds true for all 
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Gettier type examples which have been suggested in the 
literature.  If I see far enough, the hypothesis is at 
least confirmed by a significant amount of examples, 
and by some reasonably good arguments as well. 
 
If I am right in holding that all Gettier type beliefs 
are in fact also secondary beliefs, we can revert back 
to the analysis which was offered in chapter III, and 
if I am wrong, the analysis offered in the previous 
section would remain as an, admittedly less plausible, 
alternative which could be adopted.  There may be 
other alternatives. 
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 VIII 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed a sorites type of 
problem faced by weak justification.  A further, 
although related disadvantage of weak justification as 
compared to our approach to justification can be seen 
in the former's failure to avoid the lottery paradox30. 
 In the lottery paradox the following is assumed: (A) 
One is justified in believing that which is very 
likely, and (B) If one is justified in holding p and 
justified in holding q then one is justified in 
holding p and q.  Suppose there is a lottery, 
justifiably recognized to be fair by everyone, with as 
many tickets as it takes (e.g. 1000 tickets) for an 
adherent of weak justification to claim that one is 
justified in holding that  e.g.  ticket 1 will not 
win.  One is thus justified in holding that ticket 1 
will not win.  But it is at least as unlikely that 
ticket 2 will win as it is that ticket 1 will win, 
given that the lottery is fair, so one is justified in 
holding that ticket 2 will not win.  By assumption B 
                     
30. Due originally to Henry Kyburg: "Probability and 
the Logic of Rational Belief". (Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1961). 
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one is then justified in holding that neither ticket 1 
nor ticket 2 will win.  By reasoning in this fashion, 
we may then eventually conclude that one is justified 
in holding that no ticket will win.  But the lottery 
was recognized to be fair by everyone, so one is also 
justified in holding that some ticket will win.  By 
assumption (B) one is therefore justified in holding 
that no ticket will win and some ticket will win.  As 
it is not reasonable to hold that one can be justified 
in holding something which can be recognized to be 
inconsistent, the lottery paradox shows that a theory 
of justification cannot both fulfill condition (A) and 
(B).   
The theory of justification which we are defending 
does not fulfill condition (A).  For it does not on 
our account follow from the fact that one is justified 
in holding that a certain item is one of the lottery 
tickets and that if something is one of the lottery 
tickets then it is very likely that it will not win 
that one is justified in holding that the ticket will 
not win.  It does, however, follow that one is 
justified in holding that it is very likely that the 
ticket will not win, and that it in that sense is 
rational to accept that the ticket will not win.  But 
note that it does not follow from the fact that one is 
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justified in holding that it is very likely that 
ticket 1 will not win and justified in holding that it 
is very likely that ticket 2 will not win that one is 
justified in holding that it is very likely that 
ticket 1 will not win and ticket 2 will not win.  This 
inference is blocked because of the rules of 
probability theory which governs the use of the 
operator "it is very likely that _ ", and not by 
giving up assumption (B).  It may be objected that it 
is still very likely that neither ticket 1 nor ticket 
2 will lose, given that there are, say, 1000 tickets 
in the lottery.  But this is only because "very 
likely" is a vague notion.  As soon as this notion is 
made precise, it will be seen that it does not follow 
from the fact that event x is very likely and that 
event y is very likely that it is very likely that 
both x and y will occur.   
 
It does, however, on our account follow from the fact 
that one is justified in holding that it is very 
likely that ticket 1 will not win and justified in 
holding that it is very likely that ticket 2 will not 
win that one is justified in holding that it is very 
likely that ticket 1 will not win and very likely that 
ticket 2 will not win.   
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Given all of this, we can see that the lottery paradox 
does not arise for our notion of justification because 
assumption (A) of the lottery paradox is not 
satisfied.  Nor does the lottery paradox arise for the 
weaker notion of "rational acceptance" if we by "it is 
rational of S to accept p" mean that "S is justified 
in holding that it is very likely that p", for 
assumption (B) of the lottery paradox is, as can be 
seen from or discussion above, not satisfied by the 
compound operator "S is justified in holding that it 
is very likely that _".   
 
As weak justification does accept condition (A), it 
must reject condition (B) on justification in order to 
avoid the lottery paradox.  This is a very high price 
to pay, especially if one is interested in a notion of 
justification which is to serve in an analysis of 
knowledge.  For the principle that if someone knows p 
and knows q then s/he knows p and q has strong 
intuitive appeal.  In fact, I think it is true.  But 
if condition (B) for justification is given up then 
this principle can only be maintained by holding that 
the rules governing our use of "justified" are 
sensitive as to whether what is justified does also 
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fulfill the remaining necessary conditions for 
knowledge.  If it does then (B) holds for 
justification, if it doesn't then (B) may not hold.  
But this seems to be a somewhat arbritrary decision.   
 
More importantly, it seems that principle (B) for 
justification plays an important role in our use of 
arguments by reductio ad absurdum.31   For if it can be 
shown that a contradiction can be derived from a set 
of assumptions then that gives me a reason to discard 
at least one of the assumptions since I am justified 
in holding that a contradiction cannot obtain.  But if 
I have a reason to discard at least one of the 
assumptions it must follow that there is at least one 
assumption which is not justified, since I cannot be 
justified in holding something which I have a reason 
to discard.  This reasoning does not hold, however, if 
it is possible, as it is if principle (B) for 
justification is rejected, to be justified in holding 
each of the assumptions in isolation and not to be 
justified in holding the conjunction of the 
assumptions.  But the reasoning in the argument above 
                     
31. See Mark Kaplan: A Bayesian theory of rational 
acceptance, The Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 
305-330. 
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is sound, so this seems to prove that principle (B) 
for justification is true.   
 
Given these considerations, the lottery paradox 
virtually proves that condition (A) cannot be 
fulfilled for justification in the lottery situation. 
 This is, I think, a fact which lends very strong 
support to our theory of justification, i.e. to the 
view that we by "justified" should mean the same as 
"having the right to be certain". 
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Appendix 1: 
 
The argument presented in Descartes' first meditation 
has been one of the most debated and influential 
arguments in the history of philosophy.  But although 
the Dream Argument has been commented upon by such a 
vast number of authors throughout the centuries, some 
philosophers32 have recently claimed to shed some 
important new light upon the argument by using some 
rather elementary principles and alleged theorems of 
epistemic logic.  One author, viz. David Gordon, even 
comes close to say that the Dream Argument does not 
stand if we subscribe to an adequate theory of 
knowledge.  These claims deserve our attention if we 
are either interested in how to interpret Descartes or 
struggling with the challenge of skepticism. 
                     
32.  In particular this is implied by Mark Steiner in 
his Cartesian Scepticism and Epistemic Logic published 
in Analysis in 1979, and by David Gordon in his answer 
to Steiner (also published in Analysis in 1979) 
Steiner on Cartesian Scepticism.  More modestly 
perhaps, the same claim seems to be implied by George 
Schlesinger in the first chapter of his book The Range 
of Epistemic Logic published in 1985.  Anthony 
Brueckner, in an unpublished paper Epistemic Logic and 
the Dream Argument, would probably agree with the 
aforementioned authors in the relevance of epistemic 
logic for the analysis of the dream argument, but 
would, as we will see, disagree with their way of 
analyzing it. 
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Steiner claims that the following would be a 
reasonable paraphrase of the Dream Argument: "If I am 
in fact dreaming, then I do not know that I am sitting 
down.  I do not know that I am not dreaming.  So I do 
not know that I am sitting down."  We can symbolize 
this, and let D abbreviate "I am in fact dreaming", 
let S abbreviate "I am sitting down" or some other 
sentence that holds true of the subject that does the 
Cartesian meditation.  If we thus abbreviate Steiner's 
paraphrase of the Dream Argument we get: 
 
 P1 D e -K(S) 
 P2 -K(-D) 
 c -K(-S) 
 
But this argument is not valid.  Some other premises 
or rules of inference are needed in order to support 
the skeptical conclusion.  Seeing this, Steiner 
proposes a rather lengthy argument as the adequate 
Dream Argument.  It is most likely not thought of by 
Steiner as the argument that Descartes actually had in 
mind.  But he would probably argue that his is the 
most adequate representation of the Dream Argument, 
that it is Cartesian in spirit, and that it might be 
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thought of as a proper explication of what Descartes 
actually had in mind.  Steiner's argument runs as 
follows: 
 
l K(S) e -D Premise 
(If I know that I'm sitting down then I'm not 
dreaming.) 
 
2  K(K(S) e -D) l, Necessitation 
(I know that if I know that I'm sitting down then 
I'm not dreaming.) 
 
3 KK(S) e K(-D) 2, Distribution of K over "e". 
(If I know that I know that I'm sitting down then 
I know that I'm not dreaming.) 
 
4  K(S) e KK(S) The KK Principle  
(If I know that I'm sitting down then I know that I 
know that I'm sitting down.) 
 
5 K(S) e K(-D)  3,4 
(If I know that I'm sitting down then I know that I'm 
not dreaming.) 
 
6 -K(-D) e -K(S) 5, Contraposition 
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(If I don't know that I'm not dreaming then I don't 
know that I'm sitting down.) 
 
7 -K(-D) Premise 
(I don't know that I'm not dreaming.) 
 
C  -K(S) 6,7 
(I don't know that I'm sitting down.) 
 
 
This argument appeals to three principles of epistemic 
logic, viz. Necessitation for the K-operator, 
Distribution of K over "e" and Hintikka's KK-
principle.  Each of these principles might be 
challenged.  In particular, as Steiner points out, 
Hintikka's KK- Principle is implausible for reasons 
that are independent of the skeptical Dream Argument. 
 Steiner cites as an example a student who is credited 
with knowledge of a test answer that she has little 
confidence in.  We would not say of such a student 
that she knows that she knows the answer, but the 
student would be justified in complaining if points 
were deducted for that reason.  (We must assume that 
Steiner did not have an oral exam in mind when he gave 
this example.) 
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There is also, one should note, strong textual 
evidence for holding that Descartes would have 
ohjected to the KK-principle, for Descartes in his 
Sixth Replies, writes: 
 
"It is true that no one can be certain that he is 
thinking or that he exists unless he knows 
what thought is and what existence is.  But 
this does not require reflective knowledge, 
or the kind of knowledge that is acquired 
by means of demonstrations; still less does 
it require knowledge of reflective 
knowledge, i.e. knowing that we know, and 
knowing that we know that we know and so on 
ad infinitum.  This kind of knowledge 
cannot possibly be obtained' about 
anything.  It is quite sufficient that we 
should know it by that internal awareness 
that always precedes reflective 
knowledge."33 
 
It is clear from this passage, that Descartes would 
have had to object to the KK-principle, for the KK-
principle implies that we have what Descartes calls 
reflective knowledge, and knowledge of reflective 
knowledge, and so on ad infinitum.  But Descartes 
states that we cannot possibly have such reflective 
knowledge about anything. 
                     
33.  See e.g. in Descartes   Selected Philosophical 
Writings, John Cottingham (et.al.), p. 127. 
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This leaves us with a situation where it seems that 
the Dream Argument does not stand.  Steiner argues, 
however, that we can replace the KK-principle with the 
following rationality principle:  
 
*If one is committed to -K(P) ['P' for any 
sentence], then it is irrational to assert 
P. 
 
We can arrive at the conclusion -KK(S) without the KK-
principle from premise 1,2,3 & 7.  We are thus 
committed to -KK(S).  So if * is correct, it is 
irrational to assert K(S).  This is a conclusion that 
might satisfy the skeptic.  If we furthermore accept 
the rationality principle 
 
**If it is irrational to assert K(P), then it is 
irrational to assert P. 
 
then we arrive at the conclusion that it is irrational 
to assert S (e.g. that I am sitting down).  A 
skeptical conclusion indeed. 
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But is Steiner's interpretation of the Dream Argument 
correct?  It seems, at least on the face of it, that 
Descartes' argument has a significantly simpler 
structure than the argument presented by Steiner.  
Might there not be interpretations of Descartes that 
retain this simplicity while having the Dream Argument 
stand?  This is exactly what Schlesinger thinks is the 
case. 
 
Schlesinger introduces the symbol 'JB*sp' to mean the 
same as 'objectively speaking, it is rational to 
accept p on the basis of information in s's 
possession'34.  He then establishes, or, as we will 
later see, tries to establish, the following 
equivalent theorems: 
 
(d1) [(p => q) & Ksp] => JB*sq 
(If both if p then q and s knows p then it is 
objectively speaking rational to accept q 
on the basis of information in s's 
possession.) 
 
(d2) [(p => q) & -JB*sq] => -Ksp 
                     
34.  Schlesinger (1985) p. 3. 
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(If both if p then q and it is objectively 
speaking not rational to accept q on the 
basis of information in s's possession then 
s does not know p.) 
 
It should be noted that we cannot replace 'JB*' with 
'K', because we do not know all consequences of what 
we know. 
 
If we now substitute 'KS' ('I know I'm sitting') for 
'p' and '-D' ('I'm not dreaming) for 'q' in (d2) we 
get: 
 
(d2*) [(KS => -D) & -JB*s-D]  => -KKS 
 
Schlesinger interprets Descartes as holding -JB*-D.  
By using (d2*) and an appeal to Steiners principle * 
or **, Schlesinger is able to derive the skeptical 
conclusion of the Dream Argument. 
 
But Schlesinger's proposal suffers from a fundamental 
unclarity: What does the first '=>' in (d2*) mean.  If 
the '=>' is the sign for material implication, the 
principle is obviously wrong.  It would (by (d1)) be 
rational, objectively speaking; to accept all true 
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sentences q if we know one sentence p.  Suppose '=>' 
means 'strictly implies'.  But this alternative does 
not help a bit.  All necessary statements are strictly 
implied by any sentence.  Suppose e.g. that Fermat's 
Theorem (FT) is true.  It is then necessarily true.  
Suppose furthermore that '=>' abbreviates 'strictly 
implies'.  We then, according to (d1), have: 
 
[(Grass is green => FT) & KsGrass is green)] e 
JB*s(FT) 
 
But this result is not at all reasonable.  On the 
contrary, it is a bizarre result, for even preliterate 
children know that grass is green, and it is not, 
objectively speaking, rational to accept FT on the 
basis of information that these children possess. 
 
But if '=>' does not mean material or strict 
implication, then what does it mean?  This should have 
been made clear by the author.  As it stands, 
Schlesinger's analysis is quite unsatisfactory.  But 
let us try to see whether his analysis can be amended 
in any plausible ways. 
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Suppose Schlesinger restated his analysis, and e.g. 
gave us (d1') as an amendment of (d1): 
 
(d1') [(|p e q) & Ksp]  => JB*sq 
 
Let us suppose that "|" means "Is provable in the 
logical system A".  But this does not work.  Suppose 
e.g. that q (e.g. FT or some non-trivial mathematical 
or logical theorem) is provable in A.  We then again 
have |p e q for any sentence p.  So we would also in 
this case be committed to say that it is, objectively 
speaking, rational to accept q (e.g. FT) on the basis 
of information possessed by preliterate children.  
Schlesinger might in reply try to suggest (d1'') 
instead of (d1') as an alternative to (d1): 
 
(d1'')   [(|p e q) & Not-|q & Ksp] => JB*sq 
 
But such a suggestion would, of course, put severe 
restrictions on the logical system A.  Suppose e.g. 
that q is a non-trivial tautology of the sentential 
calculus.  We would then not want to say that it is 
rational to accept q on the basis of information 
possessed by preliterate children.  So we would have 
to say that q is not a theorem of A, i.e. that q is 
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not provable in A.  So the logical system A would, at 
least in some respects, have to be significantly 
weaker than the sentential calculus. 
 
As Schlesinger, in his text, is unaware of the aporia 
which we have pointed out, we are not offered any 
clues by him as to how to avoid the problem.  Suppose, 
though, for the sake of argument, that the problem 
that I have pointed out could be solved.  This would 
shift our attention from how to read '=>' to the 
operator 'JB*'.  There is an exegetical as well as a 
systematical difficulty with the way this operator has 
been introduced by Schlesinger.  It is at least open 
to question whether Descartes really held that it was 
not rational to accept 'I am not dreaming' on the 
basis of the information he possessed.  Descartes did 
hold that he could not be certain that he was not 
dreaming.  But that is not the same as to say that he 
would have been irrational were he to think that he 
was not dreaming. 
 
The systematical difficulty with the 'JB*' operator 
remains even if we disregard the exegetical problem.  
The systematical difficulty connects with the problem 
we discussed above concerning how to read '=>'.  
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Suppose p e q is provable in the system A and that q 
is, although A is a weak logical system, a relatively 
nontrivial sentence whose truth depends upon the truth 
of p and upon properties of A.  Suppose furthermore 
that s knows p.  It is then, according to Schlesinger, 
objectively speaking rational to accept q on the basis 
of the information possessed by s.  But it may not be. 
 This all depends upon what the system A is like.  If 
A contains some reasonably strong rules of inference 
and axioms, we have a problem reminiscent of the one 
pointed out above.  If A does not contain some 
reasonably strong rules of inference and axioms, then 
Schlesinger would face the difficulty of convincing us 
that the sentence (KS e -D) is provable in the system 
A.  But it seems that the system A cannot be all to 
weak in order for it to be able to prove (KS e -D).  
One way out would be to take (KP e -D) [for any 
sentence 'P', except those that express knowledge that 
we may have even if it should be true that we were 
dreaming] as an axiom of the system A.  I think, 
though, that the best strategy for Schlesinger would 
be to redefine his operator by means of a reference to 
the system A.  He could e.g. introduce JB*' as 
follows: 
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 JB*'sq =Df|(Information possessed by s e q) 
(q is provable in the system A on the basis of 
the information possessed by s.) 
 
We then get 
 
(d1''') [|(p e q) & Not-|q & Ksp] => JB*'sq 
 
 
and finally 
 
(d2*''') [|(KS e -D) &Not-|-D & -JB*'-D] => -KKS 
(If it can be proved in A that if I know that I'm 
sitting down then I'm not dreaming, and it 
cannot be proved in A that I'm not 
dreaming, and it cannot be proved in A from 
the information that I possess that I'm not 
dreaming, then I don't know that I know 
that I'm sitting down.) 
 
(d1''') and (d2*''') are, as opposed to (d1) and (d2) 
as given by Schlesinger, not obviously unreasonable to 
adopt as epistemic principles.  Let us, as seems 
reasonable, suppose that (d2*''') expresses what 
Schlesinger wanted to express with (d2*).  We then 
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seem to have an interpretation of the Dream Argument 
that is arguably simpler in structure than the 
interpretation or reconstruction offered by Steiner.  
But although one might hold that the interpretation 
offered by Schlesinger, or rather our revision of 
Schlesinger, has the virtue of being simpler and more 
reasonable as an interpretation of Descartes than 
Steiner's reconstruction of the Dream Argument, one 
can at least not claim that it is a simple and natural 
interpretation. 
 
Note that both Steiner and Schlesinger depend upon the 
rationality principles * and ** in order to arrive at 
the skeptical conclusion of the Dream Argument.  But 
are these so called rationality principles plausible 
principles?   
 
Gordon points out that * and **  fail for the same 
reason as the one Steiner gives as evidence for 
holding that Hintikka's KK-principle fails.  Consider 
** and the example given by Steiner in order to 
criticize that KK-principle.  Although it is 
irrational for the student who lacks confidence in the 
answer he gives to the test to say that he knows the 
answer, it is not irrational for him to give the 
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answer.  Consider *.  Suppose e.g. that my sister 
tells me that she is getting married, and that my 
girlfriend and I are invited.  I am committed to say 
(if pressed) that I do not know that my sister is 
getting married, because she might, for all I know, 
change her mind and decide not to marry, or something 
else might happen.  But is it irrational of me to 
assert "My sister is getting married" as I tell my 
girlfriend that we are invited?  It seems that it 
isn't, so principle * must be false. 
 
Gordon concludes his note by saying: "It seems to me 
that Professor Steiner has failed to show that 
modifications of Hintikka's principle can be produced 
which are consistent with the Causal Theory while 
allowing a version of the Cartesian argument to 
stand."  Gordon here invokes the Causal Theory because 
he seems to think that the example with the student 
that invalidates the KK-principle and * and **  must 
be derived from such a particular theory of knowledge. 
 Although also Steiner makes such a connection, I do 
not think that such a claim is justified.  It seems to 
me that the counter example with the student, and 
other such counter examples, are genuine and 
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independent of any particular theory of knowledge and 
justification. 
 
Gordon seems to be entirely right in his criticism of 
the rationality principles * and **.  But if this is 
so, it follows that if either Steiner's reconstruction 
or our revision of Schlesinger's interpretation of the 
Dream Argument is a correct interpretation of the 
Dream Argument, and if the criticism of the KK-
principle and the rationality principles * and ** 
holds, then the Dream Argument does not stand.  But I 
think there are compelling reasons to hold that none 
of these interpretations of the Dream Argument are 
adequate, as simpler and more natural interpretations 
are available. 
 
In an unpublished paper Epistemic Logic and The Dream 
Argument which was written before the publication of 
Schlesinger's book, Anthony Brueckner responded to 
Gordon's claim, and argued that neither the KK-
principle nor * nor ** are needed in deriving the 
skeptical conclusion of the Dream Argument. 
 
Brueckner considers the conceptual truths: 
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l D e -(A & S) 
(If I'm dreaming then I'm not awake and 
sitting down.) 
 
and 
 
2  -(A & S) e -K(A & S) 
(If I'm not awake and sitting down then I 
don't know that I'm awake and 
sitting down.) 
 
We then get 
 
3D e -K(A & S) 
(If I'm dreaming then I don't know that I'm 
awake and sitting down.) 
 
by a hypothetical syllogism from l and 2.  If we 
contrapose l we get 
 
4(A &S) e -D 
(If I'm awake and sitting down then I'm not 
dreaming.) 
 
By the rule of necessitation, we get: 
  
  173 
 
5 K((A & S) e -D) 
(I know that if I'm awake and sitting down 
then I'm not dreaming.) 
 
By distributivity of K over e we get 
 
6K(A & S) e K-D 
(If I know that I'm awake and sitting down 
then I know that I'm not 
dreaming.) 
 
Since we assume 
 
7  -K(-D) 
(I don't know that I'm not dreaming) 
 
we get 
 
8-K-(A & S) 
('I don't know that I'm awake and sitting down') 
 
from 6 & 7 by modus tollens. 
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Brueckner thus gets what he takes to be an adequate 
formulation of the skeptical conclusion of the Dream 
Argument by only appealing to the necessitation rule 
of epistemic logic and to the distributivity of K over 
e.   
 
But one of Schlesinger's motives for giving an 
interpretation that differs from Steiner's is that he 
questions the necessitation rule for knowledge, and I 
think that Schlesinger is essentially correct when he 
questions the necessity rule.  Note that even 
Hintikka35, who in an important sense may be claimed to 
have started the whole enterprise of epistemic logic, 
admits that the necessitation rule for knowledge as 
used in an epistemic logic has as a consequence that 
the epistemic subject becomes omniscient.  All 
theorems of the epistemic logic become known to the 
epistemic subject if the necessitation rule for 
knowledge is adopted, so in this sense an epistemic 
logic with the necessitation rule for knowledge is a 
very idealized theory indeed.  Clearly, no real 
epistemic subject knows all the theorems of any 
plausible epistemic logic.  It is for this reason more 
                     
35.  See Hintikka, K.J., Knowledge and Belief, Ithaca 
1962. 
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than just merely advisable to not rely upon any 
appeals to a necessitation rule for knowledge when 
interpreting the Dream Argument.  And if such a 
simplification is not possible, it seems to me that 
one on the basis of the current literature may 
plausibly claim that there are no available 
interpretations of the Dream Argument which do not 
rely upon a use of quite questionable and implausible 
epistemic principles. 
 
But there seems to be interpretations of the Dream 
Argument which are even simpler than the one offered 
by Brueckner, and which do not appeal to the 
necessitation rule for knowledge.  Consider the 
sentence 
 
A-K(-D) e -K(A) 
('If I don't know that I'm not dreaming then I 
don't know that I'm awake') 
 
A seems to be as much a conceptual truth as l and 2, 
although Brueckner uses some effort to derive A in a 
part of his paper. 
 
We also have 
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B-K(A) e -K(A & S) 
(If I don't know that I'm awake then I don't know 
that I'm awake and sitting down.) 
 
So if we assume 
 
C-K(-D) 
  ('I don't know that I'm not dreaming') 
 
we arrive at the desired conclusion 
 
D-K(A & S) 
('I don't know that I'm awake and sitting down') 
 
from A, B and C by means of a repeated use of modus 
ponens.  This interpretation of the Dream Argument 
does not appeal to any principles that are special for 
an epistemic logic.  We can call this the 
uncomplicated interpretation of the Dream Argument. 
 
It might be objected to Brueckner's and the 
uncomplicated interpretation that D is not the 
conclusion of the Dream Argument.  The dream 
alternative allows us to have knowledge of conceptual 
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truths like the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4, whereas 
Brueckner's interpretation or mine both seem not to 
allow this.  But such an objection would be wrong, 
although it is true that the arguments do not allow 
for knowledge of the form 'I know that I'm awake and 
two and two is four'.  But it does allow us to have 'I 
know that two and two is four'.  There is a difference 
here between the proposition that I'm sitting down and 
the proposition that two and two is four, which is of 
the following kind.  If I claim to know that I'm 
sitting down then "what I would like to claim to know 
is that I am sitting .........while awake" (Brueckner, 
p. 3).  But there is no such claim of being awake 
involved if I claim to know that two and two is four. 
 
We can because of this phenomenon provide an even 
simpler interpretation of the Dream Argument which we 
call the simple interpretation if we add: 
 
E-K(A & S) e -K(S) 
(If I don't know that I'm awake and sitting down then 
I don't know that I'm sitting down.) 
 
Principle E does not hold for any sentence S.  It does 
e.g. not hold for the sentence '2 + 2 = 4'.  But it 
  
  178 
seems to hold for a large family of sentences that 
express empirical propositions, and those are the ones 
that are challenged by the Dream Argument. In 
particular, E holds for the sentence 'I'm sitting 
down'.  From A and B and E, by a repeated hypothetical 
syllogism, we get 
 
F-K(-D) e -K(S) 
 
The uncomplicated interpretation depends only upon the 
truth of A, whereas the simple interpretation depends 
upon the truth of A and the truth of E for the 
relevant set of sentences that express empirical 
propositions which are damaged by the Dream Argument. 
 If both A and E are true, and I think that there are 
compelling reasons for holding that they are, then the 
skeptical conclusion of the Dream Argument can be seen 
to simply follow from C and F by modus ponens.  If 
only A is true, then the skeptical conclusion will 
again follow by modus ponens, but the conclusion will 
in this case be of the form -K(A & S), i.e. that I 
don't know that I'm awake and sitting down.  This, as 
Brueckner points out, seems to be an adequate 
formulation of the skeptical conclusion. 
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It follows from my discussion, that the only inference 
rule that is needed in order to arrive at the 
skepcical conclusion of the Dream Argument, i.e. if we 
accept either the simple or the uncomplicated 
interpretation, is modus ponens.   
 
At this point I want to bring in the analysis of 
knowledge which I have suggested in order to show what 
kind of bearing it has upon the problem of Cartesian 
skepticism.  I take it to be obvious, given our 
linguistic criterion LC, that my belief to the effect 
that I see that there is a computer in front of me is 
a primary belief.  Let us abbreviate this belief as 
S(C).  Likewise, my belief to the effect that I see 
that if I see that there is a computer in front of me 
then I am not dreaming is a primary belief.  Let us 
abbreviate this second belief as Σ(S(C) e -D).  Note 
that we two sentences ago used the word "see" in two 
different ways, and we symbolize the first way we used 
it by using "Σ" and the second way by using "S" when 
abbreviating the belief.36  Both of the two ways we 
used the word "see", however, are veridical uses of 
the word, hence if it is the case that Σ(S(C) e -D) 
                     
36.  For a discussion of these types of primary and 
non-inferential beliefs, see chapter III. 
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then it is the case that (S(C) e -D), and if it is the 
case that S(C) then it is the case that C. 
 
Consider now my belief to the effect that I am not 
dreaming.  What I want to suggest is that I believe 
that I am not dreaming because I believe that I see 
that there is a computer in front of me and I see that 
if I see that there is a computer in front of me then 
I am not dreaming.  If we abbreviate, we get 
 
B(-D) because B(S(C) & Σ(S(C) e -D)) 
 
If I am right in identifying the belief S(C) and the 
belief Σ(S(C) e -D) as primary beliefs, it follows, 
given our analysis of knowledge, that I know S(C) and 
Σ(S(C) e -D) if the beliefs are both justified and 
true.  But the skeptic would not want to deny that I 
do see that there is a computer in front of me, nor 
would he want to deny that I see that I see that if I 
see that there is a computer in front of me then I am 
not dreaming.  And I think that it would be 
unreasonable of the skeptic to say that I am not 
justified in believing that I see that there is a 
computer in front of me or that I am not justified in 
believing that I see that if I see that there is 
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computer in front of me then I am not dreaming.  If I 
am justified in holding anything, then it seems that I 
would at least be justified in having these two 
beliefs.  If this is right, it follows that I do know 
that I see that there is a computer in front of me and 
that I know that I see that if I see that there is a 
computer in front of me then I am not dreaming.  But 
it then follows, given our analysis, that I know that 
I am not dreaming.   
 
In order to critizise my approach to the problem, the 
skeptic will have to critizise one or a combination of 
the following assumptions which I have made, viz. (1) 
that the analysis of knowledge which has been 
presented is adequate, or (2) that the beliefs S(C) 
and Σ(S(C) e -D) are primary, or (3) that the beliefs 
are true or (4) that the beliefs are justified, or (5) 
that I believe that I am not dreaming because I have 
the primary belief (S(C) & Σ(S(C) e -D)).  Needless to 
say, but I think that each of the assumptions (1) 
through (5) are quite reasonable, and in fact true. 
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Appendix 2: 
 
We will in the following explore some consequences of 
the fact that we cannot take only occurrent or 
conscious beliefs into account in our analysis.  For 
also tacit or non-occurrent beliefs play a role in our 
belief systems.  It would e.g.  be correct of us to 
ascribe the belief that 2 + 326 = 328  to most people 
we know, although few, if any, of them do actually 
think consciously that 2 + 326 = 328 at the time at 
which we ascribe it as a belief which they hold at 
that time.   
 
In order to include tacit beliefs in our analysis, we 
need to think of beliefs in dispositional terms.  We 
will accordingly think of a belief in a proposition p 
as a disposition to assent to a sentence or internal 
representation which expresses the proposition p.  It 
then  follows that a person S believes p, where p is a 
proposition, if, but not only if (see below), S is 
disposed to assent to some sentence s which expresses 
the proposition p.  We will refer to this as our 
Disquotation Principle, abbreviated as DP.  For 
reference: 
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DPS believes proposition p if S is disposed to 
assent to some sentence s which expresses p. 
 
We are naturally assuming that S understands the 
sentence s to which S assents, and we must also assume 
that S assents to the sentence s as meaning p and not 
as some code for something else.  Note that a person 
S, given this criterion, may believe a proposition p 
(e.g. that the Morning Star is identical with the 
Evening Star) and at the same time not assent to, or 
even assent to the negation of, one sentence s which 
expresses p (e.g.  the sentence "The Morning Star is 
identical with the Evening Star") because S is 
assenting to some other sentence s' (e.g.  the 
sentence "The Morning Star is identical with the 
Morning Star") which expresses p, provided that the 
proposition p in question is expressed by both 
sentences.  One might of course dispute that the 
proviso given in the previous sentence is fulfilled in 
the case where s="The Morning Star is identical with 
the Evening Star" and s'="The Morning Star is 
identical with the Morning Star".  One may hold that s 
and s', so defined, are sentences which express 
different propositions.  Such is Frege's way of 
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dealing with the situation.  While it is not our main 
concern in this essay to deal with Frege's Puzzle or 
with the problem of how to deal with socalled non-
extensional contexts, it turns out that these are 
problems which we cannot fully ignore.  For it is our 
goal to provide an account of knowledge, and since 
believing a proposition is a necessary condition for 
knowing it, it follows that a reasonably full account 
of knowledge must come to terms with what it means to 
say that someone believes a proposition.  (For the 
same reason, a reasonably full acoount of knowledge 
must also com to terms with the concepts of truth and 
justification.  In this essay, however, we shall only 
tacitly assume some kind of minimalist theory of 
truth, and we shall try to be as neutral as possible 
with respect to different theories of justification.) 
 But we are suggesting that DP gives a sufficient 
condition for what it takes for someone to believe 
something, and DP has consequences for how to deal 
with Frege's Puzzle.  And the consequences are such 
that they need to be defended.   
 
We will assume it as uncontroversial that different 
sentences may express the same proposition.  An 
important consequence of DP and the fact that a person 
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S may assent to one sentence s which expresses a 
proposition p and at the same time assent to the 
negation of a sentence s' which also expresses the 
proposition p is then that S may believe both the 
proposition p and its negation.  S may even believe 
the contradictory proposition p and not-p.  Insofar as 
one thinks that this is an unacceptable result, one 
must also think that at least one of the following 
three principles is unacceptable, viz.  DP; the 
principle that different sentences may express the 
same proposition; the principle that propositions are 
the objects of our beliefs.  I take it, like I have 
already stated, as being uncontroversial that 
different sentences may express the same proposition, 
and I will also assume that propositions are the 
objects of our beliefs.  In order to defend principle 
DP, which plays an important role in our analysis, we 
therefore have to defend the possibility of there 
being situations where a subject believes a 
proposition and its negation, since DP, together with 
the truth of the two other principles mentioned, 
virtually entails that there are such situations.   
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Nathan Salmon has, I think, in his book Frege's 
Puzzle37, made a strong case for holding that the 
principle of substitutivity of coreferential terms 
holds in belief contexts, and that there are such 
cases as we have pointed out where a person believes a 
proposition p and its negation because the person is 
disposed to assent to one sentence s which expresses p 
and at the same time to assent to a sentence s' which 
expresses the negation of p.  Salmon also considers a 
situation where S is disposed to assent to one 
sentence s which expresses the proposition p and at 
the same time  expressly witholding judgment with 
respect to the same sentence s, and his analysis of 
the situation gives, I think, a plausible account of 
what is going on.  The reader is referred to his 
discussion.  In the following I will give a brief 
sketch of Salmon's analysis.  I then make some 
refinements of his analysis which make it somewhat 
more transparent why many, in fact most, people have 
had the intuition that we e.g.  cannot infer that S 
believes that Tully is an author from the fact that 
Cicero is Tully and S believes that Cicero is an 
author.  I also want to suggest that my refinements 
                     
37. Nathan Salmon: Frege's Puzzle, MIT Press 1986. 
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make it possible to provide a new solution to the 
problem as to when we can quantify into belief 
contexts, and to account for Donnellan's distinction 
between a referential and an attributive use of 
definite description.  Before suggesting these 
refinements I give some examples which should make it 
clear, I hope, that some analysis along the lines 
suggested by Salmon must be the appropriate kind of 
analysis.  The examples should also provide ample 
evidence for my principle DP.  Principle DP is, as the 
reader should note, stronger than the disquotational 
principle suggested by Kripke. 
 
Salmon suggests the following analysis of the 
proposition that S believes p, where p is a 
proposition: 
 
BS (BSp) = (›x)(S grasps p with x & BEL(S,p,x)) 
 
Salmon makes notes of three ways in which a negation 
sign may alter BS.  We first of all have the situation 
where it is not at all the case that S believes p: 
 
-BS -(BSp) = -(›x)(S grasps p with x & BEL(S,p,x)) 
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We also have the situation where S believes not-p: 
 
BS- (BS-p) = (›x)(S grasps -p with x & BEL(S,-p,x)) 
 
There is also, as Salmon points out, a sense in which 
a person may withhold judgment with respect to a 
proposition p which does not entail that the person 
withholds judgment with respect to p in the sense of 
-BS: 
 
BS (-BSp) = (›x)(S grasps p with x & -BEL(S,p,x)) 
 
In this latter case we shall, following Salmon, say 
that the subject S withholds belief from p.   My use 
of parentheses in order to distinguish between the 
different cases should be self explanatory. 
 
But note that there is in addition a fourth place 
which a negation sign can occupy, for also BS can be 
negated.  In that case we get 
 
-BS -(-BSp) = (œx)(S grasps p with x  e BEL(S,p,x)) 
 
Note that in one kind of circumstance, both -(-BSp) 
and -(-BS-p) can be true.  If they are, it signifies 
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that the subject does not even grasp the proposition 
p.  This is one way in which a person may be said to 
fail to judge whether p which differs from what we 
ordinarily think of as a suspension of judgment.  For 
when we say that a person suspends judgment as to 
whether p is the case we usually think of a situation 
where the subject grasps the proposition p but 
withholds belief from p and also withholds belief from 
-p.  We may e.g. say of a child that it fails to judge 
whether the continuum hypothesis is true simply 
because the continuum hypothesis is beyond the grasp 
of, or at least not in fact grasped by, the child, 
whereas we would say of some mathematicians that they 
suspend judgment as to whether the continuum 
hypothesis is true without thereby implying that they 
don't grasp the continuum hypothesis.  In the first 
case we have a situation where -(-BSp) and -(-BS-p) are 
both true if S denotes the child we are talking about 
and p denotes the continuum hypothesis.  In the second 
case, i.e. if we take S to denote one of the undecided 
mathematicians and p to denote the continuum 
hypothesis, neither -(-BSp) nor -(-BS-p) is true, but 
both (-BSp) and (-BS-p) would be true.   
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It is clearly, I think, the case that BSp implies 
(-BS-p).  For if there is an x such that the subject 
grasps the proposition p with that x and BEL(S,p,x) 
holds, i.e.  S believes p relative to x, then there 
must surely be an x such that S grasps the proposition 
-p with that x and it is not the case that 
BEL(S,-p,x).  This is not so because it must be 
impossible to believe a contradiction.  In fact, I 
don't think that is impossible.  Rather, I think that 
the fact that BSp implies (-BS-p) reflects some kind of 
psychological law. 
 
One should not think that it is an objection to my 
claim in the previous paragraph to point out that we 
may have difficulties with grasping a proposition 
which is expressed by a sentence which begins with a 
long series of "not"'s, such as "It is not the case 
that not not not not not not not not not snow is 
white".  One may plausibly argue against such a point 
as Ramsey does by pointing out that it is an 
accidental feature of our language, whether we talk 
about formal languages or natural ones, that negation 
is expressed by letting a sentence be preceded by a 
negation operator. We could e.g. imagine that the 
negation of a sentence was expressed by reversing it, 
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so that the negation of the sentence "Snow is white" 
would be "Etiwh si nows".  But such is, fortunately 
enough, not the case.  It is, however, more than 
plausible to hold that the proposition expressed by a 
sentence s preceded by two negation operators is 
identical with the proposition expressed by the 
original sentence s.  But it then follows, given our 
disqutational principle DP, that the proposition 
expressed by the sentence "It is not the case that not 
not not not not not not not not snow is white" is 
grasped if one assents to the sentence "Snow is 
white", since one, according to DP, believes the 
proposition that snow is white if one assents to the 
sentence "Snow is white", and because one must grasp 
what one believes. 
 
One might here want to raise something like the 
following as an objection to what I have just argued. 
 The fact remains, it would seem, that there are some 
ways of formulating negations, viz. the ordinary ones, 
which can trick the subject in such a way that he or 
she becomes confused and does assent to a negation of 
a sentence to which the subject has earlier assented. 
 But I do not disagree with that.  What I have stated 
as a principle above is that if a subject does believe 
  
  192 
a proposition in the ordinary sense then the subject 
also withholds belief from the negation of that 
proposition in the ordinary sense.  If we spell out 
the principle that BSp implies (-BS-p) in terms of the 
definitions which I have given above, we see that it 
means the same as to say that the fact that (›x)(S 
grasps p with x & BEL(S,p,x)) implies the fact that 
(›x)(S grasps -p with x & -BEL(S,-p,x)).  But this 
principle does not in any way contradict the 
possibility which was envisaged in the argument which 
we have now just considered.  For it may still be the 
case that (›x)(S grasps -p with x & BEL(S,-p,x)). 
 
We can on the basis of the observations that we have 
made above distinguish between seven distinct 
epistemic attitudes which a subject S may have vis à 
vis a proposition p.  We have (1) the case where the 
proposition p is not even grasped by S and (2) the 
case where S grasps p but, as Nathan Salmon would say, 
actively suspends judgment as to whether p is the 
case.  We also have (3) the situation where S believes 
p and (4) the one where S believes -p, and nothing 
funny is going on.  In addition we have (5) the Kripke 
situations where it is both the case that S believes p 
and that S believes -p.  And we finally have two types 
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of Salmon situations, viz. in the first place when we 
both have (6) that S believes p (BSp) and S withholds 
belief from p when S grasps the proposition in a 
different manner (-BSp) and in the second place when 
(7) the same holds for S relative to -p.  Let me make 
a table which shows how I think that these seven 
distinct epistemic attitudes differ in their truth 
value ascriptions to the four expressions BSp, BS-p, 
(-BSp) and (-BS-p): 
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 BSp BS-p (-BSp) (-BS-p) 
(1) False  False False False 
(2) False False True True 
(3) True False False True 
(4) False True True False 
(5) True True True True 
(6) True False True True 
(7) False True True True 
 
 
It is a pleasant exercise to verify that the following 
two axioms for belief statements allow for exactly the 
seven different epistemic attitudes which I have 
discerned.  By this I mean that the seven distinct 
epistemic attitudes are the only possible ones given 
that the following two axioms are true: 
 
A(1) (BSp) e (-BS-p) 
 
A(2) (BSp) w (BS-p) w ((-BS-p)/(-BSp)) 
 
  
  195 
A(1) may here be understood as saying that if there is 
a way in which S believes p then there is also a way 
in which S disbelieves -p.  A(2) can be understood as 
saying that if there neither is a way in which S 
believes p nor a way in which S believes -p, then it 
is either the case that S actively suspends judgment 
as to whether p is the case or it is the case that S 
fails to judge whether p because S does not even grasp 
the proposition p.  The "or" in the previous sentence 
must be understood in its exclusive sense. 
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Of the seven distinct epistemic attitudes which I have 
discerned, a more orthodox approach would only be able 
to include three, or, at the most, four.  It is, I 
think, a quite serious defect of orthodox approaches 
that they have to conflate (1) and (2).  For, 
intuitively, there is a difference between a subject 
who is actively suspending judgment with respect to a 
proposition that he or she grasps and one who fails to 
judge whether the proposition is true because he or 
she doesn't grasp the proposition.  But since there is 
such a difference, the difference should have to be 
captured in order for an account to be counted as an 
adequate account of belief.  One should also, I think, 
not try to camouflage the peculiarities in the 
situations described by Kripke and Salmon.  The 
situations described are peculiar and different from 
ordinary situations.  The difference between Kripke 
situations and Salmon situations on the one hand and 
ordinary situations on the other hand should therefore 
be captured by an adequate theory.  But orthodox 
theories do not capture this difference, so they are 
not adequate. 
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Let us now try to apply Salmon's analysis to the 
following example.  Suppose S at some point met 
Paderewski while he was performing, so S believes that 
Paderewski is an accomplished musician.  S later gets 
to know about Paderewski as a statesman without 
realizing that he is the same as the man who played 
the piano, and S is not, in this situation, disposed 
to assent to the sentence "Paderewski is an 
accomplished musician" if he takes "Paderewski" to 
refer to the statesman.  In fact, he is disposed to 
assent to the negation of that sentence if he takes 
"Paderewski" to refer to the statesman.  So S is in 
the peculiar situation that he is disposed to assent 
to the sentence "Paderewski is an accomplished 
musician" and at the same time to assent to the 
negation of that sentence.  Salmon would here say that 
S takes the single sentence "Paderewski is an 
accomplished musician" to be two different sentences.38 
 This bars him from thinking of the third relatum of 
the BEL-predicate in the definitions above as some 
function of subjects, times and sentences in the 
general case.39  For in the Paderewski case both the 
                     
38. See Salmon (1986) p. 116. 
39. See Salmom (1986) p. 117. 
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subject and the time and the sentence is the same, 
although the subject erroneously takes what is one 
sentence to be two different sentences.  I think that 
there are additional reasons for not thinking of the 
third relatum as such a function, but I am now 
anticipating some of what I am going to say below.  
The main thing to note at this point is that Salmon 
leaves us with no general account of the third relatum 
of the BEL-predicate in the definitions above.  I will 
in the following try to rectify this by providing at 
least some rough outlines of such an account.   
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Let us, however, first take a look at how a Fregean 
theory would fare when faced with the Paderewski 
example.  What would a Fregean say? He would probably 
say that the single name "Paderewski" is associated by 
S with two different senses.  But the Fregean cannot, 
I think, deny that S believes that Paderewski is a 
musician, nor can he deny that S believes that 
Paderewski is not a musician.  To see this, consider 
two other people T and U.  T was with S at the concert 
where Paderewski performed, and T and S expressly 
agreed and assented to the sentence "Paderewski is an 
accomplished musician".  And T died the next day.  U 
was another friend of S, and U only knew about 
Paderewski as a statesman, and S and U expressly 
agreed and assented to the sentence "Paderewski is not 
an accomplished musician".  But clearly, T believed 
that Paderewski was an accomplished musician and U 
believed that Paderewski was not an accomplished 
musician.  If not, noone can ever have believed that 
Paderewski was an accomplished  musician or that he 
wasn't.  So the Fregean must concede both that T 
believed that Paderewski was an accomplished musician 
and that U believed that Paderewski was not an 
accomplished musician.  But if so, he must also 
concede that S believed that Paderewski was an 
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accomplished musician and that S believed that 
Paderewski was not an accomplished musician.  At least 
the Fregean must concede this insofar as he is willing 
to say that S and T at one time, and S and U at 
another time, believed the same thing.  But we have 
assumed that S and T were in agreement, as were S and 
U at a later time.  So the Fregean should be willing 
to say, in whatever way he can, that S and T at one 
time, and S and U at another time, believed the same 
thing about Paderewski.  And it should then follow 
that S believed that Paderewski was an accomplished 
musician and that S believed that Paderewski was not 
an accomplished musician. 
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All of this goes to show that we should say about S in 
our example that S believes that Paderewski is an 
accomplished musician and that S believes that 
Padereswki is not an accomplished musician.  And the 
Fregean can, insofar as he wants to offer an analysis 
of propositions expressed by sentences like "T 
believes that Paderewski is an accomplished musician", 
not avoid saying that S in our example has two beliefs 
which contradict each other if we, as I think is 
reasonable, say that two contingent propositions are 
contradictories iff it is necessarily the case that 
any fact which makes one of them true (false) will 
make the other false (true).  In particular, the 
Fregean does then not avoid the fact that S believes 
propositions which contradict each other by 
maintaining that a sense1 of "Paderewski" in the true 
proposition expressed by "S believes that Paderewski 
is an accomplished musician" is different from a 
sense2 of "Paderewski" in the true proposition 
expressed by "S believes that Paderewski is not an 
accomplished musician".  For sense1 and sense2 of 
"Paderewski" would in this case determine the same 
referent, viz.  Paderewski, so, necessarily, the fact 
that Paderewski was an accomplished musician makes the 
one proposition which is believed by S true, and the 
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other false, and if it were a fact that Paderewski was 
not an accomplished musician, then that fact would 
make one of the propositions believed by S true and 
the other false.  In short, the two propositions that 
are believed by S contradict each other, and this 
remains so even if one thinks of propositions along 
the lines suggested by Frege.40 
 
                     
40.  Note that my criterion will not make e.g. the 
proposition that the man on the stage is an 
accomplished musician and the proposition that 
Paderewski is not an accomplished musician into 
contradictory propositions even if it is the case that 
Paderewski in fact is the man on the stage.  For the 
fact that Paderewski is an accomplished musician makes 
the proposition that Paderewski is not an accomplished 
musician a false one without making the proposition 
that the man on the stage is an accomplished musician 
a true one.  We need the conjunctive fact that 
Paderewski is an accomplished musician and that 
Paderewski is the man on the stage in order to make 
the proposition that the man on the stage is an 
accomplished musician a true one, but that conjunctive 
fact is not the same as the fact that Paderewski is an 
accomplished musician. 
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Note that although the above argument makes an 
extremely strong case for saying that S in the 
situation described does have contradictory beliefs, 
the argument does not establish that different 
coreferential terms are substitutable salva veritate 
in belief contexts.  A Fregean inspired philosopher 
may concede that there are such odd situations as the 
one described where the subject has contradictory 
beliefs, without thereby giving up his fundamental 
idea that different coreferential names like e.g.  
"Cicero" and "Tully" are not substitutable salva 
veritate in belief contexts.  This may sound like an 
odd position, but it clearly is a possible one.  I 
therefore do not think that the above argument 
suffices to show that different coreferential names 
are substitutable salva veritate in belief contexts, 
and I shall for that reason present arguments which I 
think make a very strong case for holding that such is 
indeed the case. 
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It is natural, but I think in a sense unfortunate, 
that disussions in the field of philosophy of language 
has primarily, if not exclusively, centered around 
lingual creatures and their language and access to 
reality.  This is, I think, somewhat unfortunate 
because we should not forget that we also use our 
language to make reports about nonlingual creatures.  
In particular, we use our language to make reports 
about the inner states of animals and young children. 
 We may e.g.  say of an animal that it is in pain.  
And it is obvious, or at least it should be, that we 
can sometimes truly ascribe belief states to animals. 
 Even Quine, who is a sententialist, would concede 
that much.   
 
  
  205 
Let me try to bring out the relevance of all this by 
providing the following example.  Imagine that we were 
in a position to observe the behaviour of one of 
Cicero's dogs, assuming he had some.  Since we don't 
know the names of any of his dogs, we might as well 
call this one "Fido".  We observe Fido throughout some 
time and make notes of his habits.  In particular we 
make note of the fact that Fido salivates when Cicero 
is preparing food for him.  In these situations we may 
obviously say that Fido believes that it is going to 
be fed by Cicero.  But insofar as we may say that, we 
may also say that Fido believes that it is going to be 
fed by Tully.  So we clearly have that coreferential 
names are substitutable salva veritate in the belief 
contexts of nonlingual creatures, and in particular in 
the case of Fido.  And note that this is not something 
which holds because Fido knows that the names "Cicero" 
and "Tully" are coreferential or because Fido knows a 
Fregean identity proposition to the effect that Cicero 
is Tully.  The dog may have no beliefs whatsoever 
concerning the names "Cicero" and "Tully", and it 
would therefore make no sense to talk about the dog's 
Fregean senses of "Tully" and "Cicero".  But it does 
make sense to say that Fido believes that Cicero will 
feed it, as well as to say that Fido believes that 
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Tully will feed it.  If I am right, it follows, and at 
this point maybe uncontroversially, that it must be 
wrong to assume that the fact that a name lacks a 
sense for an individual should have as a consequence 
that the name cannot figure within the scope of the 
belief operator of a sentence which ascribes a belief 
to the individual. 
 
I take the above argument to provide very strong 
evidence for the view that coreferential names are 
substitutable in belief contexts.  There is at least 
one type of objection that a Fregean may raise.  One 
may say that the dog doesn't believe that it will be 
fed by Cicero.  This would either be extremely 
anthropocentric and implausible to say, or it would 
have to rely upon the distinction between de re and de 
dicto beliefs.  Maybe a Fregean would claim that a 
nonlingual being only has objectual beliefs.  It would 
therefore strictly speaking be false to say, de dicto, 
that Fido believes that Cicero will feed it.  Fido, so 
one may claim, only has the de re belief of Cicero to 
the effect that he will feed it.   
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There are two reasons why I would not be impressed 
with such a reply.  Firstly, I am convinced that de re 
beliefs are reducible to de dicto beliefs.  This is 
something for which I will argue below.  Secondly, an 
even stronger case for the view that coreferential 
names are substitutable can, I think, be made on the 
basis of beliefs which we ascribe to human beings.  I 
will first try to make this stronger case, and then 
try to show how de re beliefs are reducible to de 
dicto beliefs and that they are so reducible even in 
the case of nonlingual beings. 
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I do not know much about Cicero's personal history, 
but let us suppose that he was bald and that he had a 
son whom we call "Antonio".  When Antonio was less 
than one year's old, Cicero was already bald.  Cicero, 
so we assume, was a compassionate father who spent 
much time with Antonio, and Antonio loved to stroke 
Cicero's bald head.  And Antonio had not yet learned 
to speak and was not yet familiar with the use of 
proper names.  In particular then, he did not know 
that "Cicero" or "Tully" are names of Cicero.  But it 
would be quite implausible to say, I think, that 
Antonio did not believe that Cicero was bald.  
Clearly, Antonio must have had a variety of beliefs, 
and I do not see any reasons why we should not say 
that Antonio believed that Cicero was bald.  Granted, 
Antonio may not have had a very sophisticated concept 
of baldness, but then again, most people don't.  And 
the concept of baldness is not essential to my 
example.  One may, however, if one thinks there is a 
problem here, e.g. want to replace "bald" with "kind", 
or whatever.  In the following I shall pretend that 
there is no problem, but if one disagrees, I suggest 
that one replace "bald" with some word which one finds 
less problematic. 
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Let me be granted, then, at least for the sake of 
argument, that Antonio believed that Cicero was bald. 
 But clearly, if such was the case, Antonio also 
believed that Tully was bald.  And, as was the case in 
our example with Fido, the substitution which we are 
allowed to make within this belief context does not 
rely upon any fact such as that Antonio knows that 
"Cicero" and "Tully" are coreferential names, or that 
Antonio knows a Fregean proposition to the effect that 
Cicero is Tully.  For Antonio was not at this stage 
even aware of the names "Cicero" and "Tully". 
 
So far our example does not differ much from our 
previous example with Fido and Cicero.  But let us 
consider a new stage in Antonio's development.  
Antonio had now learned how to speak, and he was quite 
familiar with the uses of the name "Cicero" in order 
to refer to his father.  But Cicero had kept it a 
secret that he had used "Tully" as a pseudonym, and 
Antonio was not yet let in on this secret. 
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It was agreed above that Antonio, before he learned 
latin, did believe that Cicero was bald and that he 
believed that Tully was bald.  Do we have any good 
reasons to hold that Antonio now did no longer believe 
that Tully was bald but did believe that Cicero was 
bald? I shall think not.  Insofar as we admit that 
Antonio did believe that Tully was bald before Antonio 
learned a language, we must also admit that Antonio 
now that he did speak Latin still believed that Tully 
was bald.  We have no good reasons at all to think 
that Antonio ever stopped believing that Tully was 
bald.  On the contrary, it would, it seems, be 
patently absurd to propound the view that Antonio lost 
any knowledge that he had concerning Tully just 
because he learned how to speak Latin and to use the 
name "Cicero".41 
 
                     
41.  At this point confer Kripke's similar argument, 
given in connection with his example with Pierre who 
moves to London, in "A Puzzle about Belief", in 
Meaning and Use, A. Margalit (ed.), (D.Reidel), p. 
239-83.  
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But Antonio, after he learned latin, was in a 
situation which is not in any relevant respects 
different from that of a modern day schoolgirl who has 
learned about Cicero and believes that Cicero is an 
author but never learned that "Tully" refers to 
Cicero.  If we accept the substitution of "Tully" and 
"Cicero" in one of these belief contexts, we should 
also accept the substitution in the other belief 
context.  All of this, then, goes to show that 
coreferential names, contrary to what the tradition 
has held, indeed are substitutable in belief contexts. 
  
 
We will now, partly in order to make the above result 
more palatable to the skeptical reader, discuss the 
nature of the third relatum in Salmon's BEL-predicate. 
 Clearly, since it is the case that also non-lingual 
beings have beliefs, it cannot be the case that the 
third relatum is some sort of function from times, 
sentences and subjects.  Neither the dog Fido nor the 
young Antonio grasps any proposition by means of 
sentences.   
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How, then, can we provide a general account of the 
third relatum? Let us think about what is going on in 
the simple case when Antonio grasps the proposition 
that Cicero is bald, where we think of that 
proposition as being identical with the ordered 
triple42 <λΦλu.Φu, baldness, Cicero>, and let us assume 
that the time at which this occurs is held constant.  
I shall suggest that what is going on is that Antonio 
somehow manages to pick out Cicero by means of a 
referential device α relative to one of Antonio's 
mental states m.  Let us abbreviate this as 
R(Antonio,α,m,Cicero).  α may be some mental picture 
or element of an internal language, whereas m is maybe 
most useful to think of as a dispositional state of 
Antonio's mind.  Similarly, I shall suggest that 
Antonio is somehow able to pick out the property 
baldness by means of some kind of referential or 
expressional43 device δ relative to a mental state m', 
or short R(Antonio,δ,m',baldness).   
                     
42.  We are following Alonzo Church's suggestions for 
modelling propositions with proposition surrogates.  
See his Intensionality and the Paradox of the Name 
Relation in Joseph Almog (et. al.) Themes from Kaplan, 
O.U.P. 1989, p. 151-165. 
43. We shall ignore the question as to whether we 
refer to properties or express them, or both. 
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It is reasonable to assume that there is a very 
intimate connection between the second and the third 
argument of the R-predicate which I have introduced, 
i.e.  between the mental disposition and the 
referential or expressional device, and I think the 
following principle which we stipulate captures this 
intimacy: 
 
(œS)(œα)(œβ)(œm)(α…βe((›x)R(S,α,m,x)e 
-(›x)R(S,β,m,x))) 
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This principle, which we may call our Principle of 
Intimacy, or PI, simply suggests that each one of a 
subjects mental states or dispositions can be paired 
at most with one referential device such that the R-
predicate holds of the subject, the referential 
device, the mental state and some object or property 
which is being picked out by the subject with the 
referential device relative to that mental state.  The 
referential devices which a subject has can, on the 
other hand, be paired with more than one of his or her 
mental states or dispositions, where the R-predicate 
holds of the subject, the referential device, the 
mental state and the referent.  This was e.g. the case 
in the example above where the subject S picked out 
Paderewski with "Padwerewski" relative to two 
different mental states.  The mental states of a 
subject, then, can, given PI, be thought of as being 
more fine grained than the refererential devices which 
are at the subjects disposal. 
 
By means of our technical vocabulary, we can now state 
what we take to be the analysis of the proposition 
that Antonio believes that Cicero is bald.  We have: 
 
Antonio believes that Cicero is bald =Df 
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(›α)(›β)(›m)(›m')[R(Antonio,α,m,Cicero) & 
R(Antonio,δ,m',baldness) & 
BEL(Antonio,<λΦλu.Φu, baldness, 
Cicero>,<m,m'>)] 
 
Note that, given our story about Antonio, the first of 
the two following existential instantiations of the 
definiendum above is true whereas the second is false: 
 
I1(›β)(›m)(›m')[R(Antonio,"Cicero",m,Cicero) & 
R(Antonio,δ,m',baldness) & 
BEL(Antonio,<λΦλu.Φu, baldness, 
Cicero>,<m,m'>)] 
 
I2(›β)(›m)(›m')[R(Antonio,"Tullius",m,Cicero) & 
R(Antonio,δ,m',baldness) & 
BEL(Antonio,<λΦλu.Φu, baldness, 
Cicero>,<m,m'>)] 
 
The fact that I1 is true and I2 is false might lead 
some to think that something like I1 would be the 
proper analysis of the proposition that Antonio 
believes that Cicero is bald.  But we should resist 
such suggestions.  There are at least two reasons for 
that.  Firstly, such a metalinguistic approach would 
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fail because of Alonzo Church's translation argument44. 
 Secondly, we would, if such a view were to be 
adopted, not be able to ascribe beliefs to nonlingual 
beings like Fido and the young Antonio.  But I regard 
it as being extremely implausible to say that animals 
and young children don't have beliefs.   
 
The truth of I1 and falsity of I2 does, however, I 
think, to a certain extent make it understandable that 
people have had the intuition that coreferential names 
are not substitutable in belief contexts.  But we have 
seen that there is very strong evidence for holding 
that this traditional view is false. 
 
Because of PI, there should be no danger in letting 
the third argument of the BEL-predicate consist of the 
ordered pair <m,m'>, for the mental states are, as we 
have seen, more fine grained than the referential 
devices available to a person.  In the case of more 
complex propositions, the third argument will be an n-
tuple of mental states, where n>2.  It is useful and 
appropriate to think of the third argument of the BEL-
                     
44.See Alonzo Church, On Carnap's Analysis of 
Statements of Assertion and Belief. Analysis, 
10, 5, 97-99. 
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predicate as signifying how the subject believes the 
proposition which is the second argument of the BEL-
predicate.  In some discussions about the explanatory 
force which a person's beliefs may have, e.g.  in 
explaining the person's behaviour, one should, ideally 
speaking, not only consider what a person believes but 
also how the person believes what he or she believes. 
 Needless to say, but it will in general be quite 
difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to describe 
how a person believes a proposition.  This would, 
however, it seems, be a problem for the philosophy of 
mind, and it is a problem with which we shall not be 
concerned in this essay. 
 
We can on the basis of our present analysis also draw 
Donnellan's distinction between the attributive and 
the referential use of definite descriptions.  If e.g. 
 Smith while in mental state m uses the definite 
description "The man who murdered Jones" referentially 
in the sentence "The man who murdered Jones is mad", 
then the definite description functions in much the 
same way as a name, viz. as a second argument of the 
R-predicate.  We assume that Smith believes the 
proposition which he expresses by using the sentence 
"The man who murdered Jones is mad", where the 
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definite description is used referentially.  Let us 
also assume that Smith refers to Anderson, who is the 
innocent man who is charged with the murder of Jones, 
with his referential use of the definite description. 
 We then have: 
 
RBB 
(›m,m')[R(Smith,"The man who murdered 
Jones",m,Anderson) v R(Smith,"mad",m,madness) v 
BEL(Smith,<λΦλu.Φu, madness, Anderson>,<m,m'>)] 
 
Note that the belief which RBB ascribes to Smith may 
be true even if it is not the case that Anderson, the 
man who  Smith refers to, murdered Jones.  For Smith 
may say something true about the innocent man who is 
being prosecuted for the murder of Jones.   
 
Note that RBB is not a very natural analysis of the 
proposition that Smith believes that the murderer of 
Jones is mad, rather, it more naturally analyses the 
proposition that Smith believes of Anderson that he is 
mad.  This is so because we, knowing, by virtue of our 
construction of the example, that Anderson didn't 
commit the murder, would be unwilling to use "The 
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murderer of Jones" referentially in order to pick out 
Anderson.   
 
Suppose the definite description "The murderer of 
Jones" is being used attributively by Smith as Smith 
uses the sentence "The murderer of Jones is mad", i.e. 
as a statement about the man, whoever he may be, who 
murdered Jones. The proposition that Smith believes 
that the murderer of Jones is mad is then to be 
analysed as follows, where we let "S" be short for 
"Smith" and "M" be short for "is the murderer of", "I" 
be short for "is mad", "j" be short for "Jones" and we 
use "T" to denote the definite description function: 
 
ABB 
(›m,m',m'',m''')[R(S,"the",m,T) v R(S,"murderer 
of",m',λxy(Mxy)) v (R(S,"Jones",m'',Jones) v 
R(Smith,"mad",m''',λx(Ix)) v 
BEL(S,<λΦλΧλΨλu.Φ(Χ(λxΨxu)),I,T,M,j>,<m,m',m'',m'''>)] 
 
Note that the man who murdered Jones is not an 
argument of the R-predicate in ABB, nor is he, 
assuming the murderer was a man, an element in the 
proposition which is believed, i.e. in the second 
argument of the BEL-predicate.  This is a very 
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important point in connection with the problems we 
have had with making sense of the relational sense of 
believing something.  The fact that the man who 
murdered Jones is not an argument of the R-predicate 
in ABB may be a consequence of the fact that the man 
who murdered Jones, i.e. the value of the T-function 
as applied to the property of being a murderer of 
Jones, may be outside the subject's area of 
acquaintaince (Cfr.  Russel).  The main thing to note 
is that we cannot on the basis of ABB existentially 
generalize on an individual in such a way that we get 
the result that there is someone who Smith believes is 
mad.   
 
The same cannot, or so I claim, be the case in RBB.  
For the R-predicate cannot hold unless the subject 
succeeds in referring to an object with the second 
argument of the R-predicate, and that presupposes that 
the object in some nontrivial sense is within the 
subjects area of acquaintaince.  My claim, then, is 
that a de dicto belief is a de re belief just in case 
we can existentially generalize as we can in RBB.  A 
person S must be in a position to refer to an 
individual I in order for S to have a de re belief 
about the individual I.  And in the case of definite 
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descriptions my claim is that it is only the 
referential use of definite descriptions which 
succeeds in referring to the descriptum in such a way 
that a singular proposition is expressed, and 
consequently in such a way that the person who uses 
that description may be said to have a de re belief 
about the descriptum.  It is for this reason that we 
cannot infer that there is someone whom Ralph believes 
to be a spy from the fact that Ralph believes that the 
shortest spy is a spy.  For it would, presumably, only 
be when the description "The shortest spy" were to be 
used attributively that Ralph would assent to the 
sentence "The shortest spy is a spy".   
 
Note that our present criterion for identifying de re 
beliefs would also classify the beliefs of nonlingual 
beings as de re if, and only if, we can existentially 
generalize as in RBB.  In the case of nonlingual 
beings the second arguments of the BEL-predicate will 
of course be nonlinguistic referential devices, such 
as mental pictures or elements of an internal mental 
language.  It may therefore be, and probably is, the 
case that Fido believes of Cicero that Cicero will 
feed it, but only if it is also the case that Fido 
believes that Cicero will feed it.  If I am right, one 
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cannot argue against my use of the examples above by 
saying that nonlingual beings only have de re beliefs, 
for what I have argued is that the set of de re 
beliefs which a subject has is a subset of the set of 
de dicto beliefs which that subject has.  If this is 
right, it may still be the case that nonlingual beings 
only have de re beliefs, but not in such a way that it 
e.g. in our example with Fido would be false to say 
that Fido believes, de dicto, that Cicero will feed 
it.  The de re beliefs are also de dicto beliefs, and 
we should not be seduced by the etymologi of "de 
dicto" into believing that nonlingual creatures can 
have no de dicto beliefs. 
 
Note that a metaphysical consequence, or maybe rather 
a metaphysical presupposition, of our discussion has 
been that thinking is prior to language in the sense 
that thinking can occur without any use of language, 
whereas no use of language can occur without thinking. 
 For to believe something is to think, so if 
nonlingual beings may have beliefs, it follows that 
nonlingual beings may think.  So it follows that 
thinking can occur without any use of language.  That 
no use of language can occur without thinking should 
be pretty obvious, and I am here naturally assuming 
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that computers don't use a language.45  It seems, 
however, that it is less obvious to many people that 
thinking can occur without the use of language.  I am 
puzzled by such a reluctance to admit what ought to be 
obvious.  For how else can we understand the 
ontogenesis and fylogenesis of language?  The view 
that no thinking can occur without the use of language 
leaves the origin of language a complete mystery, and 
would, it seems, ultimately have to appeal to some 
kind of divine intervention. 
 
We should at this point assess the epistemological 
relevance of our discussion in this chapter.  If our 
analysis is rigth, it clearly follows that the 
converse of our principle DP is false.  For we have 
argued that Fido believed that Cicero was going to 
feed it, and that the young Antonio believed that 
Cicero is bald.  But clearly, neither Fido nor the 
young Antonio were disposed to assent to any sentence 
s which expressed the proposition of their belief, 
although both Antonio and Fido must have had some 
                     
45.  Insofar as we want to say that the language-like 
sounds made by a parrot are not expressions for 
something which the parrot thinks, we would not want 
to say that the parrot has a language. 
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internal representation which made it possible for 
them to grasp the propositions which they believed. 
 
But since Fido was in a position where he believed 
that Cicero was going to feed it without being in a 
position where he would assent to a sentence s which 
expressed the proposition that Cicero was going to 
feed it, there should be no problem in assuming that 
principle DP must be true.  For since it is the case 
that a nonlingual being can believe a proposition p 
without being in a position to assent to any sentence 
s which expresses p, it must also be the case that a 
lingual being is in a position where he or she 
believes a proposition p if it is the case that he or 
she assents to any sentence s which expresses the 
proposition p.  And we have seen that the somewhat 
controversial consequences which principle DP has are 
indeed defensible ones. 
 
Principle DP is important to our analysis of knowledge 
because, if true, it refutes the idea that a fluent 
monolingual English speaking subject believes that P 
if, and only if, he or she assents to "P".  Here P 
stands for any sentence, so that we e.g.  would have: 
S believes that snow is white if, and only if, S 
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assents to "Snow is white".  Given DP, such a 
quotational/disquotational principle must be false, 
even in the case of a monolingual fluent English 
speaking subject.   
 
The importance of all this is that we, given principle 
DP, will find that it should on many occassions be 
less controversial to ascribe beliefs to subjects.  
And we may even in many situation be in a position to 
ascribe a belief in a proposition p to a subject S 
even though S fails to assent to a sentence s which 
expresses p, or even though S may assent to the 
negation of s, as long as it seems to be the case that 
S would assent to some other sentence s' which also 
expresses the proposition p.  This fact will be useful 
throughout this essay, as the analysis, and in 
particular the technique I use to get around the 
Gettier type difficulties, to a large extent depends 
upon us being able to ascribe beliefs to the epistemic 
subject. 
